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I
INTRODUCTION
Criticism of health care in the United States usually focuses first and
foremost on the millions of Americans who lack health insurance of any kind.
But the uninsured are not the only Americans whose welfare should concern
policymakers. Because of the way private health services are financed on the
one hand and dispensed on the other, the U.S. health care system burdens
lower- and middle-income premium payers for the benefit of providers and
high-income consumers. In this article, we seek to show the nature—and to
suggest the cumulative magnitude—of the many regressive tendencies of the
financing, regulatory, and legal regime governing the private side of U.S. health
care.1 Parts II and III chart some of the numerous pathways through which too

1. Although we focus on the private sector in this article, there are important distributive justice
issues on the public side as well. To be sure, progressive redistribution appears in many programs of
public subsidies and financing—the Medicaid program in particular. But many aspects of Medicare are
not so progressive. Thus, less than a third of Medicare’s funding in 2004 came from general revenues
raised through progressive taxation. See SOC. SECURITY & MEDICARE BD. OF TRS., STATUS OF THE
SOCIAL SECURITY AND MEDICARE PROGRAMS: A SUMMARY OF THE 2005 ANNUAL REPORTS (2005)
http://www.socialsecurity.gov/OACT/TRSUM/trsummary.html (showing breakdown of 2004 income of
the Hospital Insurance and Supplementary Medical Insurance trust funds). A much larger share (fiftyfour percent) was yielded by a 2.9% flat tax on the wages, salaries, and self-employment income of
current workers—a tax that, because it applies only to earned income, is less equitable than a true flat
tax. See also infra note 48. Moreover, if one views Medicare only as a pay-as-you-go program, this tax
appears to be an enormous intergenerational transfer, taking large amounts from today’s workforce to
provide health services for today’s retirees. If Medicare is viewed as social insurance, however, the
unfairness is less clear because, up to now at least, each generation has gotten substantially more out of
the program than it has put in. See Mark McClellan & Jonathan Skinner, The Incidence of Medicare, 90
J. PUB. ECON. 257 (2006). Nevertheless, it is unlikely that this pattern will continue. It depends, after
all, not only on continuing upward trends in both health care costs and life expectancy but also on the
willingness of the next generation of workers to pay the taxes needed to support the elderly population
in the same generous way. There are good reasons, it would seem, to question the fairness of
Medicare’s payroll tax to today’s workers.
Medicare’s intragenerational fairness can also be questioned—and is actively in dispute. It is at
least an open question, it appears, whether, having made larger payments into the program, higherincome individuals may enjoy more than proportionately greater benefits from it. This could happen
because higher-income individuals both live longer under the program and make more intensive use of
its nominally equal entitlements. (We examine the latter matter at length infra notes 121–127 and
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much money flows or appears to flow from the pockets of the less-than-affluent
to the benefit of elite interests. Part IV observes how the legal and regulatory
environment of U.S. health care has been structured according to the
perceptions and preferences of these same elites, thus raising costs for everyone
who seeks health coverage; because the marginal benefits of more and better
health care are, of necessity, valued less by people with lower incomes and
other unmet needs,2 significant social-justice issues are raised by the American
legal system’s many ways of making families of modest means, if they want
health coverage, pay for especially costly versions of it.
Our explicit concern in writing this article is that, for whatever reasons, the
health care system’s systematic exploitation of the many for the benefit of the
privileged few has been either overlooked, underestimated, or conveniently
ignored by analysts and policymakers. We will also suggest, however, that the
regressive tendencies we observe are no accident, but result from a combination
of ideology and the political economy of health care. Specifically, we see a
seemingly well-meant but essentially destructive policy bias—assiduously
cultivated by the health care industry and shared by many commentators and
policy analysts—in favor of more and better health care for all with only
nominal regard for how much it costs or who bears the burden.3 Because
accompanying text). For the latest (conflicting) findings on whether Medicare, taken as a whole, is a
regressive or progressive program, compare McClellan & Skinner, supra (using average incomes within
zip codes as proxies for beneficiaries’ incomes and finding net wealth transfers from lower- to higherincome beneficiaries), with Jay Bhattacharya & Darius Lakdawalla, Does Medicare Benefit the Poor?,
90 J. PUB. ECON. 277 (2006) (using educational attainment as a proxy for income and finding net
transfers from higher- to lower-income beneficiaries).
In view of this mixed record of distributive justice, one might wonder why Medicare is so rarely
criticized by those concerned about the welfare of lower-income Americans. But see Jonathan Skinner
& John E. Wennberg, Exceptionalism or Extravagance: What’s Different About Health Care in South
Florida?, 2003 HEALTH AFF. (WEB EXCLUSIVES) W3-372, W3-374 (“On equity grounds, we have
problems with the idea of single working mothers in Nebraska (often themselves lacking health
insurance) footing the bill for gold-plated health care provided to high-income Medicare enrollees in
Miami.”).
2. For a fuller discussion of the income elasticity of demand for health services and its significance
for our thesis, see infra note 101 and text accompanying note 209.
3. A good example of this pervasive bias can be found in the stated primary mission of the $9
billion Robert Wood Johnson Foundation (RWJF): “To improve the health and health care of all
Americans.” RWJF ANN. REP. 2004, at 1 (2004). The Foundation’s ambivalent attitude toward cost as
a relevant consideration in its grant making has recently been documented—notably, in a publication
sponsored by the Foundation itself. Carolyn Newbergh, The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation’s
Efforts to Contain Health Care Costs, in TO IMPROVE HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE, VOLUME VII:
THE ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUNDATION ANTHOLOGY 57–80 (2004). Although the Foundation
has not entirely ignored cost in its activities, it was only in 1998, twenty-six years after its founding, that
it recognized cost considerations at all in its mission statement—as one of four subsidiary goals: “To
assure that all Americans have access to basic health care at reasonable cost.” Id. at 64. In 2003, it
substituted the word quality for basic, indicating that the objective of more and better health care still
dominates. See id. at 80 n.2. Not only is the notion that costs must be subjectively “reasonable” little
more than lip service to an obvious public concern, but, whenever the Foundation has acknowledged
high costs as a problem, it has mostly seen them only as an obstacle to achieving its main mission, not as
a possibly unwarranted burden on those who pay them. See, e.g., Goals Update, in RWJF ANN. REP.
1996, at 141 (1997) (“[C]ontrolling costs was clearly an essential prerequisite for our other goals . . .”).
Newbergh describes how Steven Schroeder, M.D., RWJF’s president from 1990 to 2002, downgraded
interest in cost to a “half goal.” Newbergh, supra, at 63. Finally, it is significant that most of the
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unwillingness to view health care as an economic good accords so well with
illusions about health care in the public mind, it has been easy for industry and
other interests to manipulate people’s thinking about health care issues, both as
consumers and as voters. In particular, we emphasize how policies effectively
hiding the true cost of health coverage from the consumer-voters who
ultimately bear them4 enable elite interests to have their way in the political
process, thereby maintaining a system that is rigged against the true interests of
the political majority.5 Contrary to the assumptions of many observers,
ordinary Americans are not well served by health policies and practices
founded on the premise that health care should be beyond price.
We hope, at least, that this article’s demonstration of serious and systematic
unfairness in the American way of financing, regulating, and dispensing health
care will stimulate further research on distributional issues, including the scope,
existence, and quantitative significance of the numerous specific injustices we
have tried to identify.6 But we believe that, even without precisely quantifying

Foundation’s activities relating to cost containment that Newbergh describes involved sponsoring
community, governmental, or industry-wide cooperative initiatives (for example, an RWJF program
focused on Medicaid managed care, its “Community Programs for Affordable Health Care,” and its
“Physician-Directed Program to Improve Medical Care Services and Control Costs”) rather than
promoting ways of making costs and quality negotiable in the marketplace. See id. at 62.
4. Crucial to our claim that premium payers are overburdened is the proposition, stoutly
defended by most economists, that, even though employers purchase most health coverage, its cost is
ultimately borne virtually in full by employees, principally in the form of reduced wages. Logically,
employers are primarily concerned about a worker’s total compensation and are largely indifferent
about the forms in which that compensation is paid. Empirical studies support the economists’
prediction. See generally Jonathan Gruber, Health Insurance and the Labor Market 55 (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6762, 1998) (reviewing the empirical literature and concluding that
“the results that attempt to control for worker selection, firm selection, or (ideally) both, have
produced a fairly uniform result: the costs of health insurance are fully shifted to wages”). Individual
studies have found that real wages fall after government-mandated increases in the cost of insurance
and when health costs rise, especially for high-consumption groups. See Jonathan Gruber & Alan B.
Krueger, The Incidence of Mandated Employer-Provided Insurance: Lessons from Workers’
Compensation Insurance 1 (Princeton Univ. Indus. Relations Section, Working Paper No. 279, 1990)
(finding that areas and industries with high workers-compensation costs led to a corresponding
reduction in wages); Jonathan Gruber, The Incidence of Mandated Maternity Benefits, 84 AM. ECON.
REV. 622 (1994) (finding that the mandated expansion of health insurance coverage in the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act of 1978 led to reduced wages); Louise Sheiner, Health Care Costs, Wages, and
Aging (Apr. 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Fed. Reserve Bd. of Governors), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/1999/199919/199919pap.pdf (finding relatively lower wages for
older workers and workers with family coverage in areas with high medical prices).
5. See, e.g., Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., Wanna Fix Health Care? Stop Hiding the Cost!, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 13, 2004, at A17.
6. The only extensive overall examination of distributional issues that we have found is a 1992
study, John Holahan & Sheila Zedlewski, Who Pays for Health Care in the United States? Implications
for Health System Reform, 29 INQUIRY 231 (1992). Undertaken to inform efforts at major health
reform, that study was mostly concerned with showing how the overall burden of paying for health care
was then distributed among income classes in order to provide a baseline for evaluating any new plan
or proposal. To be sure, that study found that “the distribution of the financing burden is regressive.”
Id. at 244. But, as Christopher Conover shows in this volume, this characterization is not helpful or
accurate for present purposes because it depends upon an artificial and unrealistic definition of
regressivity—in terms of the proportion of income that a given class spends on health care in general,
including its own, rather than only the proportion that is diverted to essentially public purposes or to
meeting regulatory requirements. Christopher J. Conover, Distributional Considerations in the
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the cumulative extent of regressivity in U.S. medical care, we have shown
enough actual and probable unfairness to the sub-affluent majority to suggest
the desirability of shifting definitively to a health care system in which “you get
what you pay for,” no less as well as no more, but also in which substantial
public subsidies funded by progressive taxation ensure that inability or
unwillingness to pay plays only a marginal role—a crucially important marginal
role, to be sure—in allocating resources to health care. Of course, others might
reasonably view the same injustices as pointing in the direction of less reliance
on markets and more direct government intervention. In any event, in a time of
justifiable concern about widening income disparities in American society,7 it is
important to recognize that the health care sector offers a unique opportunity
for society to mitigate a very large inequity—and, in so doing, to put the
nation’s resources to more appropriate uses, thereby enhancing aggregate
welfare, productivity, and competitiveness rather than diminishing them as
other redistributive measures are often thought to do.
II
OVERSPENDING ON HEALTH CARE—WHO PAYS? WHO BENEFITS?
There are numerous reasons to believe that the United States spends too
much of its considerable wealth on health care. A comparison with other
developed nations, for example, suggests that excessive spending on health care
in the United States amounts to several whole percentage points of gross
domestic product (GDP)—possibly more than half a trillion dollars each year.8
Overregulation of Health Professionals, Health Facilities, and Health Plans, 69 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 181, 183 (Autumn 2006). Moreover, the method employed by Holahan and Zedlewski in
identifying cost burdens—estimating the average burden borne by individuals in each income decile—
did not reveal the particular burden borne by lower- and middle-income premium payers to which we
call attention in this article. Indeed, because each higher decile almost certainly included a greater
number of persons having health coverage, the average cost calculated for each decile effectively
obscured differences in the burdens borne by insured and uninsured individuals, both within each
decile and across the board. Thus, whereas Holahan and Zedlewski’s data inadvertently made it
appear that individuals in each higher income decile bore higher insurance costs than those with lower
incomes, we hold it unlikely that insurance costs for those actually having insurance vary greatly
according to income.
7. From the late 1980s to the late 1990s, the share of aggregate personal income received by the
middle fifth of the population fell from 17.2% to 16.2%, while the income of the top fifth increased
from 42.1% to 45.4%. JARED BERNSTEIN ET AL., PULLING APART: A STATE-BY-STATE ANALYSIS
OF INCOME TRENDS xi (2000). The poorest quintile likewise fell further behind the high earners.
Thus, incomes at the twentieth percentile were 16.8% of incomes at the ninetieth percentile in 1989 and
15.9% of such incomes ($18,556 versus $116,472) ten years later. CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL.,
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME IN THE UNITED STATES: 2002 26, available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/p60-221.pdf.
8. See generally Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Health
Data, chart 4-5 (June 5, 2005), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/35/13/34966969.pdf. In 2003, when health
spending in the United States represented 15% of GDP, no other nation spent more than
(Switzerland’s) 11.5% of its GDP on health care in that year, and the median level of expenditure
among all thirty OECD nations was 8.6% of GDP. If Switzerland’s 11.5% of GDP devoted to health
care is converted into “purchasing power parity international dollars” (PPP$), the OECD data can be
read to show that Switzerland in fact spent only 67% as much per capita on health care in 2003 as the
United States ($3,781 versus $5,635). See Uwe E. Reinhardt et al., U.S. Health Care Spending in an
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In this Part II we ask who benefits most, in their own terms, from this
extraordinarily high level of spending and show that it is not just the economy
in general that is overburdened but also, disproportionately, ordinary working
Americans. Even if we have overstated the annual amount of misspent dollars
by a hundred billion or so, it would still be a very heavy cost to impose
unnecessarily on working families that are finding it increasingly difficult to pay
energy bills, to raise and educate their children, and to save for an uncertain
retirement. To be sure, excess spending yields some offsetting benefits in the
form of improved health status, reassurance, and security. But paying for some
of those benefits might be seen as an extravagance by those with pressing needs
of other kinds. Moreover, only a fraction of the health care premiums paid by
insured working Americans goes to defray the costs of their own health care.
Instead, as we will show, much of the money they contribute as premiums is
spent on services for persons other than themselves.9
Health care costs in the United States were projected to reach $2.16 trillion
in 2006 approximately $7100 per capita and 16.5 percent of GDP.10 The annual
premium for an average family’s health coverage reached $10,880 in 2005,
equivalent to nearly 19 percent of the median household’s income.11 While
burdensome to all but the most affluent families, this level of spending can be
deemed excessive, in policy terms, only if either (1) the prices paid to providers
and suppliers are too high—that is, significantly in excess of competitive
prices—or (2) patients regularly receive services or products of such little
benefit that the human and capital resources expended could have been better
employed in providing other goods or services. In fact, U.S. health care appears
to present both of these problems: both supracompetitive prices and
inefficiently high levels of consumption, particularly in the intensity of care
delivered.12 Thus, there is reason for concern not only about the excessive cost
International Context, HEALTH AFF., May–June 2004, at 10 (using this methodology to derive similar
estimates). Treating as “excessive” all U.S. health spending over this percentage provides a basis of
sorts for the eye-catching number suggested in the text as a possible measure of the magnitude of U.S.
overspending. The extreme outlier status of the United States also appears from a comparison of its
2003 health spending of 5,635 PPP$ per capita with median per capita spending of 2,161 PPP$ among all
OECD nations. See id. To be sure, the income-elasticity of demand for health care is such that richer
nations naturally spend higher percentages of their national income on it. See infra note 101. But this
article shows not only that the level of spending in the U.S. results from a unique combination of
dysfunctional markets and misguided public policies but also that it is working-class Americans, and not
the affluent, whose money is being spent excessively on health care—without anything resembling their
informed consent.
9. In addition, working Americans bear much of the cost of the largely pay-as-you-go Medicare
program through a payroll tax of questionable fairness. See supra note 1.
10. Christine Borger et al., Health Spending Projections Through 2015: Changes on the Horizon,
2006 HEALTH AFF. (WEB EXCLUSIVES) W61, W62 exh. 1.
11. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION & HEALTH RESEARCH AND EDUCATIONAL TRUST,
EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS: 2005 ANNUAL SURVEY 16 (2005) (estimating the average annual
premium for family health insurance coverage in 2005 as $10,880); U.S. DEP’T HOUS. & URBAN DEV.,
NOTICE PDR-2005-01 (2005) (estimating median family income in 2005 as $58,000).
12. Wasteful spending might also take the form of excessive administrative costs, which many think
they see in the U.S. private sector. See, e.g., David U. Himmelstein, Steffie Woolhandler & Sidney M.
Woolf, Administrative Waste in the U.S. Health Care System in 2003: The Cost to the Nation, the States,
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burden itself but also about how both the burden and the benefits of excessive
spending are distributed among different income classes. The two sections of
this Part II call attention to the immense, regressive redistribution of wealth
that results from public policies and industry practices that cause lower-income
workers with health coverage both (1) to overpay for many health-related
goods and services and (2) to consume more than they would freely choose to
consume. Part III then observes how these same overcharged families may be
regularly disadvantaged on the receiving end as well, getting both less and
lower-quality health care than higher-income participants in the same health
plans get for the same money.
A. Excessive Prices: Overpaying Providers and Suppliers
Prices paid for health care goods and services in the United States are quite
high in comparison with similar prices in other developed nations.13 Likewise,
prices paid to suppliers and providers by U.S. private payers significantly
exceed comparable payments under the Medicare and Medicaid programs.14 In
each case, the explanation may be simply that government-controlled health
systems, here as well as abroad, exercise their buying (monopsony) power to set
prices below fair, competitive levels.15 But the substantially higher prices
observed in the U.S. private sector may also be a consequence of weak
competition and unchecked monopoly or market power. To whatever extent
prevailing prices exceed competitive levels and cannot be justified as
appropriate rewards for inventive or entrepreneurial success, they can be
deemed an unfortunate redistribution of income from consumers to various
and the District of Columbia, with State-Specific Estimates of Potential Savings, 34 INT’L J. HEALTH
SERVICES 79 (2004). Although a decentralized, competitive industry will inevitably incur certain costs
that could be avoided in a system run by government, those added costs are usually justified by a
competitive market’s better incentives for improved performance and greater ability to satisfy differing
consumer needs and preferences. To the extent that the nominally decentralized U.S. health care
system does not deliver these benefits (as we later suggest it largely fails to do), any higher costs it
entails may be counted as unjustified burdens imposed on consumers for the benefit of the insurance
industry and other interests. Rather than centralizing administration in government’s hands, however,
the better way to address inefficiency of this kind might be to enable, and encourage, health insurers to
realize the usual benefits of competition. See Clark C. Havighurst, Why Preserve Private Health Care
Financing?, in AMERICAN HEALTH POLICY: CRITICAL ISSUES FOR REFORM 87 (1993) (arguing that
private health plans are hard to defend unless they are allowed to offer, and do offer, consumers a full
range of health care options, including economizing opportunities).
13. Reinhardt et al., supra note 8; Gerard F. Anderson et al., It’s the Prices, Stupid: Why the United
States Is So Different from Other Countries, HEALTH AFF., May-June 2003, at 89. Comparisons of care
in the United States with care in other OECD nations suggest that American health care consumers do
not receive generally better quality but are simply paying more for comparable goods and services. See,
e.g., Peter S. Hussey et al., How Does the Quality of Care Compare in Five Countries?, 23 HEALTH AFF.
89 (2004).
14. The Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) reports that although hospital
payment-to-cost ratios for private payers declined fairly steadily through the 1990s, dropping from
approximately 130% to 115%, comparable ratios for Medicare and Medicaid were substantially lower.
MEDPAC, MEDICARE PAYMENT POLICY 62 fig.2B-1 (2002). For physician services, Medicare
payments were only eighty-three percent of private payments in 2004. MEDPAC, MEDICARE
PAYMENT POLICY 81 (2006).
15. See infra note 34.
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elements of the health care industry. Of course, merely redistributing income
does not affect aggregate wealth. In this case, however, the unjustified gains
enjoyed by the winners appear large enough that it is important to know just
who the losers are and whether there are ways to reduce their losses.
1. How Health Insurance Exacerbates the Redistributive Effects of
Monopoly
Even though rewarding providers handsomely does not itself lessen total
wealth, aggregate welfare does suffer when the economy’s capital, labor, and
other resources are not used to their maximum advantage. In economic theory,
high monopoly prices can result in “deadweight loss” (from “allocative”
inefficiency) because they discourage consumption of the monopolized good,
thus diverting productive resources to other sectors and away from their best
use.16 Strikingly, this misallocative tendency of monopoly is not a significant
problem in health care because of health insurance, which enables consumers to
pay inflated prices rather than being discouraged by them from consuming the
overpriced item.17
But at the same time that health insurance reduces the danger that any
monopolized good or service it covers will be underproduced, it exacerbates the
other objectionable consequence of monopoly pricing: its regressive
redistribution of income from consumers to producers.18 It does this by enabling
monopolists to set substantially higher prices than they could set if consumers
were exposed to actual prices.19 Because insureds face only deductibles, co-

16. See generally JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 65–78 (1988)
(outlining the distortions and inefficiencies associated with monopoly in economic theory). For reasons
why economists are chary of basing policy prescriptions on claims that their adoption will increase
allocative efficiency, see note 212 infra.
17. Thus, health insurance eliminates most of the “deadweight loss triangle” that appears under the
demand curve in textbook illustrations of monopoly’s misallocative effect. See Arti K. Rai, The
Information Revolution Reaches Pharmaceuticals: Balancing Innovation Incentives, Cost, and Access in
the Post-Genomics Era, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 173, 202–09 (2001) (observing that “providing access to
insurance is a low-cost mechanism for reducing deadweight loss”); Martin Gaynor, et al., Are Invisible
Hands Good Hands? Moral Hazard, Competition, and the Second-Best in Health Care Markets, 108 J.
POL. ECON. 992 (2000) (considering offsetting allocative effects of insurance-induced moral hazard and
supracompetitive prices for health services). For a graphic presentation of deadweight loss, see
TIROLE, supra note 16, at 67.
18. Most economists take no professional position regarding the distribution or redistribution of
income because it has no effect on aggregate welfare (that is, efficiency) unless one makes certain
assumptions about the marginal utility of income to different individuals. See generally Daniel A.
Farber, What (If Anything) Can Economics Say About Equity?, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1791 (2003)
(reviewing LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE (2002), extensively
examining arguments in law and economics). But monopoly’s redistributive effects can be a potent
political issue—as we suggest they should be in the current state of U.S. health care.
19. In the normal monopoly case, there is a trade-off between allocative inefficiency and
redistribution. Thus, while more elastic demand makes high prices more likely to discourage desirable
consumption, it also means that there is less consumer surplus (see infra note 54) available for a
monopolist to capture; likewise, to whatever extent a monopolist is able to practice price
discrimination, consumption is facilitated and deadweight loss is reduced—but the monopolist earns
greater profits at consumers’ expense. Strikingly, this reciprocal relationship between monopoly’s
misallocative and redistributive effects does not generally hold in the U.S. health care market. As the
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insurance, or co-payments, the pricing decisions of monopolists selling insured
products or services are only slightly constrained by the limits of consumers’
willingness or ability to pay.20 By effectively steepening the demand curve a
monopolist faces, health insurance enhances the monopolist’s pricing freedom
and ability to exploit consumers, enabling it to charge even more than the
theoretical “monopoly price.”21
Because health insurance so greatly dilutes the individual consumer’s priceconsciousness as a check on provider pricing freedom, price competition in
health care depends heavily on private insurers’ acting as knowledgeable,
aggressive purchasing agents for their insureds. Indeed, large private insurers
and health plans are often thought to exercise substantial buying power vis-à-vis
providers.22 But even though health plans certainly make competition more
effective in potentially competitive markets (because of their superior skill in
searching the market and their ability to reward low-price providers by steering
substantial business their way), they are largely helpless in confronting true

text in this and the next section explains, once U.S.-style health insurance and a few other factors
(specifically, the peculiar incentives and conduct of nonprofit firms) are added to the mix, monopoly
may generate excessive rather than suboptimal consumption. And this misallocation of resources (if it
occurs as we hypothesize), instead of being offset in some sense by a reduction in monopoly’s
redistributive effect, is simply an additional burden on the economy.
20. The differences among different forms of cost sharing are important in this context. In health
plans with so-called tiered benefits, payment of a fixed co-payment usually entitles the insured to full
coverage of the remaining cost of “medically necessary” care and medications. In other plans, stop-loss
provisions entirely eliminate co-insurance at some point. In both cases, once the initial deductible or
other cost-sharing requirement is met, the sky may be almost literally the only limit on the monopolist’s
pricing freedom. To be sure, the amount of pricing freedom enjoyed by sellers of patented,
therapeutically unique prescription drugs has not been quite so great because, until fairly recently, a
large proportion of the population lacked extensive coverage for these products, and Medicare
generally did not cover them (even though its beneficiaries were particularly heavy users). But,
according to one survey, seventy-three percent of non-institutionalized Medicare beneficiaries aged
sixty-five or older had some form of public or private (Medigap or retiree) coverage of prescription
drugs in 2003. Dana G. Safran et al., Prescription Drug Coverage and Seniors: Findings from a 2003
National Survey, 2005 HEALTH AFF. (WEB EXCLUSIVES) W5-152. Also, coverage for the rest of the
population expanded rapidly from the late 1980s. See Patricia M. Danzon & Mark V. Pauly, Health
Insurance and the Growth in Pharmaceutical Expenditures, 45 J. LAW & ECON. 587 (2002). The finding
by Danzon and Pauly that the rapidly rising share of the national health dollar claimed by prescription
drugs during the period in question reflected improved insurance coverage is consistent with the
hypothesis that monopolistic sellers found it increasingly profitable to price their products in the range
where demand was especially inelastic due to health insurance. In any event, our observations about
how monopoly and health insurance interact appear to have important (though as yet unrecognized)
implications for the implementation of the new Medicare prescription drug benefit. See generally
Jennifer Bowman et al., Access to Cancer Drugs in Medicare Part D: Formulary Placement and
Beneficiary Cost Sharing in 2006, 25 HEALTH AFF. 1240 (2006).
21. A typical monopolist seeking maximum profit sets its unit price so that “marginal cost” (the
cost of producing one additional unit) does not exceed the additional (“marginal”) revenue generated
by that price across all units. Because higher prices generally reduce the number of units that can be
sold, there is normally a finite point beyond which a higher price per unit will net the monopolist a
lower total profit, not a higher one. With health insurance helping consumers pay the monopolist’s
price, however, marginal cost and marginal revenue will equate at a higher level. In other words, with
insurance in the picture, the monopolist’s profit-maximizing price will be significantly higher, and the
redistribution of income it causes will be significantly greater.
22. See generally Roger D. Blair & Jill Boylston Herndon, Physician Cooperative Bargaining
Ventures: An Economic Analysis, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 989 (2004).
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monopolists. It is highly unlikely, for example, that an afflicted enrollee would
easily accept a plan decision to forgo purchasing a monopolized service or
product on his behalf simply because its price was too high. By hypothesis,
there would be no close substitute for the monopolized service or product as a
treatment for certain health problems, and enrollees facing those problems
could be expected to protest, even sue, if the plan refused to purchase it for
them.23 Although it is possible to imagine health plans whose enrollees agree in
advance to let the plan make benefit-cost trade-offs in designing coverage and
purchasing for the group, insurance of that kind has not been accepted in the
U.S. market.24 In the absence of insurer competition focused on giving subsets
of consumers optimal value for their health care dollars (rather than merely
easy access to all “medically necessary” services and products), private health
insurance enables providers and suppliers possessing advantageous market
positions to parlay them into unusually large profits earned at premium payers’
expense.

23. For truly stunning examples of the price-increasing and profit-generating effects of combining
U.S.-style health insurance and monopoly, see Geeta Anand, The Most Expensive Drugs (pts. 1–4),
WALL ST. J., Nov. 15, 2005, at A1 (quoting one drug company executive as saying, “I never dreamed we
could charge that much”); WALL ST. J., Nov. 16, 2005, at A1; WALL ST. J., DEC. 1, 2005, at A1; WALL
ST. J., Dec. 28, 2005 at A1. This series of articles reports that insurers are paying amounts up to, and
even in excess of, $600,000 per patient per year for drugs needed to treat a relatively small number of
individuals with rare chronic conditions. Purveyors of these drugs, which generally cost relatively little
to produce, enjoy exceptionally strong protection against competition for their drugs and biologics
under the Orphan Drug Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049 (1983). Although other healthsector monopolists, even patent monopolists, may not possess the same market dominance as firms
protected by the Orphan Drug Act, the insurers with which they deal have few tools with which to
resist paying quite high prices for often small or debatable incremental benefits. See infra notes 24 &
27.
24. See Rai, supra note 17, at 208 (“The extent to which plans can engage in price/quality
competition based on true cost-benefit tradeoffs . . . is still limited by the structure of contract and tort
law. Limitations on quality that emerge from limitations on beneficial coverage will be difficult to
implement in our current system.”). One of the instant authors has consumed much ink in trying to
make the world safe for such economizing contracts. See, e.g., CLARK C. HAVIGHURST, HEALTH
CARE CHOICES: PRIVATE CONTRACTS AS INSTRUMENTS OF HEALTH REFORM (1995) [hereinafter
HAVIGHURST, HEALTH CARE CHOICES]. The legal system and the market have been largely
unwilling to embrace them, however. See generally Mark V. Pauly, Competition and New Technology,
24 HEALTH AFF. 1523 (2005) (recognizing lack of contractual freedom as a reason why costs of new
technology are uncontrolled); Clark C. Havighurst, How the Health Care Revolution Fell Short, 65 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 55, 67–74 (Autumn 2002) [hereinafter Havighurst, How the Revolution Fell
Short]. Indeed, managed health care ran into a political firestorm in the 1990s when it began to appear
that health plans might invoke their contracts to ration arguably beneficial care. See generally id. at 64–
100; Mark A. Hall, The Death of Managed Care: A Regulatory Autopsy, 30 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L.
427 (2005) (reviewing and explaining the dramatic decline in health plans’ efforts to actively manage
health care costs); see also Michael E. Chernew et al., Barriers to Constraining Health Care Cost
Growth, HEALTH AFF., Nov.-Dec. 2004, at 122 (reporting post-backlash interviews with health plan
administrators and finding unwillingness to constrain technology-driven cost increases). Evidence of
insurers’ lack of either the will or the means to limit their insureds’ access to costly treatments on the
basis of well-calibrated benefit-cost comparisons appears in their difficulty in resisting paying even the
staggering prices demanded by firms with monopolies under the Orphan Drug Act. See Anand, supra
note 23, pt. 1 at A1 (reporting, however, that, in the face of Orphan Drug Act monopolies, “employers
and insurers are now pushing back” but only by “excluding coverage of certain orphan drugs [or]
requiring employees to pay as much as half the cost of the pricey medicines”).
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While many health care markets feature reasonably effective price
competition for health insurers’ business, there are many others in which health
insurance appears to facilitate price gouging by monopoly sellers. Antitrust
enforcement, although actively pursued since the 1970s, has been relatively
unsuccessful in preventing hospital mergers and consolidations that increase
already high levels of market concentration.25 Also, despite some success in
preventing providers from nakedly combining for the purpose of bargaining
collectively with payers, antitrust agencies have not been able to stop the
formation of integrated single-specialty medical groups with substantial pricing
freedom in their local markets.26 In fact, in many health-care markets and

25. “[S]ince 1981, the Commission and DOJ have challenged relatively few hospital mergers, in
some instances seeking relief only for part of the transaction. . . . From 1994 through 2000[,] . . . when
there were approximately 900 hospital mergers, the Agencies and state antitrust enforcers lost all seven
cases they litigated.” FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IMPROVING HEALTH CARE: A
DOSE OF COMPETITION ch. 4, at 1 (July 2004). See generally id. at 1–33; Cory S. Capps et al., Antitrust
Policy and Hospital Mergers: Recommendations for a New Approach, 47 ANTITRUST BULL. 677 (2002).
On the price-increasing effects of mergers and consolidations, see David Dranove, THE ECONOMIC
EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN HEALTH CARE 122 (2000) (“I have asked many providers why they
wanted to merge. Although publicly they all invoked the synergies mantra, virtually everyone stated
privately that the main reason for merging was to avoid competition and/or obtain market power.”);
Jack Zwanziger & Cathleen Mooney, Has Price Competition Changed Hospital Revenues and Expenses
in New York?, 42 INQUIRY 183 (2005) (finding that mergers undermined price- and cost-reducing
effects of hospital competition following deregulation); Cory Capps & David Dranove, Hospital
Consolidation and Negotiated PPO Prices, HEALTH AFF., Mar.-Apr. 2004, at 175; Martin Gaynor &
William B. Vogt, Competition Among Hospitals, 34 RAND J. ECON. 764, 764 (2003) (“During the
second half of the 1990s, a dramatic wave of hospital consolidation occurred in the United States. . . .
[M]any local markets, including quite a few large cities such as Boston, Minneapolis, and San Francisco,
have come to be dominated by two or three large hospital systems. Not surprisingly, many health plans
have complained about rising prices as a result of this consolidation.”). On the courts’ special tolerance
for anticompetitive mergers of nonprofit hospitals, see infra note 41.
26. On enforcement policy toward the formation of large medical groups and physician networks,
see Fed. Trade Comm’n & U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Statements of Enforcement Policy in Health Care 61–
105 (1996), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/hlth3s.pdf. See also FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 25, ch. 2, at 34–41. The agencies’ enforcement policy guidelines take the
view that physician joint ventures must involve a substantial degree of “integration”—either financial
risk-sharing or close cooperation in clinical matters—before the agencies will deem them anything
other than naked price-fixing if they facilitate collective bargaining with payers over prices. See, e.g.,
letter from Jeffrey W. Brennan, Bureau of Competition, Fed. Trade Comm’n, to John J. Miles (Feb. 19,
2002) (MedSouth advisory opinion), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/adops/medsouth.htm (giving
tentative approval, subject to re-examination in light of actual experience, to a potentially large
physician joint venture in Denver that promised some clinical efficiencies in coordinating care provided
by independent medical practices). In the MedSouth matter, the FTC staff neglected to consider that
the venture, if truly procompetitive, should not need price-fixing to succeed because the promised
efficiencies and improvements, if realized, should make participating physicians especially attractive to
payers and thus, presumably, able to command higher compensation in individual, rather than
collective, negotiations; also, the FTC has reported no follow-up examination of the MedSouth joint
venture to verify that its consequences were not anticompetitive. More generally, one commentator
has observed that
the federal enforcement agencies have been slow to challenge physician or other provider
networks . . . . Generally, they have targeted only near-monopolies and outright cartels.
Further, the agencies’ advisory opinions in many cases have generously extended the safeharbor limits contained in their own policy statements. Consequently, many private attorneys
advise clients that it is a relatively low risk proposition to form networks that encompass large
segments of a market. In sum, agencies’ failure to back up their advisory opinions with
enforcement actions may have undermined the prophylactic potential of their advisories.
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submarkets (or niches) significant monopoly or market power exists and is
uncontestable under the antitrust laws because it arises solely from market
circumstances, technological causes, or regulation. For example, naturalmonopoly conditions, entry barriers, network effects, exclusionary licensure or
certificate-of-need requirements, significant product differentiation, tacit
coordination among oligopolists, valid patents, trade secrets, or first-mover
advantages all can bestow de facto market power.27 In addition, providers and
suppliers may have undue pricing freedom simply because insurers lack strong
incentives to drive hard price bargains with providers even when there are
opportunities to do so. For example, if purchasers of health insurance are
themselves less than fully cost-conscious (as we later argue is the case28) and
therefore tend to overvalue such things as unrestricted access to providers or
small increments of arguable quality, provider prices will be supracompetitive.
Where lawful or uncontested power over price exists, private health
insurance—at least the kind currently found in the United States—not only
provides inadequate countervailing bargaining power but positively facilitates
the translation of market power into a major redistribution of income from
consumers to providers or suppliers. Indeed, the recent renewal of health care
cost escalation after several years of relative stability appears directly
attributable in part both to increasing supply-side market power as a result of
hospital consolidations and the growth of provider organizations and to reduced
purchasing discretion of health insurers following the backlash against managed
health care in the 1990s.29 It is also no accident that prescription drugs and

Thomas L. Greaney, Whither Antitrust? The Uncertain Future of Competition Law in Health Care,
HEALTH AFF., Mar.-Apr. 2002, at 185, 190. Even when enforcement occurs, the sanctions are generally
prospective cease-and-desist orders, the threat of which creates little deterrent to future violations by
other physician groups.
27. Monopoly and market power, defined as the ability to charge prices higher than marginal cost,
are always matters of degree, of course. Thus, many pharmaceutical products, including those with
patent protection, have reasonably close substitutes, limiting their sellers’ pricing freedom. Yet price
competition in markets for prescription drugs is often less than robust even after generic substitutes
enter the market. See Atanu Saha et al., Generic Competition in the U.S. Pharmaceutical Industry
(May 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.analysisgroup.com/AnalysisGroup/
uploadedFiles/Publishing/Articles/Generic%20Competition%20in%20the%20U.S.%20Pharmaceutical
%20Industry.pdf (finding that “each additional [generic] entrant on average is associated with a 0.2%
decline in brand price. Nevertheless, unless the number of generic competitors is large, brand prices
continue to rise in absolute terms.”); see also Alex Berenson, A Cancer Drug’s Big Price Rise Disturbs
Doctors and Patients, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2006, at A1 (reporting large price increases of unpatented,
single-source drugs for small market segments and pressure on insurers to cover such drugs). For
present purposes, it suffices to understand that the pricing freedom of firms with market power is
frequently greatly enhanced by health insurance even though in some circumstances insurers
strengthen price competition.
28. See infra text accompanying notes 90–92.
29. See supra notes 25 & 26; see also MEDPAC, MEDICARE PAYMENT POLICY 57 (2005) (noting
that insurers’ use of selective contracting “has been limited by both hospital consolidation and
consumers’ reluctance to accept limitations on their choice of providers”); Hall, supra note 24
(describing how the backlash against managed care weakened health plans’ discretion in dealing with
powerful providers). As a practical matter, hospitals’ monopoly power does not appear to be exercised
so much by raising the price of individual services for which there is no close substitute (geographically
or otherwise) as by resisting insurer demands for steeper discounts from arbitrarily set list prices for its
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medical devices (both areas in which patents and trade names can confer
valuable market power) have been important contributors to recent cost
increases.30 Because premium payers appear to bear a particularly heavy
burden due to supracompetitive prices in health care markets, there is reason to
examine the fairness of the resulting redistribution of income.
Its exceptional redistributive effects aside, the combination of monopoly
and U.S.-style health insurance also contributes in a different way to allocative
inefficiency. Although health insurance diminishes the usual tendency of
monopoly to discourage consumption, the prospect of extraordinary profits that
health-sector monopolists can hope to earn by virtue of health insurers’ inability
to negotiate prices can be expected to influence firms to pursue such profits
aggressively, often in ways that are not socially productive. Richard Posner has
hypothesized that, even in the general economy, monopoly’s most important
misallocative effects flow not from discouraging marginal consumption but from
inducing firms to make excessive investments in seeking to gain, hold onto, or
increase market power.31 Indeed, Posner observes that there is no certainty that
a successful monopolist will not dissipate most of its monopoly profits, earned
at consumers’ expense, in such endeavors. To be sure, some efforts to gain and
retain market power, especially by technological and other innovation, are
socially beneficial. But the prospect of monopoly profits also induces conduct
that is purely rent-seeking, such as lobbying for and exploitation of protectionist
regulation, spurious product differentiation, uninformative advertising and
other promotional activities, erecting entry barriers, and other monopolistic
conduct. Precisely because U.S.-style health insurance makes health-sector
monopolies more profitable than monopolies of other kinds, Posner’s
recognition of the social waste potentially generated by the prospect of

full range of services; thus, for example, a hospital may be able to charge an insurer $5 for an aspirin
tablet because it has a powerful position in the market for open-heart surgery. For insights on how
hospitals usually negotiate their prices, not service-by-service but by agreeing to across-the-board
discounts for a bundle of services, see Christopher P. Tompkins, Stuart H. Altman & Efrat Eilat, The
Precarious Pricing System for Hospital Services, 25 HEALTH AFF. 45 (2006). Unfortunately, it is
difficult to quantify hospitals’ market power except by noting that hospitals’ revenues from private
sources tend to exceed allocations of fully distributed costs (not necessarily the true costs of treating
patients insured by such private sources) by substantially greater margins than their revenues from
public sources. See id. at 47. Although hard data on hospitals’ monopoly profits are lacking, we see no
reason to doubt our conceptual hypothesis that, although insurers keep prices well down for many
things, they still enable true monopolists to charge exorbitant prices that premium payers ultimately
pay.
30. See Bradley C. Strunk, Paul B. Ginsburg & John P. Cookson, Tracking Health Care Costs:
Declining Growth Trend Pauses in 2004, 2005 HEALTH AFF. (WEB EXCLUSIVES) W5-286 (finding a
7.2% increase in prescription drugs spending from 2003 to 2004, accounting for 21% of the overall
increase in health care costs in 2004); see also Katharine Levit et al., Health Spending Rebound
Continues in 2002, HEALTH AFF., Jan.-Feb. 2004, at 147 (noting that spending on prescription drugs
increased to 11% of total health care expenditures in 2002 from 7% in 1997 and that drugs accounted
for 16% of the total increase in health expenditures in 2002); Danzon & Pauly, supra note 20. A study
by PriceWaterhouseCoopers found that drugs and medical devices together accounted for 22% of
premium increases from 2001 to 2002. PriceWaterhouseCoopers, The Factors Fueling Rising
Healthcare Costs, at tbl.1 (April 2002).
31. RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 13–18 (2d ed. 2001).
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monopoly profits is especially significant for health policy. There are,
unfortunately, few guarantees that the extraordinary profits earned by healthsector monopolists will induce only investments beneficial to the economy as a
whole, let alone to the premium payers who bear the ultimate cost.32
2. Cross-subsidies: One Consequence of Providers’ Insurance-Enhanced
Market Power
Even though U.S.-style health insurance exacerbates the incomeredistributive effects of monopoly, not all of the extraordinary monopoly profits
earned by health care monopolists end up, as such, in private pockets. Many
health care institutions, especially nonprofit hospitals, plow excess earnings
back into the health care enterprise, using them to cross-subsidize activities that
the market would not otherwise support.33 Therefore, much of the high cost of
health care in the United States appears not in monopoly profits accruing to
providers and suppliers, but as the cost of activities in which certain industry
members are financially able to engage only because of the way health
insurance and monopoly interact.
Among the costs that are frequently covered out of surpluses earned on
providers’—especially hospitals’—other business are those that result when
prices paid by government for services rendered under Medicare or a state
Medicaid program add up to less than the costs the provider incurs in caring for
that program’s beneficiaries.34 In addition, legal and regulatory requirements

32. See infra notes 45 & 59.
33. Besides hospitals, private payers and providers of other kinds sometimes cross-subsidize
services for which individuals pay either nothing at all or less than the cost of the services or coverage
they receive. See, e.g., New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 514 U.S. 645 (1995) (describing, and upholding against a claim of federal preemption, a complex
New York statutory scheme, since repealed, designed to preserve the ability of Blue Cross, as well as
some private hospitals, to finance care for individuals who would otherwise be uninsured or
uninsurable); see also IHC Health Plans, Inc. v. Comm’r, 325 F.3d 1188 (10th Cir. 2003) (denying
federal tax exemption to health maintenance organization in part because it failed, unlike some other
HMOs, to cross-subsidize indigent care, education, or research); see also In re Health Care Admin. Bd.,
415 A.2d 1147 (N.J. 1980) (upholding a regulation requiring nursing homes to reserve a reasonable
number of their beds for indigent persons as a condition of licensure).
34. To be sure, a responsible government monopsonist would pay suppliers and providers enough
to ensure continuing supplies of needed goods and services of appropriate quality—which would be in
jeopardy if potential new entrants could not expect investment returns at least comparable to what they
could earn elsewhere. Nevertheless, it appears that government does in fact sometimes fail to
compensate providers, particularly hospitals, generously enough for them to break even in caring for
their government-financed patients. See Stuart H. Altman, David Schactman & Efrat Eilat, Could U.S.
Hospitals Go the Way of U.S. Airlines?, 25 HEALTH AFF. 11, 14 (2006) (“[I]n 2003[,] Medicaid
reimbursed hospitals at 92 percent of costs, and Medicare, at 95 percent.”). Medicaid appears to be the
worst offender in this regard, since state Medicaid budgets are generally tight and legislatures often find
it easier to resist provider lobbies and welfare advocates than to raise taxes. See generally Jason S. Lee
et al., Medicare Payment Policy: Does Cost Shifting Matter?, 2003 HEALTH AFF. (WEB EXCLUSIVES)
W3-480, W3-485 (quoting view of long-time observer that “the big cost shifter is Medicaid” and
presenting graphic evidence of significant cost shifting by both Medicare and Medicaid from 19871992). Since 1992, hospitals have, on average, had positive margins on their Medicare inpatients but
have lost money on outpatients. MEDPAC, MEDICARE PAYMENT POLICY 78–79, fig.3A-7 and tbl.3A2 (2004) (showing that inpatient margins followed a bell-shaped trajectory from 1% in 1993, to a peak
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frequently force providers to incur costs (for example, in their emergency
departments) for which government makes no restitution and that cannot be
charged directly to some private payer.35 Moreover, most major medical centers
voluntarily engage in extensive research and educational activities only partly
paid for by grants, contracts, tuition payments, or government subsidies for
professional education.36
Finally, hospitals render a great deal of
uncompensated health care, estimated at $30–$35 billion in 2003, to the millions
who have no or incomplete health coverage.37 Although much of the cost of
maintaining this safety net for those who cannot pay is paid ultimately by
taxpayers at different levels,38 hospitals themselves are stuck with a significant

of approximately 16% in 1997, to 4.7% in 2002, while outpatient margins from 2000 to 2002 were
consistently below zero, fluctuating between -12% and -6%).
35. The prime example of such an “unfunded mandate” is the Emergency Medical Treatment and
Active Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2003) [hereinafter EMTALA], which requires that any hospital
that both maintains an emergency department and takes Medicare money must screen every patient
(not just Medicare patients) coming to the emergency room and must stabilize any emergency medical
condition found, all without regard to the patient’s ability to pay. Although a hospital is free to close its
emergency room and escape this costly obligation (and a significant number have done so), most
hospitals believe that their mission requires them to maintain money-losing services of this and other
kinds. See infra note 40. Other examples of care that is mandated but not paid for by government
include laws prohibiting “discrimination” against the disabled and handicapped. See, e.g., In re Baby
“K”, 832 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D. Va. 1993), aff’d on other grounds, 16 F.3d 590 (4th Cir. 1994) (finding
several statutory duties of hospital to treat hopeless case); see also E. Haavi Morreim, Futilitarianism,
Exoticare, and Coerced Altruism: The ADA Meets Its Limits, 25 SETON HALL L. REV. 883 (1995).
Another example is the “free-care” obligation imposed at one time on hospitals pursuant to the HillBurton Act. See Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Schweiker, 721 F.2d 170 (7th Cir. 1983). See also Methodist Med.
Ctr. v. Ingram, 413 N.E.2d 402 (Ill. 1980) (holding the state’s police power “sufficient to justify, in
proper circumstances, uncompensated deprivation of . . . property”).
36. For an estimate that health-profession education costs hospitals $20–25 billion annually, see
Bruce C. Vladeck, Paying for Hospitals’ Community Service, 25 HEALTH AFF. 34, 38 (2006). Medicare
allowances to hospitals frequently contain upward adjustments for “indirect medical education” and
“direct medical education” (totaling $3.7 billion and $2.2 billion, respectively, in 1999). Lee et al., supra
note 34 at 485. See also SEAN NICHOLSON, MEDICARE HOSPITAL SUBSIDIES: MONEY IN SEARCH OF
A PURPOSE 7–24, 55 tbl.3 (2002). In considering the issue of distributive justice in U.S. health care, it is
appropriate to question the practice of forcing taxpayers or premium payers, or both, to subsidize the
training of individuals for lucrative careers as physicians or other health professionals.
37. Vladeck, supra note 36, at 37, exh. 1. Although hospitals are not generally compelled to create
money-losing services, a hospital that chooses to maintain an unprofitable service, such as a burn,
shock-trauma, or neonatal intensive care unit, or to become a regional referral center, is legally
obligated to serve all comers without regard to ability to pay. EMTALA, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(g) (2000).
38. State and local governments directly support public and community hospitals and community
health centers both by direct subventions and by exempting them from various taxes. The Medicare
and Medicaid programs also provide extra payments to hospitals with a “disproportionate share” of
nonpaying patients. See The Tax-Exempt Hospital Sector: Hearing before the Comm. on Ways and
Means, 109th Cong. (2005) (Statement of Mark McClellan, Administrator, Centers of Medicare and
Medicaid Services), available at http://www.cms.gov/media/press/testimony.asp?Counter=1476
(“Preliminary data show that during 2004, Medicare DSH payments amounted to about $8.5 billion,
while Federal and State Medicaid DSH payments totaled nearly $17.2 billion.”); see also NICHOLSON,
supra note 36, at 25–35. Medicare is also especially generous to certain kinds of rural hospitals, and
allowances paid to teaching hospitals in recognition of their educational functions, see supra note 36,
are also viewed as supporting the safety net, as well as the training of health professionals. It is relevant
for present purposes that Medicare payments to hospitals are financed almost entirely by a flat tax on
wages and salaries, not from general revenues. See infra text accompanying notes 47 & 48.
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portion of the bill in the form of bad debts and uncompensated care.39 This
burden comes on top of hospitals’ burdens from Medicare and Medicaid
underpayments, unfunded governmental mandates, and activities they elect to
cross-subsidize, all of which add up to a very large cost burden40 with the
misallocative and distributional consequences noted immediately below.
Most observers of the health care industry find it entirely appropriate that
most of the monopoly profits earned in providing health services are used to
defray other health-related costs.41 But in the absence of either market
discipline or effective political oversight, there is no assurance that easily gained
revenues will not be squandered in low-priority activities, in overpaying for

39. For an estimate that that for 2001 the net cost to hospitals for uncompensated care was $1.5–3
billion, see Jack Hadley & John Holohan, How Much Medical Care Do the Uninsured Use, and Who
Pays for It?, 2003 HEALTH AFF. (WEB EXCLUSIVES) W3-66, W3-76. This relatively low estimate of
hospital uncompensated-care costs, derived by upwardly adjusting reports from uninsured patients
themselves, was seemingly provided to suggest that the new public cost of covering the uninsured
would be small. The hospital industry understandably reports a much higher burden from bad debt and
uncompensated care. See First Hearing in a Series on Tax Exemption: Pricing Practices of Hospitals,
Before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the House Committee on Ways and Means, 108th Cong. (2004)
(statement of David Bernd, Chairman of the Board of the American Hospital Association) (reporting
that hospitals incurred $22 billion in uncompensated care costs in 2002). See also Altman et al., supra
note 34, at 14 (“[G]eneral hospitals provide a sizable amount of uncompensated care—an average of
5.5 percent of total general hospital costs, or about $25 billion, in 2003.”). The rapid increase in the
number of the uninsured is putting increased pressure on hospital budgets.
40. See Vladeck, supra note 36, at 37 (estimating hospitals’ total community service costs at $80-95
billion in 2003). This is not to say there is an actual “cost-shift,” at least in the strict sense that, say, a
cutback in government payments or an increase in the hospital’s uncompensated-care burden translates
directly into a compensating increase in prices charged to private payers. Indeed, economists are quick
to point out that a firm possessing market power in any market would normally exercise that power to
the fullest, whatever its other costs or obligations in other markets might be. See Michael A. Morrisey,
Cost Shifting: New Myths, Old Confusion, and Enduring Reality, 2003 HEALTH AFF. (WEB
EXCLUSIVES) W3-489. In the real world, however, there are influences that appear to keep some
hospitals, particularly nonprofit ones, from maximizing profits. See generally Allen Dobson, Joan
DaVanzo & Namrata Sen, The Cost-Shift Payment “Hydraulic”: Foundation, History, and Implications,
25 HEALTH AFF. 22 (2006); Paul B. Ginsburg, Can Hospitals and Physicians Shift the Effects of Cuts in
Medicare Reimbursement to Private Payers?, 2003 HEALTH AFF. (WEB EXCLUSIVES) W3-472
(suggesting that some hospital boards might deem their mission to include some obligation to charge
fair prices). On the other hand, managers of nonprofits have a strong interest in expanding the firm’s
size and maximizing its output as a way of enhancing their own authority, prestige, job satisfaction, and
perquisites. The principal way they can do this is by earning excess profits whenever possible and
either reinvesting them in bricks and mortar or using them to cross-subsidize activities that the market
will not support. Price discrimination (that is, charging different prices to different buyers based on
differences in ability or willingness to pay) is therefore common in nonprofit firms, even to the extent
of charging below-cost (even zero) prices for some activities—a practice that would normally be
irrational for a for-profit monopolist. Strictly speaking, such price discrimination is not cost shifting,
because the hospital is rationally pursuing its own objectives, rather than being forced into involuntary
spending. See Morrisey, supra. However, the burden on premium payers is the same.
41. The belief that nonprofit monopolies are largely benign appears to account for the antitrust
agencies’ lack of success in challenging mergers bestowing market power on nonprofit hospitals. See
Barak D. Richman, The Corrosive Combination of Nonprofit Monopolies and U.S.-Style Health
Insurance: Implications for Antitrust and Merger Policy, 69 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 139, 142–43
(Autumn 2006) (observing the significance for antitrust policy of this article’s emphasis on the
extraordinary pricing freedom enjoyed by monopolists, nonprofit as well as for-profit, selling services
covered by U.S.-style health insurance).
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inputs, or simply through managerial slack.42 Indeed, tax-exempt monopolists in
health care markets are committed by their corporate charters and the tax code
to pursuing only “charitable” purposes,43 with the result that any surpluses they
generate are essentially trapped in the health sector and unavailable for use
elsewhere in the economy—even if they would yield greater welfare gains in
alternative uses. Thus, hospital and other nonprofit monopolies suck large
amounts of cash out of the economy either to support ongoing health-related
activities or to create new health facilities or new health-sector monopolies.
Over time, this one-way flow of capital into the health sector has built
enormous enterprises that can legally use their untaxed income and assets only
for health-related activities, whatever the economy’s or the public sector’s or
premium-paying individuals’ other needs. Too little attention has been given,
we submit, to the involuntary flow of substantial funds from premium payers
into the coffers of powerful private institutions that are largely unsupervised
and unconstrained with respect to their use of those resources.44 It is ironic that,
while health insurance eliminates monopoly’s usual threat to allocative
efficiency—the danger that monopolized goods or services will be
42. See also infra note 45. It is well established that nonprofit hospitals are more likely than forprofits to offer unprofitable services. See Jill R. Horwitz, Does Corporate Ownership Matter? Service
Provision in the Hospital Industry 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11376, 2005)
(also observing that nonprofits are more likely than government hospitals to offer highly profitable
services). But, even though many believe that this fact alone establishes that nonprofits are in all
respects socially beneficial, there remains the possibility that nonprofits frequently exercise market
power and invest the resulting profits in activities to which the public would ascribe relatively little
value.
43. Nonprofit corporations can be exempt from various federal, state, and local taxes if (1) their
earnings accrue only to the firm and not to any private interest (which might reinvest them outside the
health sector) and (2) their resources, surpluses, and other assets are used exclusively for charitable
purposes, variously defined. Nonprofit hospitals, which generate supracompetitive returns in many
lines of business even when the whole institution seems to struggle, have been treated with special favor
under federal law, which accepts “the promotion of health” in a community as a purpose charitable
enough for tax exemption without regard to the amount of indigent care provided. Rev. Rul. 69-545,
1969-2 C.B. 117.
44. Such attention as these firms receive nearly always focuses only on similarities and differences
in the behavior of nonprofit and for-profit firms and on the appropriateness of tax exemptions for the
former. See, e.g., Mark Schlesinger & Bradford Gray, How Nonprofits Matter in American Medicine,
and What to Do About It, 2006 HEALTH AFF. (WEB EXCLUSIVES) W6-287 (reviewing empirical
literature comparing the behavior of nonprofits and for-profits in the health sector); David A. Hyman
& William M. Sage, Subsidizing Health Care Providers Through the Tax Code: Status or Conduct?, 2006
HEALTH AFF. (WEB EXCLUSIVES) W6-312 (suggesting that nonprofits’ tax subsidies be tied to
quantifiable measures of performance). This article emphasizes significantly larger issues, particularly
the unfairness of systematically financing costly public services by undue impositions on premium
payers rather than out of public funds. See Clark C. Havighurst, The Debate over Health Care CostContainment Regulation: The Issues and the Interests, in INCENTIVES VS. CONTROLS IN HEALTH
POLICY: BROADENING THE DEBATE 9 (Jack A. Meyer ed., 1985) (opining that, at least in the mid1980s, “cross-subsidies in the health care industry . . . may constitute the most entrenched, most
extravagant, and least closely-supervised government-tolerated use of private monopoly to generate
revenues for public purposes anywhere in the U.S. economy”). Many hospitals enjoy much of their
market power solely because of regulatory protection (under so-called certificate-of-need laws) against
competition that would undermine their ability to generate revenues needed for seemingly worthy
purposes. Regulation that confers monopoly power on private interests as a quid pro quo for providing
publicly approved services has been characterized as “taxation by regulation.” Richard A. Posner,
Taxation by Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 22 (1971).

02__HAVIGHURST_RICHMAN.DOC

24

3/7/2007 3:53 PM

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 69:7

underproduced—it conduces, in combination with other incentives and
circumstances in the American system, to allocative inefficiency of precisely the
opposite kind: too much of a good thing.45
Even if hospitals and other entities in the health care sector cross-subsidized
only activities of indisputable value to the general public, it would be no less
objectionable to see those activities financed by means of extraordinary
monopoly overcharges to private payers. The buck obviously does not stop
with the payer. Instead, the heavy costs of activities unrelated to the care of the
payer’s own patients are inevitably passed on to working Americans more or
less in proportion to the health insurance premiums that employers largely pay
on their behalf. The result is a well-entrenched method of financing important
health-related activities, many of uncertain value, through what amounts to a
hidden “head tax.” True to the nature of such a tax, the burden is distributed
more or less equally across all premium payers rather than in proportion to
their wealth or income.46 In view of the magnitude of the burden thus imposed
on lower- and middle-income premium payers, the regressivity resulting from
the corrosive combination of nonprofit monopolies and U.S.-style health
insurance should be a matter of specific public concern.
A telling final point is that, to the substantial extent that hospitals are
compensated by the Medicare program for their various unremunerative
undertakings (and thus do not have to finance them out of monopoly profits
earned at premium payers’ expense),47 the burden still falls unfairly—though
less unfairly than a head tax—on working Americans. Such Medicare
subventions to hospitals are financed almost entirely by a 2.9 percent payroll tax
on all current workers, including those without health coverage of their own.
Because this tax applies to all earned, and no unearned, income, it is regressive
in a way that even a true flat tax is not.48

45. But see infra note 212. To be sure, monopoly’s extraordinary profitability in the health sector
can also induce allocative inefficiency in the form of less-good things, including wasteful spending in
pursuit and defense of market dominance. See supra text accompanying notes 31 & 32. Examples of
such rent-seeking behavior in the hospital industry include advertising, see Robert J. Town & Imran
Currim, Hospital Advertising in California, 1991-1997, 39 INQUIRY 298 (2002); advocacy and
exploitation of protectionist certificate-of-need regulation, see infra notes 156 & 157 and accompanying
text; anticompetitive mergers; and restrictive agreements with actual or potential competitors.
46. Although cross-subsidization is sometimes analogized to a system of taxation, its unfair
regressivity as a kind of head tax is generally not observed. E.g., Dobson et al., supra note 40, at 30–31
(likening the cost shift to a premium tax without observing its regressivity); Holahan & Zedlewski,
supra note 6, at 236 (treating uncompensated care “as a kind of premium surtax for families with
private insurance that is transferred to those who receive uncompensated care”).
47. Such subsidies represent roughly twelve percent of total Medicare payments for hospital
inpatient care. NICHOLSON, supra note 36.
48. See supra note 1. An additional inequity results to the extent that higher-income employees
contribute higher percentages of their earnings to tax-favored retirement plans, thereby escaping
payroll taxes that, unlike deferred income taxes, are not recaptured when plan accumulations are
distributed.
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Recently, attention has been directed to hospitals’ attempts to recoup
otherwise unrecovered costs by overcharging—of all people—the uninsured.49
Contrary to a widespread impression, many uninsured are not impecunious, and
hospitals have not been shy—at least until the practice was recently
spotlighted—about charging their full list prices to patients for whom no insurer
has negotiated a discount from those prices.50 Because list prices are set
arbitrarily (mostly to establish a favorable baseline for negotiating with
insurers), hospital bills rendered to patients without insurance can be literally
outrageous. Nevertheless, it does not seem likely that very much of hospitals’
community service burden is borne by the relatively small number of uninsured
individuals unlucky enough to be hit with both a catastrophic health need and a
staggering bill for treating it. As demonstrated by the large number of personal
bankruptcies caused by health-care-related liabilities,51 many such charges go
unpaid. In any event, because those who actually pay the big bills are
demonstrably wealthier than those who do not, hospitals’ discriminatory pricing
practices do not have regressive distributional implications of the kind focused
upon in this article.52 It is nonetheless striking to see firms claiming to operate
for charitable purposes using their market power and extreme price
discrimination to punish those who, whether voluntarily or otherwise, have no
insurance coverage.53
3. Innovation Incentives: Technological Progress at Whose Expense?
In the special case of monopolies (including patent monopolies) resulting
from valuable innovation, it is arguable that the greater profits that health
insurance enables monopolists to earn are justifiable as rewards for past
innovations and inducements for future ones. Indeed, Darius Lakdawalla and
Neeraj Sood have cogently observed that whereas incentives for innovation are
systematically suboptimal in most markets (because even patent-protected
innovators cannot hope to capture the full potential value of their inventions to
consumers54), health insurance can, in theory at least, create near-optimal
49. See Tompkins et al., supra note 29; Uwe E. Reinhardt, The Pricing of U.S. Hospital Services:
Chaos Behind a Veil of Secrecy, 25 HEALTH AFF. 57 (2006).
50. For a review of legal and other issues raised by such discriminatory pricing by hospitals, see
Mark A. Hall, Paying for What You Get and Getting What You Pay for: Legal Responses to ConsumerDriven Health Care, 69 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 159, 161–65 (Autumn 2006).
51. See Melissa B. Jacoby, Teresa Sullivan & Elizabeth Warren, Rethinking the Debates over
Health Care Financing: Evidence from the Bankruptcy Courts, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 375 (2001); David U.
Himmelstein et al., Illness and Injury As Contributors to Bankruptcy, 2005 HEALTH AFF. (WEB
EXCLUSIVES) W5-63. But see David Dranove & Michael L. Millenson, Medical Bankruptcy: Myth
versus Fact, 2006 HEALTH AFF. (WEB EXCLUSIVES) W74 (finding earlier estimates of frequency of
bankruptcies caused by health costs to be exaggerated).
52. See also Hall, supra note 50, at 163 (reporting that hospitals are rapidly reducing their efforts to
“tax” at least the lower-income uninsured).
53. On class-action litigation challenging such discriminatory pricing and other alleged neglect of
nonprofit hospitals’ charitable mission, see id. at 162–63.
54. In economic theory, the usual monopolist’s potential rewards are limited to the “consumer
surplus” (measured by the maximum prices that individual consumers would pay, as reflected in the
demand curve) that consumers would enjoy if they could purchase the service or product at a
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incentives for developing valuable medical technologies.55 According to their
argument, a health insurer can set its co-payment requirement so that anyone
able to pay the marginal cost of a new product or service can purchase it, thus
avoiding the deadweight loss usually associated with monopoly pricing. At the
same time (the theory goes), the insurer, by paying the remainder of the
monopolist’s price, can reward the monopolist with the full value of the
innovation to the insured group. The result, if one could assume universal
health insurance with such characteristics, would be near-optimal incentives for
innovation.56
A possible implication from the work of Lakdawalla and Sood is that,
because health insurance is substantially less than universal (and incentives for
innovation therefore substantially suboptimal), the extraordinary rewards that
innovators can hope to gain from insured consumers in the U.S. market should
be valued as socially beneficial inducements to potential innovators.57
Nevertheless, the practical difficulties that U.S. health plans would face in
attempting to curb their members’ demand for a monopolized product or
service (in order to bargain more effectively with the monopolist) leave us still

competitive price. In reality, given the difficulty of price discrimination (that is, charging different
prices to different buyers, depending on where they appear on the demand curve), ordinary
monopolists cannot hope to capture all consumer surplus, let alone the value of any positive
externalities the product may yield. Incentives to pursue valuable innovations are therefore suboptimal
in the absence of insurance. The innovation literature leaves no doubt that suboptimal investments are
made in basic scientific research, e.g., Richard R. Nelson, The Simple Economics of Basic Scientific
Research, 67 J. POL. ECON. 297 (1959), although there is some disagreement over whether investments
in applied research and development of specific goods and services are also suboptimal. See generally
ANTITRUST, INNOVATION, AND COMPETITIVENESS (Thomas M. Jorde & David J. Teece eds., 1992).
55. Darius Lakdawalla & Neeraj Sood, Insurance and Innovation in Health Care Markets (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11602, 2005).
56. For a theoretical demonstration, using different assumptions about pricing than those used by
Lackdawalla and Sood, that universal health insurance, even with optimal copayments, may yield
excessive incentives for innovation, see Alan M. Garber, Charles I. Jones & Paul M. Romer, Insurance
and Incentives for Medical Innovation (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 12080, 2006).
57. A series of studies by such researchers as David Cutler and Frank Lichtenberg show large
social gains from investing in new medical and pharmaceutical technology. See infra note 68. Such
studies appear to justify all spending on technology development because the consumer surplus
generated by life-saving and health-improving technologies is so large, easily exceeding the social costs
incurred. Indeed, the authors’ seeming lack of concern about marginal trade-offs in the adoption of
new technologies, see infra note 68, appears to be attributable to their sense that, in general, innovation
incentives are seriously suboptimal. Certainly, the case for valuing R&D very highly is strong,
particularly if one takes an international perspective. See, e.g., Frank R. Lichtenberg, The Impact of
New Drug Launches on Longevity: Evidence from Longitudinal Disease-Level Data from 52 Countries:
1982-2001 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9754, 2003) (attributing forty percent
of world-wide decline in mortality in the period studied to the introduction of innovative drugs).
(Many health problems in third-world nations would yield to new technologies, yet those nations are
too poor to offer innovators much incentive to produce them, and strict price controls on many healthrelated technologies in other developed nations would seem to unduly diminish incentives for R&D,
making the U.S. market the principal source of such incentives.) The potentially large social benefits of
health-related R&D notwithstanding, however, it is far from clear to us that those benefits should be
given full weight in assessing U.S. health policy and used to justify imposing their heavy costs on lowerand middle-income premium payers in U.S. health plans. See infra note 154 (discussing and
questioning so-called Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, which permits gains to winners to justify imposing costs
on others without regard to distributional consequences).
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concerned about unjustified wealth transfers. The imperfections in U.S.-style
health insurance put patentees and other innovating monopolists in a position
to capture, systematically, more from insured consumers than their innovations
may be worth to those consumers,58 with the result that too much of the cost of
inducing socially beneficial innovation is borne—once again as a kind of “head
tax”—by lower- and middle-income payers of health insurance premiums.59 Just
as the burden of hospitals’ cross-subsidies of activities that are arguably socially
beneficial should not fall equally across the premium-paying population, it is
unfair to finance or induce technological progress by “taxing” insured
Americans in proportion not to their wealth or income, but to the insurance
premiums they pay.
We have offered here the perception that, as a class, lower-income payers of
health insurance premiums are probably net losers, not net gainers, from
whatever valuable technological innovations they indirectly finance. Our
concern is warranted not only by the argument that U.S.-style health insurers
generally cannot resist paying true monopolists virtually any price they ask, but
also by our later argument that lower- and middle-income premium payers are
unable, under current legal, regulatory, and market conditions, to opt for lowcost coverage that limits their potential access to new or other high-cost
technologies.60 However, even if evidence can be found to refute our contention

58. See Garber et al., supra note 56, at 14 (illustrating how, even with well-designed insurance,
“profits earned by [a] pharmaceutical company can exceed the consumer surplus associated with the
drug treatment”).
59. As in the analogous case of hospital cross-subsidies, we are reluctant to accept the argument
that large social benefits justify maintaining innovation incentives, without regard to who bears the cost
burden, in large part because of Richard Posner’s observation that the prospect of large monopoly
profits can induce wasteful as well as productive behavior. See supra text accompanying notes 31 & 32.
For example, there is a significant literature on the wasteful expenditures that the patent system can
induce—even without the prospect of extraordinary monopoly profits of the kind that U.S.-style health
insurance makes possible. See, e.g., Mark F. Grady & Jay I. Alexander, Patent Law and Rent
Dissipation, 78 VA. L. REV. 305, 308 (1992) (“The defect of the system is that if multiple inventors
expend resources in competition for the patent monopoly, the benefit to society of having the invention
will be dissipated by the cost of numerous, redundant, development efforts.”). See also Yoram Barzel,
Optimal Timing of Innovations, 50 REV. ECON. STATISTICS 348, 349 (1968) (“[C]ompetition among
potential innovators may deprive innovations of all their special economic value.”). In addition to the
wastefulness of so-called “patent races,” the social value of innovations may be further dissipated in
promoting, attacking, defending, and inventing around valuable patents. In the health care sector, for
example, one sees extensive efforts to create and heavily promote relatively modest product
improvements and to differentiate brand-name products from nearly equivalent generics by heavy
investment in direct-to-consumer advertising. In particular, there is evidence that the decreased price
elasticity of demand for brand-name drugs following the expansion of insurance coverage for
prescription drugs in the 1990s increased manufacturers’ expected returns from promotional efforts,
many of which are socially unproductive. Danzon & Pauly, supra note 20.
60. See infra Part IV.C. The importance of the practical inability of consumers to purchase health
insurance providing only selective coverage of costly technology has recently been recognized by
economist Mark Pauly. Pauly, supra note 24. See also Donald W. Moran, Whence and Whither Health
Insurance? A Revisionist History, 24 HEALTH AFF. 1415, 1423 (2005) (predicting that, with the advent
of so-called consumer-directed health care, see infra text accompanying notes 93–98, consumer costconsciousness and competitive pressure on health plans to control big-ticket items “will push back
strongly against manufacturers’ pricing flexibility. Increasingly, the question of whether a high-cost
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that health insurers are unable as a practical matter to limit their payments to
monopolists to the true consumer surplus that their insureds enjoy from unique
innovations, it would not invalidate our larger claim that U.S-style health
insurance generally enables health-sector firms with dominant market
positions—most of which are not gained or retained principally by “superior
skill, foresight, and industry”61—to exploit consumers unduly.
4. Financing the Health Sector by Means of a Regressive “Head Tax”
Foregoing discussion has characterized in two ways the extraordinary profits
that health-sector firms with market power are able to earn because of
dysfunctional aspects of U.S.-style health insurance. First, such profits may be
seen, as monopoly profits often are, simply as a redistribution of income from
consumers to producers; although such redistributions are not troublesome as a
matter of economic efficiency, the manner in which health insurance enhances
the profitability of monopoly should be a matter of concern from the standpoint
of equity. Second, because health-sector profits may either subsidize or induce
activities having some, perhaps substantial, social value, they may be viewed
and evaluated as a kind of tax levied in support of these activities. Both in the
case of cross-subsidization by nonprofit firms and in the case of profits serving
as incentives for socially desirable innovation, we have analogized the burden
borne by premium payers to a “head tax,” which falls on individuals without
appreciable correlation to wealth, income, or ability to pay. In neither case
does the manner in which the proceeds are used appear to rectify the apparent
regressivity.
Likening to a kind of tax the extra charges, in excess of their costs, that
health care monopolists can impose on payers of private health insurance
premiums is quite helpful for the purposes of this article. In addition to inviting
attention to the burden’s incidence and fairness (our particular concerns), the
analogy provides a warrant for comparing monopoly overcharges with explicit
taxes in terms of the political accountability of those imposing the burden and
spending the resulting revenue. Not only are health industry monopolists
relatively free to set their own prices, but they are subject to very little political
accountability in choosing how to use the surpluses they generate.62 Thus, many
of the activities that nonprofit providers cross-subsidize from monopoly profits
would not, we submit, be found worthy of public financing if they were subject
to the usual public processes for levying explicit taxes, appropriating funds, and

technology is covered at all by an insurance plan will become the most important determinant of
product economics.”).
61. United States v. Aluminum Co., 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945) (famous antitrust opinion by
Learned Hand, J., acknowledging that even a powerful monopoly might be lawful if gained and
maintained by “superior skill, foresight, and industry” and not by unlawful “monopolizing” behavior).
See supra text accompanying notes 25–27 on the wide variety of factors, many of them fortuitous, that
may explain why a seller is free to set unduly profitable prices in health care markets.
62. See supra text accompanying notes 42–45.
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authorizing their expenditure.63 Moreover, any projects that public lawmakers
would be willing to support would almost certainly be financed in less regressive
ways.
Similarly, given clear choices in the marketplace, a substantial majority of
consumers might rationally elect to pay substantially less for their health
protection even if it meant somewhat reducing both their access to costly new
products of health care R&D and the likelihood that more such products or
services would eventually be produced. To be sure, consumers economizing on
their own health coverage may, as free riders, be counting on others to support
R&D from which they hope eventually to benefit, leading to even greater
underinvestment in R&D. But this is the nature of all so-called public goods.
That public or philanthropic investment would otherwise be needed to achieve
appropriate levels of spending on new technology is not a persuasive argument
for forcing a subset of consumers to support R&D through an unfair tax, or
against giving health care consumers a wider range of choice. In fact, most
consumers would probably choose coverage that, while being somewhat
selective about covering technologies at any price, would provide ample
incentives for valuable future R&D.
Finally, having noted how the heavy burdens of health-sector cross-subsidies
and R&D spending fall regressively on lower-income premium payers, we also
observe how the benefits of these same expenditures accrue disproportionately
not only to well-off suppliers and providers of medical goods and services but
also, less directly and less obviously, to high-income consumers of health care.
The latter are benefited, in the first instance, by having the needs of the
uninsured, the production costs of a wide variety of quasi-public goods
(including R&D), and other arguable public responsibilities met by means other
than equitable taxes. Moreover, high-income users of the health system also
appear to benefit from having their own health insurance premiums, which they
pay to obtain access to the costly new technologies they particularly covet,
substantially reduced by the involuntary contributions of other, less privileged
premium payers.64 To be sure, it is easy to assume that more and better health
care services and products are equally good for everyone. But the convenient
assumption of industry and economic elites that the spending and other

63. Cf. Posner, supra note 44. One justification often given for exempting certain private entities
from public taxation is that they assume burdens that the public would otherwise have to bear in
educating children or caring for the uninsured sick. See, e.g., Utah County v. Intermountain Health
Care, Inc., 709 P.2d 265, 278 (Utah 1985) (denying state tax exemption to hospitals in the absence of
“the essential element of gift to the community, either through nonreciprocal provision of services or
through the alleviation of a government burden”). This “burden theory” is usually invoked, however,
without any determination that, but for the private entity’s efforts, the public sector would in fact incur
costs equivalent to the tax relief granted. In other words, a judge or public official inclined to favor
government generosity in general or public support for the particular activity in question (e.g., health
care) might confer a tax exemption under the burden theory even if, had it come to a vote, the
legislature would not have been so generous. Reasonable minds differ over whether, in an ostensible
democracy, such spending choices should be made exclusively by elected officials.
64. This apparent (though unproven) inequity is discussed at length in Part III.
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priorities of ordinary Americans with respect to health care coincide with their
own preferences has never been put to a fair test in either the marketplace or
the political process.
5. In Sum
In the foregoing discussion we have made four important and somewhat
original observations: First, U.S.-style private health insurance, by greatly
weakening price elasticity of demand as a constraint on monopoly pricing by
health care providers and suppliers, facilitates the latter’s exercise of market
power, producing profits substantially exceeding the usual returns to lawful
monopoly.65 Second, such monopoly profits fuel a great deal of otherwise
unremunerative health-sector spending, mostly by tax-exempt nonprofit firms,
that society has in no economically or politically reliable way validated as
appropriate uses of its scarce resources. Third, it is questionable whether
inducing even highly valuable technological innovations in the diagnosis and
treatment of disease justifies forcing lower- and middle-income premium payers
to pay the extraordinarily high monopoly prices that insurance enables true
monopolists to charge. And, fourth, the burden of overpaying providers and
suppliers is imposed more or less equally, as if by a head tax, on all Americans
having private health coverage, thus regressively impacting all premium payers
below the high end of the income spectrum.
It has not escaped our notice that these observations about the
consequences for the United States of combining monopoly and health
insurance could be cited to support either a shift to a single-payer health system
or extensive administrative regulation of prices, especially for hospital services
65. We have not found in economics literature anyone expressly hypothesizing, as we do, that U.S.style health insurance, by substantially increasing actual and anticipated returns to both nonprofit and
for-profit monopolies in the health sector, not only adds to monopoly’s redistributive effects but also
induces allocative inefficiencies both different from and more troublesome than those usually
associated with monopoly. But see Garber et al., supra note 56 (2006 working paper demonstrating that
health insurance “creates incentives for a monopoly provider of a pharmaceutical to charge far more
for its product than it otherwise would”). Reasons why economists may be less concerned than we are
about monopoly’s effects in the health care sector include their sense that deadweight loss is not a
serious problem, see supra note 212, and their professional agnosticism about the welfare implications
of redistributing income, supra note 18. In addition, they may assume that unlawful monopoly is both
rare and a matter for antitrust enforcement when it does occur and that lawful monopoly is either a
natural phenomenon or a transient reward for entrepreneurial endeavor. In any event, our concern is
not about monopoly as such but about how it and health insurance interact. Here the problem is that
economists do not always appreciate the significance (see Part IV.C.) of de facto and de jure limits on
insurers’ willingness and ability to optimally counteract moral hazard. See, e.g., Gaynor, et al., supra
note 17 (considering whether, in theory, imperfect competition in medical markets might, by raising
prices, offset the misallocative tendencies of moral hazard, but answering the question only on the
assumption that, contrary to our observation, the insurance industry “is competitive [and] chooses
insurance policies . . . that maximize consumer welfare”). But see Pauly, supra note 24. The articles we
have found that are at all close to our theme include Danzon and Pauly’s demonstration of how
broader insurance coverage and new technologies reciprocally induce each other. Danzon & Pauly,
supra note 20 (observing that insurance increases inelasticity of demand and may thus “may affect . . .
the launch price of new drugs”). See also Garber et al., supra note 56 (demonstrating that health
insurance facilitates pricing of pharmaceuticals in ways that, in theory, may create excessive incentives
for innovation).
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and prescription drugs. But private health insurance does not inevitably
produce the consequences described here and might be reconfigured to allow
consumers to make real economizing choices, thereby restoring price elasticity
as a constraint on monopolists’ pricing. As discussion in Part IV of the article
will show, the problems we have identified in U.S.-style health coverage have
roots in public policies and private practices that could be easily adjusted to
enable lower-income consumers to escape many burdens the current system
imposes.
B. Excessive Costs: Undercompensating for Moral Hazard
The most commonly noted market distortion caused by private or public
health insurance, more familiar than its facilitation of the exercise of providers’
and suppliers’ market power, is the inefficiency that flows from so-called moral
hazard—that is, the tendency of insurance to induce consumption that would
not otherwise occur.66 Indeed, the fundamental lesson of health economics is
that insulating patients and providers from the direct cost of health services at
the time they are consumed guarantees that, without countermeasures, health
services will be consumed in excessive quantities, generating costs that, at the
margin, are greater (in theory, at least) than the extra services’ contribution to
well-being. This potential for excessive spending worsens over time, moreover,
as incentives for innovation tend to invite cost-increasing improvements more
than cost-saving ones.67 Achieving efficient resource allocation in the face of
such powerful distortions is obviously a daunting task. Even conducting a

66. See, e.g., 2004 ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, H.R. DOC. 108-145 (2004), 24, 189
(“Over-reliance on health insurance as a payment mechanism leads to an inefficient use of resources in
providing and utilizing health care.”). See generally CHARLES E. PHELPS, HEALTH ECONOMICS 325
(2003) (describing moral hazard as the “induced demand due to the health insurance coverage”).
67. Recent work by Amy Finkelstein estimates that the spread of health insurance from 1950 to
1990 (including the implementation of Medicare and Medicaid) accounted for at least forty percent of
the dramatic increase in per capita health spending during that period. Amy Finkelstein, The Aggregate
Effects of Health Insurance: Evidence from the Introduction of Medicare (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 11619, 2005). Although public and private insurance provided both
valuable financial security and subsidized access to essential health services, the moral-hazard effect
detected by Finkelstein is substantially greater than economists had previously detected in studies of
individual behavior under various insurance arrangements (for example, the RAND Health Insurance
Experiment). In contrast to the earlier studies, Finkelstein’s long time horizon enables her to detect
long-term market-wide effects induced by the substantially steeper demand curves that sellers
increasingly faced as health insurance spread. These effects include greatly altered styles of medical
practice and strong incentives to create and use technologies that would not pass most people’s benefitcost test. Finkelstein and others have also shown that Medicare, which provided only very limited
coverage for prescription drugs, did not appreciably stimulate pharmaceutical innovation. Daron
Acemoglu et al., Did Medicare Induce Pharmaceutical Innovation? 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 11949, 2006).
For looks at the other side of the same coin, observing that markets with large HMO market shares
featured slower diffusion of new technologies and correspondingly lower health care expenditures, see
Laurence C. Baker, Managed Care and Technology Adoption in Health Care: Evidence from Magnetic
Resonance Imaging, 20 J. HEALTH ECON. 395 (2001); see also Laurence C. Baker et al., The
Relationship Between Technology Availability and Health Care Spending, 2003 HEALTH AFF. (WEB
EXCLUSIVES) W3-537, W3-547–48 (acknowledging slowing the rate of availability of technology may
slow the spending growth rate).
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constructive debate over health policy is practically impossible because of the
difficulty of focusing on health care’s marginal, rather than its aggregate,
contributions to welfare.68
To be sure, the cost-increasing effects of moral hazard are arguably only an
abstract, theoretical problem at the “macro” level, where allocative efficiency is
the principal concern.69 But excessive consumption also has substantial
consequences at the “micro” level of household budgets. Although the cost of

68. Precisely because health care generates such large amounts of consumer surplus compared to
other industries (because the value of its benefits to individuals—when it yields benefits—can be so
great, perhaps the difference between life and death), it is difficult to think about health care at the
margin, where costs are apt to be large and benefits small, especially in probabilistic terms. Occasional
studies seek to justify large and increasing expenditures on health care by noting the huge benefits
obtained in recent years from improving life expectancy for, say, victims of heart disease or afflicted
neonates. E.g., DAVID M. CUTLER, YOUR MONEY OR YOUR LIFE: STRONG MEDICINE FOR
AMERICA’S HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 63 (2004) (“On the basis of low-birth-weight-infant- and
cardiovascular-disease-care alone, therefore, the benefits of medical care are about equal to its costs.”);
David M. Cutler & Mark McClellan, Is Technological Change in Medicine Worth It?, HEALTH AFF.,
Sept.-Oct. 2001, at 11 (examining five new technologies and concluding from these examples that
“medical spending as a whole is clearly worth the cost” (emphasis added)); Lichtenberg, supra note 57;
Frank R. Lichtenberg, Are the Benefits of Newer Drugs Worth Their Cost? Evidence from the 1996
MEPS, HEALTH AFF., Sept.-Oct. 2001, at 241; Frank R. Lichtenberg, Pharmaceutical Innovation,
Mortality Reduction, and Economic Growth (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
6569, 1998) (concluding that “a one-time R&D expenditure of about $15 billion subsequently saves 1.6
million life-years per year, whose annual value is about $27 billion”). Such studies divert attention
from the all-important margin, however. See Jonathan S. Skinner, Douglas O. Staiger & Elliott S.
Fisher, Is Technological Change In Medicine Always Worth It? The Case of Acute Myocardial
Infarction, 25 HEALTH AFF. 34 (2006) (questioning Cutler and McClellan, supra, on cost-justifications
for increased spending on cardiovascular disease after 1996; also noting, from regional data, lack of
correlation between spending increases and improvements in survival rates); see also Havighurst, How
the Revolution Fell Short, supra note 24, at 80 n.89 (criticizing Cutler & McClellan, supra). Many
investments in R&D produce little, if any, useful knowledge, and many new technologies represent
only marginal improvements, at best, over earlier, cheaper treatments. The crucial fact remains that
the system lacks accepted mechanisms for comparing marginal benefits and costs, especially in cases in
which a patient hoping for relief naturally demands heavy spending on his own behalf. See supra note
24. Indeed, because the public resists any recognition of tradeoffs, it is politically dangerous even to
suggest in a public forum that people might be better off with less rather than more health care.
Moreover, any policymaker concerned that health care may be claiming too large a piece of the
economic pie must also reckon with the political strength of the health care industry. And, finally, it is
hard to argue with the industry’s consistent ability to attract capital and create jobs in an otherwise upand-down economy or with its seemingly miraculous technical accomplishments. Largely for these
reasons, it is only rising health care costs that ever trigger political concern. Whatever its magnitude,
inefficiency that is already embedded in the economy is simply never going to be viewed as a problem
by the political class. See HAVIGHURST, HEALTH CARE CHOICES, supra note 24, at 89–92 (putting
high and rising health care costs in political and economic perspective).
69. To the extent that health insurance reduces the apparent price of the insured service below its
marginal cost, it introduces a welfare-loss triangle comparable to the deadweight-loss triangle it helps to
eliminate in the case of monopoly. See supra note 17. This triangle lies above the service’s demand
curve, however, and represents not underconsumption, but arguable overconsumption, of services—
specifically, services that consumers would not have found worth purchasing at marginal cost (the
competitive price). But see infra note 212 (expressing caveat about relying too mindlessly on demand
curves as indicators of welfare). The case of patented pharmaceuticals is anomalous because their
marginal cost of production is usually very low. Even a co-insurance payment of twenty percent might
therefore exceed it, creating at least a modest deadweight loss of the usual kind. As a substitute for
insured (and therefore underpriced) hospital and other medical care, it seems likely that drugs are used
less in therapy than they would be under an efficient pricing system—that is, if everything were priced
at marginal cost.
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such overutilization is distributed more or less equally across premium payers at
all levels of income, consumers with lower incomes are likely to attach less
value than their upper-income counterparts (at least, in the sense of their
willingness to pay) to insurance giving them easy access to all arguably
beneficial health care.70 Forcing working families who want health coverage to
bear, unnecessarily, the cost of rampant moral hazard could seriously diminish
their welfare. This second section of Part II focuses on health care costs and
utilization rather than on prices alone and shows how insurers’ suboptimal
attention to the moral-hazard problem not only misallocates resources but also
severely overburdens ordinary premium payers for the benefit of the health
care industry and elite consumers of health services.71
1. Conceding the Benefit-Cost No Man’s Land
Although insuring health care inevitably increases spending on it, not all of
the added spending thus induced is necessarily inefficient. After all, consumers
choose to buy health coverage specifically to enable themselves to purchase
services they might otherwise not be able to afford; added spending resulting
from consumer choices of this kind is efficient to the extent that it is an
unavoidable cost of valuable financial protection. Likewise, although health
coverage can be administered to curb the effects of moral hazard, it is often
more cost-effective to tolerate those effects than to incur the administrative
costs necessary to avoid them; once again, to the extent that moral-hazard costs
are incurred as a necessary cost of desired protection against risk, there is no
inefficiency from either an individual or a social point of view.72
Despite the acceptability of some higher costs as a necessary price of
avoiding financial risks, third-party-financed spending on health care could be
seriously inefficient for either of two reasons: (1) because payers are artificially
inhibited, by law or otherwise, from taking cost-effective steps to counter moral
hazard; or (2) because health coverage is not designed in the first instance with
a view to striking a suitable balance between financial protection and moral
hazard’s potentially huge costs. Unfortunately, U.S.-style health insurance
generates inefficiency on both scores, as health plans have not had, or even
sought, all the de facto and de jure authority they would need to efficiently
counteract the cost-increasing effects of moral hazard.73 Indeed, the U.S. system
appears to be rigged to give moral hazard nearly full sway. Thus, custom,
practice, law, and regulation all appear to be premised on the not-quite-explicit

70. See infra text accompanying note 209.
71. The article we have found that comes closest to expressing insights on the latter issue that are
similar to our own is Daniel Shapiro, Why Even Egalitarians Should Favor Market Health Insurance, 15
SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 84 (1998).
72. By the same token, it is inefficient, strictly speaking, for health insurance to cover a service that
easily passes a benefit-cost test in a particular case if covering it generally would generate moral-hazard
or administrative costs reversing the benefit-cost calculation. See infra note 75.
73. Part IV of this Article focuses more directly on the legal system’s responsibility for the
regrettable state of U.S. health care, including its effects in raising the costs of resisting moral hazard.
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notion that, subject only to modest cost-sharing requirements,74 unlimited access
to all arguably efficacious health services that a physician is willing to prescribe
is an inalienable right of all Americans having health coverage of any kind. To
be sure, this entitlement is not universal because many millions have no
coverage at all.75 The principal focus of this article, however, is on the many
millions more who pay excessive premiums to support a style of medical care
that serves the interests of the health care industry and elite consumers far
better than their own.
Even in the heyday of managed health care, health plans were not truly in
the business of legitimately administering coverage with a view to giving
premium payers optimal value in purchasing health services—by establishing,
mediating, and enforcing mutually agreed-upon limits on the right of individual
insureds to draw upon the premium pool. Instead, virtually all health plans
have long undertaken to pay for all “medically necessary” care, thereby making
efficacy and cost-effectiveness (in comparison with other measures of equal
efficacy) the only issues in most coverage disputes.76 In effect, U.S. health
insurers concede to the moral-hazard enemy virtually the entire no man’s land
of benefit-cost tradeoffs, where the battle against inefficient spending must be
fought if it is ever to be won.77 Since managed health care abruptly fell out of
74. On the regressive consequences of cost sharing as a method of counteracting moral hazard, see
infra notes 105–108 and accompanying text.
75. The nation’s failure to provide health coverage for the uninsured is in large measure a
consequence of the high and (currently) uncontrollable moral-hazard costs that such coverage would
certainly entail. Even so, it would be hard (in both senses of the word) to argue that present policy
toward the uninsured is, on this basis, actually “efficient.” See supra note 72. Our point instead is that
the insurance gap exists and widens over time largely because U.S. health insurers are unduly limited
by custom, law, and regulation in what they may or can do to contain moral hazard. Indeed, our main
argument is that these de facto and de jure restraints on health insurers’ ability to administer their
premium pools are part of a larger pattern of health policies that, whether intentionally or not, burden
middle- and lower-income Americans in order to serve other interests. That they also contribute
heavily to the plight of the uninsured, while in some respects a separate matter, should certainly be of
equivalent concern. For a study showing the various ways in which rising health insurance premiums
are adversely affecting lower-wage workers, see Katherine Baicker & Amitabh Chandra, The Labor
Market Effects of Rising Health Insurance Premiums (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 11160, 2005) (estimating that a 10% increase in health insurance premiums results in a 1.6%
reduction in the aggregate probability of being employed, an increase of 1.9% in the likelihood that a
worker will be employed only part-time, and 2.3% decrease in wages for those who remain employed
with employer-sponsored health insurance; for hourly workers, such a premium increase will reduce
hours worked by 1% and reduce the probability of being offered health insurance by 3.8%; also finding
it likely that workers covered by employer insurance will “bear the full incidence of increases in health
insurance premiums”). See also Michael Chernew et al., Increasing Health Insurance Costs and the
Decline in Insurance Coverage, 40 HEALTH SERVS. RES. 1021, 1034 (2005) (finding that rising health
insurance premiums accounted for over half of the decline in health insurance coverage during the
1990s).
76. See generally Timothy P. Blanchard, “Medical Necessity” Determinations—A Continuing
Healthcare Policy Problem, 37 J. HEALTH L. 599 (2003); William Sage, Managed Care’s Crimea:
Medical Necessity, Therapeutic Benefit, and the Goals of Administrative Process in Health Insurance, 53
DUKE L.J. 597 (2003); Einer Elhauge, The Limited Regulatory Potential of Medical Technology
Assessment, 82 VA. L. REV. 1525 (1996).
77. The no-man’s-land metaphor is explained graphically in Clark C. Havighurst & James F.
Blumstein, Coping with Quality/Cost Trade-offs in Medical Care: The Role of PSROs, 70 NW. U.L.
REV. 6, 15–20 (1975). See also HAVIGHURST, HEALTH CARE CHOICES, supra note 24, at 93–96.
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political and consumer favor in the late 1990s, U.S. health insurers have had
even less room to counteract moral hazard by administratively discouraging
consumption that fails any kind of benefit-cost test. The limits of health plans’
ability to refuse payment for particular prescribed services on benefit-cost
grounds help to explain not only the overutilization of health services of all
kinds but also the extraordinary profits (noted previously) that private
monopolists can generate in health care markets.78
The magnitude of overspending on health care occasioned by moral hazard
in the United States is ultimately an empirical question, of course, and it has
been suggested that the United States does not in fact greatly overuse resources
because its utilization rates for many services are comparable to those in other
nations.79 Such a comparison is largely pointless, however, because the moralhazard problem is universal and foreign systems may handle it almost as badly
as we do; also, it would be more informative to compare foreign consumption
patterns to the rates at which services are used by insured Americans—
especially (for our purposes) by Americans with private coverage.80 In any
event, there is evidence that even much heavier spending on health care in
some parts of the United States correlates poorly, and sometimes inversely,
with improvement in health outcomes.81 In addition, many studies have
revealed heavy spending that is wasteful even by professional standards of
medical necessity, let alone by comparison with consumer preferences about
how their personal resources should be deployed.82 To be sure, such studies,

78. Although not labeled as such in earlier text, the extra pricing freedom that health insurance
confers on monopolists is itself a manifestation of moral hazard, flowing as it does from the removal of
consumers’ price-consciousness in purchasing insured services.
79. Anderson et al., supra note 13; Reinhardt et al., supra note 8.
80. See infra note 197.
81. See Jonathan Skinner, Elliott Fisher & John Wennberg, The Efficiency of Medicare, in
ANALYSES IN THE ECONOMICS OF AGING (D. Wise, ed., 2005); Elliot S. Fisher et al., The Implications
of Regional Variations in Medicare Spending. Part 1: The Content, Quality, and Accessibility of Care,
138 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 273 (2003); Elliot S. Fisher et al., The Implications of Regional
Variations in Medicare Spending. Part 2: Health Outcomes and Satisfaction with Care, 138 ANNALS OF
INTERNAL MED. 288 (2003); Katherine Baicker & Amitabh Chandra, Medicare Spending, the Physician
Workforce, and the Beneficiaries’ Quality of Care, 2004 HEALTH AFF. (WEB EXCLUSIVES) W4-184.
82. Studies to show inappropriate utilization were common in the 1980s and early 1990s, many of
them conducted under the auspices of the RAND Corporation. See, e.g., MARK R. CHASSIN ET AL.,
INDICATIONS FOR SELECTED MEDICAL AND SURGICAL PROCEDURES: A LITERATURE REVIEW AND
RATINGS OF APPROPRIATENESS: CORONARY ARTERY BYPASS GRAFT SURGERY (1986); Robert H.
Brook et al., Predicting the Appropriate Use of Carotid Endarterectomy, Upper Gastrointestinal
Endoscopy, and Coronary Angiography, 323 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1173 (1990); Lucian L. Leape et al.,
The Appropriateness of Use of Coronary Artery Bypass Graft Surgery in New York State, 269 J. AM.
MED. ASS’N 753 (1993); Lee H. Hilborne et al., The Appropriateness of Use of Percutaneous
Transluminal Coronary Angioplasty in New York State, 269 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 761 (1993); Steven J.
Bernstein et al., The Appropriateness of Use of Coronary Angiography in New York State, 269 J. AM.
MED. ASS’N 766 (1993). In order to ensure acceptance by the medical profession, the earlier RAND
studies relied heavily on professional opinion without asking physicians to compare benefits and costs,
yet still found numerous surgical and other procedures to be significantly overused. See, e.g., ROLLA
EDWARD PARK ET AL., PHYSICIAN RATINGS OF APPROPRIATE INDICATIONS FOR SIX MEDICAL AND
SURGICAL PROCEDURES 6 (1986). In later studies, in order to identify spending of truly marginal
benefit, the researchers asked physicians to focus, not just on medical necessity or appropriateness, but
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while certainly suggestive of a systematic failure to compare benefits and costs,
are really little more than anecdotal evidence of inefficiency since they take no
account of costs that would have to be incurred to achieve a more efficient
result. But there is, in any event, one feature of the American system that
clinches the argument that the current U.S. spending level is highly inefficient—
namely, the unlimited tax subsidy for employer-purchased health coverage, the
pernicious effects of which are described immediately below.83
2. How the Tax Subsidy Aids the Moral-Hazard Enemy
The ultimate reason why sellers and purchasers of health coverage have not
designed it in the first instance to balance the value of financial protection to
consumers against the costs of moral hazard is the substantial tax subsidy that
government has long provided to encourage employers to purchase private
health insurance. This subsidy takes the form of an exclusion of employersponsored health plan premiums from employee income subject to federal and
state income and payroll taxes.84 Its principal effect over time has been to
induce employers to be casual about efficiency in the health coverage they
procure on their employees’ behalf. Thus, instead of seeking optimal insurance
for various subsets of their workers, they bought generous, comprehensive
coverage with minimal cost sharing for everyone in order that as many health
care bills as possible could be paid with untaxed dollars.85 Amplified by
uncontrolled moral hazard, such overinsurance causes an apparently severe
misallocation of the economy’s resources.
Many observers think they detect regressivity in the tax subsidy simply
because of its greater apparent value to higher-bracket taxpayers and those with
the costliest coverage—frequently one and the same.86 Yet the unfairness here

on “cruciality,” producing an even more troublesome picture. See, e.g., PAUL P. LEE ET AL.,
CATARACT SURGERY: A LITERATURE REVIEW AND RATINGS OF APPROPRIATENESS AND
CRUCIALITY 48–50, 163–274 (1993). These studies and their findings are discussed in some detail in
HAVIGHURST, HEALTH CARE CHOICES, supra note 24, at 254–62.
83. PHELPS, supra note 66, at 356–57 (1997) (estimating, based on empirical estimates of demand
for insurance, that “employer-group health insurance premiums would be only about 55 percent as
large today if the tax subsidy were not in effect”; “it seems possible that the health sector would be at
least 10 to 20 percent smaller without the tax subsidy for health insurance”).
84. See generally Mark V. Pauly, Taxation, Health Insurance, and Market Failure in the Medical
Economy, 24 J. ECON. LIT. 629 (1986). A complementary subsidy allows deductions for health
insurance premiums paid by self-employed individuals. The total 2004 cost, in revenue forgone, of the
various federal and state “tax expenditures” subsidizing privately purchased health insurance has been
estimated at $209.9 billion. John Sheils & Randall Haught, The Cost of Tax-Exempt Health Benefits in
2004, 2004 HEALTH AFF. (WEB EXCLUSIVES) W4-106. Other tax subsidies with possible implications
for fairness include the deduction allowed (for itemizers) for out-of-pocket health expenses above 7.5%
of adjusted gross income and the favorable tax treatment of health spending through flexible spending
accounts. On new tax breaks for health savings accounts, see infra notes 93–98 and accompanying text.
85. For employees in the highest federal and state tax brackets, the saving achievable may exceed
fifty percent.
86. E.g., MADISON POWERS & RUTH FADEN, SOCIAL JUSTICE: THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF
PUBLIC HEALTH AND HEALTH POLICY 132–33 (2006). It is estimated that 26.7% of the economic
benefit they confer accrues to the 14% of taxpayers with annual incomes of at least $100,000; likewise,
“only 28.4 percent of all [these] tax expenditures will go to families with incomes below $50,000, even
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may be more apparent than real. Indeed, the regressive tax consequences
would be entirely offset if, as is arguably the case, the government replaces the
revenue it loses through such tax expenditures by taxing other income at higher
progressive rates.87 Thus, the tax subsidy may do no more for high-bracket
taxpayers, directly, than give them with one hand what the government
simultaneously takes away with another. But, even though this aspect of the tax
subsidy provides, at best, only weak evidence of the pervasive injustice we
observe in U.S. health care, there are other, more indirect ways in which the
subsidy disproportionately benefits economic elites at the expense of the less
affluent.
A particularly important effect of the tax subsidy for employer-purchased
health coverage has been to make employers—rather than consumers, acting
individually or in other, more homogeneous groups—responsible for designing
or selecting most of the private health coverage that Americans enjoy.
Although seemingly serving as purchasing agents for their employees,
employers have agendas of their own and will inevitably make choices that
benefit some (usually higher-income) employees more than others.88 It is at this
point that the greater value of the tax subsidy to higher-income workers has
distributional consequences, by biasing employers in the direction of buying
costlier coverage than even a median-income employee would choose for
himself under a more equitable subsidy.89
Perhaps the most important and pervasive effect of the tax subsidy and
employer purchasing induced thereby is a subtle one. By making health
coverage a largely undisclosed part of employees’ overall compensation,
employer purchasing effectively hides the true cost of coverage from those who

though this group contains 57.5 percent of all U.S. families.” Sheils & Haught, supra note 84, at 110.
But for this substantial regressivity, characterizing the exclusion from taxable income as a “subsidy”
might not be appropriate at all, since a taxing authority might simply find it fairer to tax individuals’
income only after certain basic necessities were provided for. But the subsidy here is decidedly not
limited to encouraging the purchase of only basic coverage. See Lawrence Zelenak, Of Head Taxes,
Income Taxes, and Distributive Justice in American Health Care, 69 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 103, 113
(Autumn 2006).
87. For a study showing awareness of this point, see Holahan & Zedlewski, supra note 6, at 235,
240 tbl.6 (in estimating total health care cost burdens borne by various deciles of consumer-taxpayers,
“we calculate income and payroll taxes that are required to finance the employer-paid health benefit
tax exclusion”). Many believe that tax expenditures—exclusions and deductions designed to achieve
substantive policy objectives—are generally unwise as a matter of tax policy because they shrink the tax
base, thus requiring higher marginal tax rates on other income to produce the same amount of revenue.
These higher rates, it is believed, adversely affect overall productivity. In any event, it is unclear that
higher-income Americans need any subsidy at all to encourage their purchase of essential health
coverage.
88. See Havighurst, How the Revolution Fell Short, supra note 24, at 70 (“[Because] only a
generous plan sends workers the message most employers want to convey about their concern for
worker welfare . . . and also because health benefits are useful in attracting and keeping workers with
the best chances of being hired by someone else, employee health plans are likely to be costlier than
even the average worker would demand (even with tax subsidies enhancing his purchasing power).”).
89. See infra text accompanying note 100.
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ultimately bear most of that cost in the form of reduced take-home pay.90
Precisely because their costs are hidden from them, employees are more likely
to demand and expect expensive health care even when their true interest
would be served by economizing.91 The entitlement mentality induced by
consumers’ inability to see the connection between their pocketbooks and the
many macro health-care choices that others make on their behalf plays out not
only in employment groups but also in explicitly political arenas where
legislative and regulatory policies with large consequences for the cost of care
are made.92 Discussion in Part IV of this article will show that hiding health care
costs from those who pay them is a key element in the systematic exploitation of
ordinary consumers in U.S. health care law and policy.
The impact of the tax subsidy for employer-purchased health coverage may
change somewhat in the near future as a result of recent legislation extending
favorable tax treatment to the funding of health savings accounts (HSAs).
Under the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement and Modernization Act
of 2003,93 consumers (or employers on their behalf) are permitted, within limits,
to fund HSAs with untaxed dollars if the HSA is coupled with a high-deductible
health plan (HDHP) meeting certain requirements.94 This legislation is widely
heralded as the centerpiece of a movement toward “consumer-directed” health
care (CDHC), which aims to correct the tax-induced tendency toward
overinsurance and thereby to restore a degree of cost-consciousness to
individuals’ consumption and purchasing decisions. Arguably, the new tax
break for funds that consumers set aside to pay future health care bills offsets
the previous tax-induced bias in favor of comprehensive insurance coverage and
against the use of substantial cost sharing to counter moral hazard. Although a
better way to achieve this objective would have been to cap the tax subsidy or
90. See supra note 4. Employers only rarely offer their workers more than one health care option
with the employee required to pay the full additional cost above the cost of the lowest-price plan. See
Alain C. Enthoven, The Fortune 500 Model for Health Care: Is Now the Time to Change?, 27 J.
HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 37 (2002); see also infra note 119.
91. The only time that consumers may actually see the true cost of health coverage is in choosing
between jobs that do and do not carry health benefits. See MARK V. PAULY, HEALTH BENEFITS AT
WORK: AN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS OF EMPLOYMENT-BASED HEALTH INSURANCE
(1997); see also supra note 4. Although wage differentials between otherwise similar jobs have been
noted, such all-or-nothing choices, with health care as only one of many considerations being weighed,
are not clearly reliable expressions of consumer preferences with respect to marginally beneficial care.
92. The political consequences of the tax subsidy are rarely recognized, even by scholars. But see
Havighurst, How the Revolution Fell Short, supra note 24, at 78–86.
93. Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 101, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003).
94. The HDHP must have an annual deductible anywhere from $1000 to $5000 for single coverage
or from $2000 to $10,000 for families, in which event untaxed dollars may be contributed to the
individual’s HSA each year in amounts up to the lesser of $2250 for an individual ($4500 for a family)
or the HDHP’s deductible. (Because the stated amounts are indexed for inflation, they are understated
here). HSAs, which may be maintained with either a financial institution or an insurer, can then
accumulate investment earnings tax-free. Account owners may draw on these funds at any time,
without tax on the distribution, to pay a broad range of “qualified medical expenses,” broadly defined.
See infra note 96. For arguments for expanding the scope of HSAs even further, see Michael F.
Cannon, Health Savings Accounts: Do the Critics Have a Point?, POL’Y ANALYSIS (CATO INST.,
Washington, D.C.) May 30, 2006, at 1, available at http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=6395.
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to replace it with government-issued vouchers of a limited, perhaps meanstested value, such reform ideas have not been well received in the political
world.95 The CDHC agenda has therefore been implemented, not by cutting
back the tax benefits of buying health services through an insurance plan, but
by creating an equivalent tax break for out-of-pocket (or, more accurately, outof-HSA) spending.96
The CDHC reforms’ leveling of the playing field of health insurance choices
should in due course cause a shift toward health coverage that is less
significantly bedeviled by moral hazard. Indeed, under the reforms, moral
hazard’s costs, though they can never be eliminated, should eventually become
merely an inherent cost of insuring against undue financial risks, no longer
inflated by over-broad coverage designed primarily to exploit a tax loophole.
Moreover, the availability of funds in HSAs that can be used to pay amounts
that an individual’s health plan is not obligated to pay should make it more
tolerable for health plans both to require more than nominal cost sharing and to
deny coverage for services that fail contractual tests requiring comparisons of
benefits and costs.97 To be sure, the tax subsidy will continue to affect
substantially the margin at which employers and consumers face trade-offs,
ensuring high levels of consumption. But the CDHC reforms may in time
change many employer calculations that have heretofore allowed moral hazard
far too much room in which to operate.98

95. See Pauly, supra note 84; see also infra note 217 (suggesting limited, refundable tax credits as a
more practical and equitable way to subsidize and universalize basic coverage).
96. It is relevant to our thesis in this article that the strategy chosen creates, whether by accident or
design, an important new tax shelter for the well-to-do. Lower-bracket taxpayers will not, it seems
certain, be in a position to take equivalent advantage of this new tax break because, in addition to
deriving smaller tax savings than those with higher incomes, they will find it harder to deposit the full
amounts allowed. Wealthier taxpayers, on the other hand, not only can afford to deposit more untaxed
money in their HSAs but also can elect to spend after-tax dollars on their medical care, leaving their
HSA funds to accumulate tax-free, as in a tax-favored retirement plan. (After an HSA owner attains
age sixty-five, any funds remaining in the HSA may be either withdrawn as taxable income or rolled
over into a tax-favored retirement account for further tax deferral.) The effect is to give higher-bracket
taxpayers yet another means of deferring taxes on present income and of escaping payroll taxes
altogether. See Eric Dash, Wall Street Senses Opportunities in Health Care Savings Accounts, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 27, 2006, at A1, A16 (“Not since the creation of the individual retirement account in the
mid-1970’s has such a potentially huge mountain of money landed in the lap of the financial services
industry.”). A very strong tax-equity argument can be made for making earnings on HSAs taxable with
individuals’ other income.
97. The need to manage health benefits and moral hazard will be essentially unaffected by the
CDHC reforms because the great majority of health care spending occurs in cases that would quickly
consume the contemplated deductibles. See generally Mark A. Hall & Clark C. Havighurst, Reviving
Managed Health Care with Health Savings Accounts, 24 HEALTH AFF. 1490, 1490–91 (2005) (arguing
that “combining managed care with HSAs can help to re-legitimize managed care in the public eye by
clarifying the respective decision-making responsibilities of health plans and patients. . . . Specifically,
the availability of HSAs should make it clearer to most people that plans’ denials of coverage are not
meant to ration health care itself but only to limit the availability of third-party financing.”).
98. See also infra notes 148–50 and accompanying text.
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3. Who Benefits (Most) from Uncontrolled Moral Hazard?
The high costs that Americans incur in overconsuming health care yield
greater benefits for some people than for others. Obviously, the economic wellbeing of the health care industry and the some twelve million individuals it
employs has come to depend on the excess resources that flow into the health
care enterprise because of uncontrolled moral hazard and the unchecked
market power exercised by many of the industry’s components.99 Of course, not
all elements of the industry are excessively rewarded for their efforts, and, as
noted earlier, much of the excess profit that some providers and suppliers are
able to earn because of entry barriers, weak competition, and so forth is used to
support a variety of seemingly (though far from clearly) worthwhile activities.
Nevertheless, many industry participants are enriched unduly, often for
performing services that the public has in no reliable way decided are worth
paying for. Moreover, although the beneficiaries of the various cross-subsidies
and investments in innovation are difficult to trace, it is unlikely that they are all
equally needy or deserving. In general, the health care system’s inefficiencies
support a huge, politically powerful industry whose claims on the nation’s
wealth and premium payers’ incomes have not been validated either through a
well-functioning, well-informed political process or by consumers’ informed
choices in unrigged markets.
Less obvious beneficiaries of public policies abetting moral hazard are those
consumers who especially prefer, even at high cost, health coverage that puts
few obstacles in their way in consuming health services and few limits on their
access to costly technology. In particular, affluent Americans, because they are
less daunted by extravagant price tags and more heavily subsidized by the tax
system, especially want their employers to select a health plan that will pay for
virtually everything their physicians prescribe. Moreover, they are in a strong
position to have this preference honored because the tax subsidy’s dilution of
cost-consciousness inclines lower-income employees in the employment group
also to favor health coverage of this expensive kind.100 High-income Americans
are thus well served by a system that, by effectively hiding the cost of coverage,

99. See Uwe E. Reinhardt, Resource Allocation in Health Care: The Allocation of Lifestyles to
Providers, 65 MILBANK Q. 153 (1987) (emphasizing the extent to which consumer savings from
enhanced price competition would come at the direct expense of industry insiders). Although many
people admire the health care industry for providing numerous secure, well-paying jobs and for being
relatively recession-proof, these features are a direct consequence of a financing system that denies
consumers easy opportunities to economize when family budgets are squeezed. Moreover, the
reciprocal effect of the health sector’s relative stability is greater instability in the rest of the economy,
including lessened job security for those who work outside the health sector but pay tribute to it
through their health insurance premiums. This is simply one more unrecognized way in which U.S.
health policy hurts working Americans while benefiting stakeholders in the health sector.
100. To be sure, generous health benefits are also found in plans that some employers maintain only
for lower- and middle-income, usually unionized, workers. Labor unions’ persistent demands for
especially generous benefits do not disprove, however, our contention that rich health plans are
contrary to the true interests of middle-income workers. Instead, they prove only that, like politicians,
union leaders (another elite) know how to exploit, in their own interest, workers’ mistaken belief that
the employer alone bears the cost of their health benefits.
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induces employees of all incomes to favor the costliest variety. “Other Ranks”
often pay more so that the elite classes can be assured of health care suiting
their elevated tastes.
III
ARE LOWER-INCOME PREMIUM PAYERS
SHORTCHANGED ON THE RECEIVING END AS WELL?
Affluent Americans may benefit at the expense of their lower-income
coworkers in another, more direct way. To be sure, it would not necessarily be
unfair if higher-income employees generally enjoyed somewhat more and better
health care than those with lower incomes;101 they also drive safer cars, eat

101. For recent journalism implying both surprise and concern that health services often vary
according to the patient’s income, see Janny Scott, Life at the Top in America Isn’t Just Better, It’s
Longer, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2005, at A1. But demand for much health care is income-elastic, meaning
that people naturally spend more on it as their incomes increase. See also Renee Mentnech et al., An
Analysis of Utilization and Access from the NHIS: 1984-92, HEALTH CARE FIN. REV. Winter 1995, at
51, 55–56 (concluding from National Health Interview Survey data that among patients in relatively
good health, higher income increases the probability of a physician visit); see generally PHELPS, supra
note 66, at 148–49. Studies of individuals under full insurance indicate that income elasticity is positive
but rather small. See EMMETT B. KEELER ET AL., THE DEMAND FOR EPISODES OF MEDICAL
TREATMENT IN THE HEALTH INSURANCE EXPERIMENT (1988) (data from RAND experiment
showing relatively small income effects, elasticities of about 0.2). Income elasticities estimated from
time series data, which capture the effects of new medial technologies, are higher and approach unity.
See Martin Feldstein, Hospital Cost Inflation: A Study of Nonprofit Price Dynamics, 60 AM. ECON.
REV. 853–72 (1971); Catherine McLaughlin, HMO Growth and Hospital Expenses and Use: A
Simultaneous-Equations Approach, 22 HEALTH SERVICES RES. 183–202 (1987) (finding an income
elasticity of 0.7 using data from 1972 to 1982). Although proper measurement of income elasticity
would focus on permanent income, most correlation studies use data reflecting transitory income, thus
diluting the apparent effect of income on health expenditures if households encountering sudden
sickness both earn below their normal income and increase their consumption of health care. In any
event, studies show that, for many health services, income elasticity exceeds unity, which means
percentage increases in income translate into even greater percentage increases in spending on those
services. See, e.g., Ronald Andersen & Lee Benham, Factors Affecting the Relationship Between Family
Income and Medical Care Consumption, in H.E. KLARMAN, EMPIRICAL STUDIES IN HEALTH
ECONOMICS (1970) (finding income elasticity greater than unity for dental care); Fred Goldman &
Michael Grossman, The Demand for Pediatric Care: An Hedonic Approach, 86 J. POL. ECON. 259
(1978); Marian E. Gornick, Disparities in Medicare Services: Potential Causes, Plausible Explanations,
and Recommendations, HEALTH CARE FIN. REV. Summer 2000, at 23 (citing data on physician visits
and medical procedures); Carol L. Jenkins, Resource Effects on Access to Long-Term Care for Frail
Older People, 13 J. AGING & SOC. POL’Y 35 (2001) (presenting data on nursing home care).
In our view, the income elasticity of demand for health care makes much of the recent concern over
disparities in the care received by different racial, ethnic, and income groups, see infra note 111,
unrealistic, reflecting a too-casual assumption that consumption of health care should be equal for all
groups and classes. Such equality, in addition to being unrealistic as a practical matter—which is not to
say that it should not be actively promoted in specific contexts—would be achievable at reasonable cost
only by leveling down, thus radically denying people the freedom to spend more on health care than
others choose or are able to spend. Cf. Chaoulli v. Quebec, 2005 S.C.C. 35, 29272, [2005] S.C.J. No. 33
QUICKLAW (June 9, 2005) (Canadian Supreme Court’s invalidation of Quebec law prohibiting
purchase of private health insurance for services covered by Canada’s national health program, on the
ground that adverse health consequences resulting from national program’s waiting lists made
prohibition unconstitutional). Moreover, while equality has great symbolic value for many, maintaining
it as a goal hampers efforts to ameliorate the specific inequities we identify in this article.
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healthier food, and live in safer, less-polluted neighborhoods.102 But it should
certainly be a cause for concern if consumption patterns vary greatly and
positively with income—rather than with health needs alone—in situations
where everyone pays the same premium for the same health coverage. This
appears to be the case in many U.S. health plans, since higher-income
employees seem to make greater use of their coverage, demanding and
receiving more and costlier services at plan expense than their lower-income
coworkers.103 Although appearances may be deceiving, in many employment
groups it certainly looks as if health insurance premiums paid on behalf of
lower-income members go to subsidize the costly consumption habits of those
with higher incomes. If this perception of systematic inequity in the purchase
and distribution of benefits within individual health plans is accurate, it would
represent yet another unfairness to working Americans—on top of the other
regressive features of the U.S. system observed in previous discussion. Once
again, the tax subsidy is the ultimate source of the problem. By causing health
coverage to be purchased in heterogeneous employment groups (including
individuals with disparate, income-correlated preferences and consumption
patterns), it creates conditions in which lower-income premium payers may be
paying—unwittingly—costs incurred by their more demanding, affluent, and
influential coworkers. The unfairness would only be compounded by the
circumstance that lower-income persons often are in generally poorer health
and have greater health care needs. 104
The most obvious factor that could be expected to cause income-correlated
differences in the consumption of health services by individuals in the same
health plan is cost sharing. Most studies of cost sharing focus only on whether it
unduly discourages consumption of health services by less-affluent patients.105

102. In general, society treats health care as a merit good, not to be rationed solely by ability and
willingness to pay. At the margin, however, spending on health care provides only limited value for
money spent—perhaps only hope or a slightly reduced probability or imminence of a bad outcome—
making it (presumably) socially acceptable for persons with higher incomes to receive services that
others cannot afford. Such persons are in a position to put a higher valuation on their well-being,
ascribing higher costs to sick days and higher value to healthy ones, and to substitute away from timeintensive investments in health, such as bed rest, in favor of paying for medical interventions.
103. This tendency was dramatized for one of the authors when, in the 1970s, his employer, in a
seemingly progressive move, combined two similar health plans it maintained for hourly-paid and
higher-paid salaried workers, respectively, with the result that the former’s premium contributions rose
while the latter’s declined.
104. See generally James P. Smith, Healthy Bodies and Thick Wallets: The Dual Relation Between
Health and Economic Status, 13 J. ECON. PERSP. 145 (1999) (illustrating that socioeconomic status
tends to positively correlate with health status). Even if it should appear that a health plan’s
expenditures were the same per capita for both high- and lower-income members, it could be argued
that the poorer health status of the latter group should entitle them to additional, not just equal,
spending; in any event, a finding of such equality would belie the usual assumption that, in employee
health plans, the healthy wealthy substantially subsidize the low-wage sick. Although we suspect that it
may be the other way around, the picture is more complicated to the extent the health status of lowerincome workers is worse. For a fuller exposition of the possibility that the predominant redistribution
is as generally assumed, see Hall, supra note 50, at 165–68. See also infra note 116.
105. The classic study was the RAND Health Insurance Experiment. See JOSEPH NEWHOUSE ET
AL., FREE FOR ALL? LESSONS FROM THE RAND HEALTH INSURANCE EXPERIMENT (1993). See also

02__HAVIGHURST_RICHMAN.DOC

Autumn 2006]

3/7/2007 3:53 PM

DISTRIBUTIVE INJUSTICE(S) IN AMERICAN HEALTH CARE

43

Our concern, however, is not that health care is rationed or distributed
unequally but the likelihood that conditioning eligibility for insurer payments
on patients’ willingness to make certain out-of-pocket payments causes lowerincome participants in employee health plans to get disproportionately fewer
benefits than their more affluent coworkers receive in return for equivalent
premiums; similar effects might also occur in health plans offering such pointof-service choices as the option of spending more to see a non-network
physician or to use a brand-name drug.106 Likewise, as employers pursue the
increasingly popular strategy of funding health savings accounts and enrolling
their workers in high-deductible health plans, it is possible that greater
emphasis on cost sharing to contain moral hazard will cause insurers’ premium
pools to be allocated even more disproportionately to the care of the affluent.107
Although these matters do not appear to have been specifically studied by
others, we hypothesize that many common forms of employee health coverage
allow those who are better able to pay various up-front fees to enjoy
disproportionately large insurance benefits at the expense of others.108
Still another possible cause of income-correlated disparities in the volume
and quality of health services received by participants in the same health plan
may be physicians’ and health plans’ different approaches and attitudes in
treating different patients. According to one observer, “[w]ell-off and
influential patients tend to link up with elite academic and private physicians, to
JULIE HUDMAN & MOLLY O’MALLEY, KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED,
HEALTH INSURANCE PREMIUMS AND COST SHARING: FINDINGS FROM THE RESEARCH OF LOW
INCOME POPULATIONS (2003); Mitchell D. Wong et al., Effects of Cost Sharing on Care Seeking and
Health Status: Results from the Medical Outcomes Study, 91 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1889 (2001); Avi Dor
& William Encinosa, Does Cost Sharing Affect Compliance? The Case of Prescription Drugs (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10738, 2004).
106. The apprehended unfairness would not occur if, as we believe is only rarely the case, the plan
charged patients who choose the more expensive option its full incremental cost. Cf. infra notes 119 &
120. It is also notable—although our point here is somewhat different—that using more or costlier
services, out-of-network providers, or non-formulary drugs may frequently produce better health
outcomes. Thus, those who are most discouraged by additional charges may get poorer service while
still seemingly subsidizing higher-quality care for those whose consumption choices are less affected.
See, e.g., Dor & Encinosa, supra note 105 (showing that co-insurance and, to a lesser extent, fixed copayments unduly discourage patients from taking efficacious preventive medicine).
107. This would occur if, as seems likely, lower-income individuals are more reluctant than higherincome participants in the same HDHPs to spend their HSA funds to satisfy deductibles and other costsharing prerequisites for tapping insurance funds. Indeed, the raison d’etre of the CDHC reform
strategy is to encourage use of heavier cost sharing to counteract moral hazard, displacing the arguably
more even-handed rationing methods employed by managed-care organizations. See Hall &
Havighurst, supra note 97, at 1492 (“[T]he strategy of causing consumers to set aside assets for
spending on their own health care should inspire at least some economizing behavior of the sort that
has been systematically missing with comprehensive first-dollar coverage.”). The empirical issue, not
yet studied (as far as we are aware), is whether and how much HSAs will affect the income-elasticity of
demand for health services. See supra note 101.
108. Intuition suggests that such effects will occur under any insurance plan providing ostensibly
equal benefits for both high- and low-income enrollees. Although we have found no studies attempting
to detect actual regressive effects in individual employment groups, data from the RAND Health
Insurance Experiment clearly showed that, in a controlled setting, cost sharing had noticeably greater
effects on middle-income consumers than on higher-income ones. NEWHOUSE, supra note 105, at 46.
This is just the effect we believe causes systematically regressive effects in employee health plans.
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sustain their relationships with these physicians, and to benefit from these
physicians’ sponsorship and advocacy in hospital and other institutional
settings. Middle-class patients tend to access a lower level of sponsorship and
advocacy . . . .”109
It would also be natural for physicians and other
decisionmakers, perceiving that more educated patients have especially high
expectations concerning their health care, to strive to accommodate those
expectations, whatever the patient’s nominal entitlement. Moreover, insured
individuals who are more Internet-savvy, articulate, assertive, or demanding can
frequently get their physicians or health plans to prescribe more or better
services for them than other patients normally receive.110 Thus, in addition to
the economic incentives associated with cost sharing, a number of other factors
generally correlated with income also suggest that affluent patients may
systematically get more out of their health plans than they pay for while others
get less.111
Some economists may be hard to persuade that lower-income members of a
health plan actually subsidize their higher-income coworkers even though the
latter, as a class, take greater advantage of collectively purchased health
benefits. To be sure, economists are generally comfortable with the idea that
employees, not employers, ultimately bear the cost of their health coverage.112
But they could plausibly argue that it is artificial to treat an employee’s pro rata
share of the employer’s total premium as the actual cost that the individual
109. M. Gregg Bloche, Race and Discretion in American Medicine, 1 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. &
ETHICS 95, 108 (2001).
110. A suggestive example of how some patients can “work the system” appears in a notable recent
case: Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355 (2002) (finding no obstacle in federal law to
enforcing Illinois statute requiring so-called external review of HMO denials of coverage). The
plaintiff, having been clever enough to find an out-of-state surgeon offering an especially aggressive
treatment for her neurological condition, was able to persuade her HMO doctor (though he disclaimed
any expertise) to opine that the surgery was medically necessary—contrary to several other medical
opinions supporting the HMO’s more conservative approach. She was also able to travel out of state
twice, pay nearly $100,000 to have the procedure done, and hire a lawyer to take her case through
several courts to obtain reimbursement of that amount. It is virtually certain that other members of the
HMO, though paying the same premiums as Ms. Moran, would not have received similarly costly
treatment for a similar problem.
111. Researchers are currently paying a great deal of attention to disparities that correlate with
patients’ racial and ethnic characteristics. See, e.g., INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, UNEQUAL TREATMENT:
CONFRONTING RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN HEALTHCARE (2003); Symposium, Racial &
Ethnic Disparities, 24 HEALTH AFF. 316 (2005). Some of these disparities may be attributable in whole
or in part to considerations of the kind mentioned in the text. Although most studies of the matter
have focused only on inequality as such, several can be cited in support of our hypothesis that
physicians resonate to income-correlated patient expectations. E.g., Michelle van Ryn & Jane Burke,
The Effect of Patient Race and Socio-Economic Status on Physicians’ Perceptions of Patients, 50 SOC.
SCI. & MED. 813 (2000) (examining physicians’ attitudes toward patients and revealing that lower-SES
patients are viewed as less independent, less rational, less responsible, and less intelligent than their
wealthier counterparts); S. Willems et al., Socio-Economic Status of the Patient and Doctor-Patient
Communication: Does It Make a Difference?, 56 PATIENT EDUC. & COUNSELING 139 (2005)
(reviewing literature finding that patients from lower social classes receive less-effective
communication and exert less control over their consultations with their physician). Evidence from
countries in which health insurance status is equal for all patients also suggests that low-SES patients
tend to receive fewer services at health-plan expense. See infra note 121 & 122.
112. See supra note 4.
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bears. Indeed, strictly speaking, the true cost of health coverage to an
employee is the opportunity cost of forgoing alternative employment that pays
more but lacks equivalent health coverage. In light of this fact, an economist
might suggest that employers unconsciously adjust the amount of wages they
are willing to pay to different classes of worker to reflect the class’s propensity
to utilize employer-financed health benefits—in which case it might be incorrect
to hypothesize that lower-income workers actually bear costs incurred by
higher-income, higher-utilizing participants in the same plan.113
Despite the plausibility of these alternative hypotheses, the question is
ultimately an empirical one on which little evidence has been collected.
Moreover, the notion that there is no regressivity depends on heroic
assumptions about employee and employer perceptions, rationality, and the
smoothness of the market’s operation. Thus, workers’ decisions about which
jobs to take turn on many factors besides the implicit value of particular health
coverage. Furthermore, employers probably think only rarely in terms of total
compensation packages, perhaps even administering employee benefits and
cash compensation in separate cost centers.114 In any event, although we cannot
be certain that labor market forces do not ameliorate the situation we
apprehend, it would be ironic if defenders of the health care system, most of
whom customarily reject all economic theorizing as unrealistic, were to cite such
market forces in arguing that, despite appearances in many health plans, lowerincome insureds do not in fact subsidize the health care of the rich.
Our concern about possible regressive redistribution in employer-sponsored
health plans would be obviated if employers generally offered their employees
separate plans, each designed for a different income group.115 In each such plan,

113. Under this hypothesis, the employer referred to in supra note 103 would be expected to adjust
wages (upward) and salaries (downward) in subsequent years to eliminate the seeming inequity. But
proving that such adjustments actually occurred would be difficult if, rather than being made explicitly,
they took the form of unconscious responses to labor market conditions.
114. One apparent exception—that nevertheless may only help to prove the general rule—is the
lower wages paid by employers to obese workers, which have been convincingly attributed in part to
such employees’ greater demands on the employer’s health insurance. Jay Bhattacharya & M. Kate
Bundorf, The Incidence of the Healthcare Costs of Obesity (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 11303, 2005). As to employees in general, however, unless an employer is self-insured, it is
unlikely to have good information on how heavily various employee subgroups use their health
benefits; indeed, because the researchers in the cited study did not distinguish between self-insured and
other employers or show that employers knew what wage adjustments to make, they could not rule out
the possibility that the reduced wages of obese workers reflected only assumptions or general prejudice.
In any event, it does not follow from the treatment of obese employees that the salaries of highutilizing, high-income employees would be similarly reduced. On the other hand, if the market does
adjust wages downward for high utilizers, it should also, presumably, adjust them favorably for
employees using fewer services. But few would expect to find that employees on the wrong side of
widely noted racial disparities are receiving compensatorily higher wages.
115. This suggestion that insurance pools should be subdivided flies in the face of the conventional
view that large, heterogeneous pools are socially desirable because they seem to cause healthier,
wealthier insureds to subsidize the care of less healthy, lower-paid enrollees. See supra note 104.
Although not finally proven, the hypothesis we offer in the text suggests not only that such progressive
redistribution is not necessarily the rule but also that most employment groups provide, not social
insurance, but what might be called “anti-social” insurance, with subsidies actually running in regressive
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members would be similarly, rather than dissimilarly, affected by cost sharing
and other factors affecting consumption, thus minimizing income-correlated
differences in access to the premium pool. Moreover, benefits in each plan
could be designed with particular regard to the group members’ financial
circumstances. For example, lower-wage workers, with fewer discretionary
funds available in a health crisis, would presumably prefer lower cost sharing
for essential services; on the other hand, for higher-paid personnel, optimal
protection against moral hazard would require higher out-of-pocket payments.116
Of course, a plan with lower cost sharing—if it were meant to optimally serve
lower-income workers—would have to economize in other ways, perhaps by not
undertaking to cover everything deemed “medically necessary” and instead by
obtaining contractual authority to compare benefits and costs in resolving
coverage issues. Plans for higher-income workers, on the other hand, could be
more generous. In any event, if employers did provide such explicitly different
coverage to different income groups, there would be little basis for concern
about regressive redistribution because take-home pay for members of each
group could then be reasonably presumed to reflect their respective health
benefits. More economical coverage would also materially enhance the welfare
of the lower-income group.117
Our impression is that today’s employers, rather than creating different
health plans for different folks, regularly include all workers in the same
insurance pool.118 To be sure, many employers offer their employees a menu of
health plan choices. But many such arrangements appear to exacerbate, rather
than eliminate, the potential for regressive results. Thus, in the great majority
of instances, the employer pays more for those who choose costlier options—
rather than, as Alain Enthoven has convincingly advocated, making them pay

directions. It is probable, to be sure, that large insurance groups organized in employment settings do
benefit incidentally those whose recurrent health problems and serious chronic conditions might make
them uninsurable, or insurable only at prohibitive cost, in an insurance market in which individuals
seek to pool their health risks only with others facing similar risks. In any event, analyzing these
matters is obviously complicated by the possibility, discussed in the text, that the labor market
ultimately causes wages and salaries to reflect the actual burdens that various income classes impose on
the employer’s health plan.
116. In theory, optimal cost sharing is a function of several factors, including the insured’s ability to
bear financial risk and the slope of the group’s demand curve for the service in question (which reveals
whether it is viewed as a discretionary service or a vital one in most cases). Indeed, but for the high
cost of administering finely tuned coverage, coinsurance rates would be set separately for each discrete
service rather than, as is the general practice, applied across the board to all services (a notable
exception being the generally higher coinsurance rates charged for outpatient psychiatric services,
imposed in the belief that such services are especially discretionary). The problem might be addressed
in part, of course, by offering different plans with different cost sharing so that lower-income persons
could purchase coverage more suitable for their situations.
117. See Shapiro, supra note 71.
118. On the case of employers dealing with labor unions, see supra note 100. The usual
explanations given for large risk pools are that they can command lower premiums for actuarial reasons
and can drive harder bargains with providers. Although such considerations introduce tradeoffs that
might tilt the balance in some cases, the alternative explanation we offer suggests that some such
benefits, even if real, may come at the expense of distributional fairness.
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the full additional cost.119 In these cases, there is reason to fear that those
choosing the cheaper package are indirectly bearing some of the costs incurred
by those who choose (and get) more costly care.120 Once again, of course, the
question is an empirical one, but we will not be easily persuaded that
regressivity all comes out in the wash—that is, that salaries and wages are lower
or higher for particular subgroups depending upon the coverage members of
the group tend to select. As usual, the unlimited tax subsidy, both by
empowering employers to make the crucial choices and by hiding the true (or
marginal) cost of coverage from the rank-and-file, is the main culprit—the
reason why both rank-and-file and higher-income employees tend to be
included in the same insured groups, creating environments in which costsharing requirements and other factors can naturally cause the regressive effects
that concern us.
Although we have found little empirical research confirming (or rejecting)
our hypothesis that employer-sponsored health plans in the United States are
rife with regressive redistributions of wealth, significant inequities in the
distribution of benefits in other countries’ national health systems are
suggestive of similar effects in U.S. health plans. Thus, a study in Canada found
that “patients with higher incomes and education levels were significantly more
likely to have been referred for coronary angiography . . . , cardiac
rehabilitation . . . , and to a cardiologist . . . following discharge from . . .
hospitalization [for acute myocardial infarction].”121 Similarly, data from the
British National Health Service indicate that “[m]ore deprived individuals (in
terms of income, education and employment) have lower than expected use of

119. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION & HEALTH RESEARCH AND EDUCATIONAL TRUST,
EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS: 2004 ANNUAL SURVEY 63, exh. 4.7 (2004) (reporting that only
nineteen percent of employers offering employees a choice of plan—and the same percentage of the
largest employers as well—make the same dollar contribution regardless of plan chosen); see Enthoven,
supra note 90. Regressivity would not be a significant problem under Enthoven’s prescription—
assuming that incremental costs are calculated actuarially, with appropriate awareness of different
groups’ propensity to use their coverage.
120. Indeed, we speculate that employers pool all their nonunionized employees for purposes of
health coverage in part because the unwitting contributions of lower-income workers make it cheaper
for them to provide the benefits that high-income employees particularly desire. See supra text
accompanying notes 88 & 89. Under the hypothesis that employers prefer arrangements under which
the rank-and-file subsidize the coverage of more affluent employees, one would expect most employers
to resist—as they have—Enthoven’s proposal to equalize contributions for each employee. Also,
employers could be expected to be slow—as they have been—to adopt the CDHC approach, under
which HSAs must be funded equally for all employees. Gary Claxton et al., What High-Deductible
Plans Look Like: Findings from a National Survey of Employers, 2005 HEALTH AFF. (WEB
EXCLUSIVES) W5-434 (finding less than four percent of employers offered HSA/HDHP coverage in
2005).
121. David A. Alter et al., Socioeconomic Status, Service Patterns, and Perceptions of Care Among
Survivors of Acute Myocardial Infarction in Canada, 291 J.A.M.A. 1100, 1103–04 (2004); see also
Norman Frohlich et al., Health Service Use in the Winnipeg Regional Health Authority: Variations
Across Areas in Relation to Health and Socioeconomic Status, HEALTH MGT. FORUM, Supplement
(Winter 2002) 9–14 (presenting additional Canadian data).
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health services.”122 These regressive distributional results presumably flow from
factors similar to those we believe cause disproportionate allocations of
insurance funds to higher-income participants in health plans sponsored by U.S.
employers.
Experience under the Medicare program is also consistent with our
impression that, even when a health plan creates equal entitlements for a large
population, wealthier participants will prove more equal than others.123 To be
sure, the principal reason why wealthier beneficiaries consume more than an
equal share of Medicare-financed services is the shorter life spans of lowerincome beneficiaries, who, despite having paid Medicare taxes throughout their
working lives, do not live long enough, on average, to derive as much value
from the program as wealthier beneficiaries. But wealthier beneficiaries also
consume Medicare services at higher rates during their years in the program—
even though beneficiaries lower on the income scale tend to have poorer health.
Thus, several studies by Jonathan Skinner and co-authors have found Medicare
spending on beneficiaries residing in zip codes where incomes are highest to be
substantially greater than spending in other areas—except where incomes are
lowest but beneficiaries have not only the poorest health but also special
assistance from Medicaid in paying out-of-pocket costs.124 Another study found
122. M. Sutton et al., Allocation of Resources to English Areas: Individual and Small Area
Determinants of Morbidity and Use of Health Care Resources, Report to the Department of Health
(Edinburgh: Information and Services Division, 2002); see also Max Exworthy et al., Evidence into
Policy and Practice? Measuring the Progress of U.S. and U.K. Policies to Tackle Disparities and
Inequalities in U.S. and U.K. Health and Health Care, 84 MILBANK Q. 75, 79 tbl.1 (2006). For data from
Australia, see Anthony Scott et al., Is General Practitioner Decision Making Associated with Patient
Socio-economic Status?, 42 SOC. SCI. MED. 35 (1996) (finding patients of high socioeconomic status
more likely to be tested for illnesses and less likely to receive a prescription, suggesting the visit was
unnecessary).
123. See Karen Davis & Roger Reynolds, Medicare and the Utilization of Health Care Services by the
Elderly, 10 J. HUM. RESOURCES 36 (1975) (finding significant income effects on the number of
physician visits by Medicare beneficiaries with a similar health status); Marian E. Gornick et al., Effects
of Race and Income on Mortality and Use of Services Among Medicare Beneficiaries, 335 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 791 (1996) (showing a positive correlation between Medicare beneficiaries’ income and their
utilization of certain physician services, including screenings); Charles R. Link et al., Equity and the
Utilization of Health Care Services by the Medicare Elderly, 17 J. HUM. RESOURCES 195 (1982)
(concluding that income affects the number of physician visits by those on Medicare when controlling
for health status); Gornick, supra note 101. On the regressivity of Medicare’s financing—that is, the
question of who pays as opposed to who benefits (the subject of discussion here)—see supra notes 1 &
48. On the larger question of Medicare’s net distributional effects, see supra note 1.
124. Their more recent data suggests that lower-income households began to account for higher
levels of spending in the mid-1990s. See McClellan & Skinner, supra note 1; Julie Lee, Mark McClellan
& Jonathan Skinner, The Distributional Effects of Medicare Expenditures (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 6910, 1999); Jonathan Skinner & Weiping Zhou, The Measurement and
Evolution of Health Inequality: Evidence from the U.S. Medicare Population (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research Working Paper No. 10842, 2004). But see Bhattacharya & Lakdawalla, supra note 1.
Query whether similar distributional effects may occur under the new Medicare prescription-drug
benefit once it is finally implemented. See supra note 20. This benefit, enacted in 2003, includes a socalled “doughnut hole”—that is, a lack of coverage for any annual expenditures between $2250 and
$3600 that applies only after an initial government outlay of seventy-five percent of all expenditures up
to $2250 (after a $250 deductible) and that a beneficiary must cover himself before new catastrophic
drug coverage kicks in. The up-front benefit, covering easily budgetable expenditures, was obviously
adopted so that the (Republican) proponents could represent to voters that the bill, while generally
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that in the second and third years prior to death, average Medicare spending
was greater for beneficiaries living in areas with the highest median income.125
Mark McClellan and Skinner, considering such evidence in 1999, concluded that
“lower-income beneficiaries who are not eligible for Medicaid [are] the income
group that fares least well in terms of net benefits in traditional Medicare,” and
that Medicare’s intragenerational transfers are largely from lower-income to
higher-income households.126
Unfortunately, Medicare data provides only weak support for our thesis
that, all else being equal, higher-income beneficiaries of a single health plan will
get significantly more out of it. Because higher-income Medicare beneficiaries
are more likely to have Medigap coverage, they face lower financial barriers to
using Medicare benefits.127 Their higher utilization rates therefore do not finally
establish that nominally equal entitlements alone do not guarantee incomeneutral distribution of benefits. Even in the absence of definitive U.S. evidence,
however, our hypothesis is supported by appearances, intuition, and experience
in analogous settings. On this basis, we are prepared, pending further
investigation, to make our allegation of regressivity an additional count in our
indictment of U.S. health care as, in several important respects, a fraud on the
working class. Together with the many other unfairnesses we detect in
American health care, the regressive tendencies we adumbrate here invite
attention to reforms that would enable people to purchase, collectively or
individually, only the health care they want and are willing, with the help of
public subsidies (up to a point), to pay for.

confusing, would immediately benefit all beneficiaries, not just the minority with very high drug costs.
But this representation hid the doughnut hole, which could present a problem for many lower-income
beneficiaries, with the result that higher-income users of the system are likely to claim a
disproportionate share of total benefits.
125. Lisa R. Shugarman et al., Differences in Medicare Expenditures During the Last 3 Years of Life,
19 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 127 (2004). Note that focusing on consumption in years prior to death,
rather than on consumption by age cohorts, may be a good way to ensure comparisons of consumption
by individuals with a similar health status.
126. Mark McClellan & Jonathan Skinner, Medicare Reform: Who Pays and Who Benefits?,
HEALTH AFF., Jan.–Feb. 1999, at 48, 59. The authors observe, however, that Medicare’s overall
unfairness was mitigated by legislation in 1994 removing the earlier ceiling on the amount of salaries
and wages subject to the Medicare tax. Another study, adding some irony to consumption disparities,
finds that much of the higher utilization is explained by the more inpatient-based and specialistoriented patterns of care that are typical of high-spending regions and that this additional consumption
does not appear to improve quality of care, access to care, satisfaction with care, or health outcomes.
Fisher et al., supra note 81.
127. See Rezaul K. Khandker & Lauren A. McCormack, Medicare Spending by Beneficiaries with
Various Types of Supplemental Insurance, 56 MED. CARE RES. REV. 137 (1999) (finding that Medicare
beneficiaries who enjoy Medigap or employer-sponsored supplemental coverage consume more
Medicare dollars than beneficiaries covered by Medicare alone); Renee Mentnech et al., An Analysis of
Utilization and Access from the NHIS: 1984–92, HEALTH CARE FIN. REV., Winter 1995, at 51 (similar
finding with respect to a Medicare beneficiary’s likelihood of visiting a physician); Nadereh Pourat et
al., Socioeconomic Differences in Medicare Supplemental Coverage, HEALTH AFF., Sept.–Oct. 2000, at
186 (finding that lower-income individuals are less likely to enjoy supplemental coverage).

02__HAVIGHURST_RICHMAN.DOC

50

3/7/2007 3:53 PM

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 69:7

IV
OVERREGULATION OF HEALTH CARE: IN WHOSE INTEREST?
The previous discussion describes the surprising number of ways in which
those working Americans who have health coverage bear, or appear to bear,
excessive costs in supporting a health care system that serves the interests of the
health care industry and its higher-income customers better than it serves
themselves. This Part IV shows how industry practice, public policy, health care
law, and government regulation are all structured at the most fundamental
levels to ensure that this regressive allocation of benefits and costs remains the
pattern in U.S. health care. The story told here is largely about how the
political process and the legal system operate in tandem to limit, de facto and de
jure, consumers’ opportunities to economize, thus ensuring that their money
will continue to flow, without their consent (if they want health coverage at all),
to the benefit of elite interests.
A. Prescription Versus Consumer Choice
A crucial question is why Americans do not treat health care as an ordinary
consumer good in the sense that they buy more or less of it (both in quantity
and quality) as their personal preferences and financial situations dictate.128 To
be sure, health insurance and the tax subsidy make consumers less costconscious than they normally would be, thus shifting outward the margins at
which most choices are made. But these influences do not explain why, at these
new margins, consumers’ choices are still not free, but are instead narrowly
cabined by industry convention and practice on the one hand and by law and
regulation on the other. Nor are the limits on freedom of contract adequately
explained—as so many seem to think—by health care’s special significance.
Although health care can often make the difference between a healthy life and
death or disability, it is not itself risk-free, nor is it all equally important to wellbeing. Moreover, when the special character and importance of health care are
clear, government and the legal system have long supplied specific protections
for patients—for example, the legal duty of hospitals to provide emergency care
without regard to ability to pay.129 With the special importance of health care
128. On the macroeconomic consequences, indirectly adverse to Americans working outside the
health sector, of limiting consumers’ opportunities to economize on health care, see supra note 99.
129. Both federal and state laws require hospitals with emergency departments to stabilize emergent
conditions without regard to commercial considerations. See, e.g., supra note 35 and accompanying
text; Thompson v. Sun City Cmty. Hosp., 688 P.2d 605, 610–11 (Ariz. 1984) (enforcing the statutory
duty to treat an indigent’s emergency at county expense). Although these laws stop short of imposing a
duty to provide free extended care or other services, federal, state, and local governments also provide
subventions, public hospitals, and public clinics as additional safety nets for those with serious health
needs and no health insurance. See supra note 38. Also, in the same spirit as laws requiring emergency
care, common-law courts do not permit a health care provider having an established relationship with a
patient to terminate it at will if doing so would place the patient in peril. E.g., Surgical Consultants,
P.C. v. Ball, 447 N.W.2d 676, 682 (Iowa Ct. App. 1989) (holding that although her doctor’s office had
told the plaintiff she was no longer a patient because of an unpaid bill, a valid claim for “abandonment”
could be proved by “evidence that the physician has terminated the relationship at a critical stage of the
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recognized in these specific respects, it might seem acceptable for freedom of
contract to prevail with respect to less crucial, though still consequential,
matters. Our question here is why health care is mostly provided under very
costly prescriptions of a regulatory and professional nature, not under
conditions reflecting consumer preferences freely revealed in the marketplace.
To be sure, health care is a paradigmatic example of a so-called merit good,
something that society does not wish to see distributed solely on the basis of
individuals’ ability and willingness to pay. But characterizing health care in
general as a merit good does not preclude its being treated as a consumer good
at the margin.130 The two characterizations are not mutually exclusive. Thus, it
is possible to visualize a health policy under which public subsidies would
enable each consumer to purchase a contractual entitlement to at least essential
services of decent quality and no one would receive more or better health care
than he or she prospectively purchased with that assistance. Yet the nation has
never treated health care this way, nor has it ever seriously considered doing
so.131 Moreover, because the health care marketplace does not make low-cost
options available, millions of Americans go without any coverage at all despite
the financial subsidies available to them, and many millions more pay
substantially more for health care than they would rationally choose to pay if
they had good information and a full range of choices. Parts II and III of this
article showed how the bargains offered consumers in the current marketplace
are, for the great majority of them, bad ones. Not only are lower-income
consumers denied the chance to take marginal risks (which might be their best
bets in spending limited resources), but the premiums they pay for coverage
defray many costs unrelated to their own care.
The most obvious reason why low-cost health care—provided, for example,
by less highly trained professionals or with only restricted access to expensive
technology—is unavailable to American consumers is government intervention
and the U.S. legal system. Many such options are simply excluded from the
patient’s treatment, that the termination was done without reason or sufficient notice to enable the
patient to procure another physician, and that the patient [was] injured as a result thereof.”). In
addition, insurance law provides special protections against such dangerous insurer practices as badfaith denials of claims for benefits. See generally WILLIAM M. SHERNOFF ET AL., INSURANCE BAD
FAITH LITIGATION (1984 & Supp. 2006); Alan O. Sykes, “Bad Faith” Breach of Contract by First-Party
Insurers, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 405 (1996).
130. See supra note 102.
131. The Clinton administration’s proposed Health Security Act of 1994 was first presented to the
public with the claim that it “empowers consumers to make more cost-conscious choices by choosing
among health plans on the basis of price and quality. Consumers reap the savings from enrolling in a
health plan that delivers the guaranteed benefits for a lower premium.” Press Release, The White
House, Health Security Preliminary Plan Summary (Sept. 22, 1993), available at
http://www.clintonfoundation.org/legacy/092293-press-release-on-health-care-security-plan.htm.
But
although this and other rhetoric implied that competition and consumer choice would primarily drive
the projected system, the plan’s details, by specifying seemingly generous “guaranteed benefits,”
greatly limited consumers’ options and the role of private contracts in particularizing rights and
obligations. In fact, the proposal’s egalitarianism quotient (and thus its probable cost) was quite high.
See HAVIGHURST, HEALTH CARE CHOICES, supra note 24, at 29–89, for a thorough review of the
Clinton proposal in this light.
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market by legal doctrines, rules, and regulations ostensibly designed to uphold
the quality of the health services people receive or the health coverage they
enjoy. Other options, although not explicitly precluded by law, would present
the first innovator with enough legal risk and uncertainty to make the cost of
introducing them prohibitive.132 However well-intended and protective the legal
regime may seem to be, any marginal benefits it yields are, of necessity, of
greater value to some people than to others. Without questioning the need for
basic legal protection against bad quality, misrepresentation, and overreaching,
we first observe here the general propensity of our legal and political
institutions to lay down and maintain rules that serve elite interests at the
expense of everyone else and, then, show some ways in which the legal
environment of U.S. health care manifests this regressive propensity. Although
the legal regime does not directly redistribute income from the have-lesses to
the have-mores, its biases and influences add significantly to our picture of a
system rigged for the latter’s benefit. Our interest here is the political economy
and legal environment of health care and how they effectively deny consumers
opportunities to economize when it would be in their interest to do so.
Although the discussion below covers some familiar ground, it also identifies
some special, under-recognized reasons why, under current circumstances,
popular government cannot be trusted to treat lower- and middle-income
consumer-voters fairly in making health policy.
B. Legislating for Health Care
Political theorists and realists alike have long appreciated that legislation on
economic matters is hardly ever the product solely of objective reasoning about
what the overall public interest requires. Instead, it emerges from a complex
political struggle in which special interests and factions compete, often behind
the scenes, to induce government to employ its taxing, spending, prescriptive,
and coercive powers in ways advantageous to themselves. Even in theory, the
democratic process of majority voting provides little basis for confidence that
legislation will improve aggregate welfare. Indeed, with so few constitutional
limits on what a majority can do, majority rule is pregnant with the possibility
that significant minority interests will be sacrificed for small majority gains.
Although some minorities (the affluent, for example) are well positioned to
protect their interests in the political arena, others are highly vulnerable to
legislation that worsens their position, whatever its net effect on society as a

132. As a thought experiment, it is instructive to ask why Americans cannot buy Canadian-style or
U.K.-style health care, both substantially cheaper than the U.S. variety though in some respects
(waiting time, for example) probably less good. Cf. Chaoulli v. Quebec, 2005 S.C.C. 35, 29272, [2005]
S.C.J. No. 33 QUICKLAW (June 9, 2005). It is our sense that such innovative offerings, even if not
actually barred by law, would face enough legal uncertainty to make them untenable despite their
potential attractiveness to many consumers. No single firm could afford to defend its innovation
against the inevitable legal challenges if its competitors could follow at no cost any trails it succeeded in
blazing. It would be hard to argue, though, that what is good enough to satisfy a political majority of
Canadians or Britons is not good enough for many Americans.
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whole. More ominously (and as next explained), the political process provides
few guarantees that even majority interests will not frequently be sacrificed for
the benefit of especially powerful minorities. In the health care field, the net
effect of such failures of the political market is a systematic overburdening of
those at the lower end of the income scale.
1. The Political Power of Influential Minorities
Social (or public) choice theory and research have shown that majority rule,
despite its logic, does not prevent powerful minorities from frequently using the
legislative process to their own advantage, even at the expense of the electoral
majority. The paradigm case is one in which a small number of participants in
the political process have large individual stakes in a legislative measure about
which members of the majority care little, either because each individual’s
interest is very small or because they have not taken the trouble to inform
themselves about it. The small, more homogeneous group has a comparative
advantage in solving the collective-action problem—that is, the tendency of
some members of an affected group to hang back (as free-riders) in the hope
that others will take the actions needed to identify, protect, and advance their
collective interest.133 Even if a voting member of the majority recognizes his
potential stake in a particular matter, he must also realize that neither his vote
nor any other action he might take has much chance of affecting the legislative
outcome—a circumstance that lessens his incentive to inform himself fully in
the first place or to act on whatever information he may have.134 Thus,
whenever a legislative struggle pits a smaller group with large interests against
the mass of consumers or taxpayers, the minority is likely to win. Moreover, the
rent-seeking minority’s gains, while substantial, may easily be less than the net
costs imposed on the majority, thus diminishing aggregate welfare.

133. As an interest group becomes larger and more diverse, the practical problems of organizing for
political or other collective action become greater. See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF
COLLECTIVE ACTION (rev. ed. 1971); Mark A. Peterson, From Trust to Political Power: Interest
Groups, Public Choice, and Health Care, 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 1145, 1154–57 (2001)
(describing the declining political effectiveness of the American Medical Association and the rise of
competing interest groups in the health care field).
134. A perennial problem in policy analysis is the quickness with which some analysts endorse a
larger role for government than for markets on the ground that consumers, on whose choices markets
depend, are ignorant, powerless, and easily manipulated. See, e.g., Russell Korobkin, The Efficiency of
Managed Care “Patient Protection” Laws: Incomplete Contracts, Bounded Rationality, and Market
Failure, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1999). Yet those same consumers, precisely because they have so little
hope of protecting themselves successfully in the political process, are apt to be even more ignorant,
individually powerless, and manipulable in their capacity as voters—to whom democratic government is
supposed to be accountable. Moreover, some consumer-voters are better equipped to participate in
and influence the political process than others, compounding the potential for harm to the most
ignorant and least politically effective. On the other hand, an attractively democratic feature of free
markets is the absence of majority dictation to the minority and the incentives they therefore create for
participants to cater specifically to minority tastes and needs. Whatever need there may be for law and
regulation to protect against real abuses, it too often serves as an excuse for disenfranchising consumers
and for empowering government and those whom it serves best.
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Political scientists and some others will rightly say that things are not as
simple as social-choice or interest-group theory suggests.135 But even when the
legislative struggle is complex and features a large number of competing
interests and factions interacting over time, the likelihood of coalitions against
poorly organized consumers and taxpayers remains high. Thus, even conceding
that legislators and public servants sometimes rise above opportunism and act
in the interest of higher values, political outcomes, if scrutinized with care
(including due skepticism about the values politicians profess to serve), are very
often consistent with the theory. Indeed, even proposals that seem unarguably
progressive on their face are regularly tailored for special interests before they
emerge from the legislative process. Such failures of the political market
appear to be especially common in the health care field, manifesting themselves
both in explicit regulation and in other measures that tilt sharply in the
direction of elite interests.136
2. The Political Consequences of Hiding Costs from Those Who Pay
Although public choice theory alone can explain much of the costincreasing, rent-generating regulation found in the health care sector, such
regulation has been much easier to enact and maintain because the cost of
health care is so well hidden from consumers as a direct and indirect
consequence of the tax subsidy.137 Because health coverage is paid for mostly
through employers’ undisclosed reductions of employees’ taxable income,
consumers have seen little reason, as voters, to question legal restrictions that
purport to uphold the quality of care.138 Certainly employers have some interest
in health care costs as well as significant political influence that they might use
to contest regulatory excesses. But employers’ attitudes toward health care
regulation are heavily influenced by the perceptions and expectations of their
workers and by their own awareness that, in the last analysis, their employees,

135. See, e.g., Symposium, Getting Beyond Cynicism: New Theories of the Regulatory State, 87
CORNELL L. REV. 267 (2002).
136. For an example of special-interest influence over seemingly benign legislation in the health
care field, see Sallyanne Payton & Rhoda Powsner, Regulation Through the Looking Glass: Hospitals,
Blue Cross, and Certificate-of-Need, 79 MICH. L. REV. 203 (1980), which shows how hospital and
insurance interests supported early certificate-of-need laws that were promoted as cost-containment
measures but in fact served to curb competition and to legitimize, rather than prevent, cost increases.
Although our overview cannot do full justice to all the specific regulatory programs and legal rules
touched upon, our survey adds weight to our claim that U.S. health care is systematically arranged and
governed to take unfair advantage of the lower- and middle-income majority. We have already
suggested in Part II the breathtaking magnitude of the injustice that concerns us.
137. See supra text accompanying notes 84–92.
138. Many of the most questionable regulatory policies, moreover, are maintained well out of public
view and are even more rarely seen as controversial. Although federal regulators are now required to
provide benefit-cost comparisons when adopting new regulations, similar requirements rarely govern
health-sector regulation at the state level. See generally Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein,
Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1995) (discussing use of regulatory impact
analyses by federal agencies). For a discussion and comparison of regulatory impact statements by
state agencies, see Robert W. Hahn, State and Federal Regulatory Reform: A Comparative Analysis, 29
J. LEGAL STUD. 873 (2000).
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not themselves, will pay any higher costs. Consumer-voter complacency about
their own health care costs thus removes a vital counterweight to the political
advantages usually enjoyed by regulated interests, creating a political economy
in which legal and regulatory standards are set with little regard for the costs
they cause consumers to bear.
The conventional justification for many kinds of government regulation is
consumers’ inability to distinguish in the marketplace between good and bad
quality. Additionally, it is generally thought self-evident that the extra
complexity of health care, together with its extra potential for causing serious
harm, justifies heavy regulation of the health sector. But when consumers for
the most part are not—or think they are not—spending their own money, the
situation is fraught with new hazards. Such consumers, fully cognizant of the
special riskiness of purchasing health services in ignorance, will want both
health coverage that virtually eliminates temptations to economize and rigorous
regulatory measures to exclude risky options from the market.139 Because the
insured population represents such a large voting bloc, their weak costconsciousness combined with their nervousness about economizing virtually
ensures political choices that err on the side of overspending. Only the interest
of the federal and state governments in the costs of their own health programs
provides a countervailing interest in keeping costs in hand.140 The irony, of
course, is that most consumer-voters tend—in their ignorance—to support
policies contrary to their true self-interest.
The inability of consumers to see what they are spending on their health
coverage is no accident but has long been a keystone of U.S. health policy.
Although fortuity may explain the original decision in the 1940s to subsidize
health coverage through the tax system, for two generations powerful interests
resisted making costs visible in ways that might cause consumers to consider
how much, given their other needs, they wished to spend on marginal health

139. In a classic 1963 article on medical economics, economist Kenneth Arrow speculated that
consumers’ fears about purchasing in ignorance alone were a sufficient explanation for health-sector
regulation:
The general uncertainty about the prospects of medical treatment is socially handled by rigid
entry [i.e., physician licensing] requirements. These are designed to reduce the uncertainty in
the mind of the consumer as to the quality of product insofar as this is possible. I think this
explanation, which is perhaps the naive one, is much more tenable than any idea of a
[medical] monopoly seeking to increase incomes. No doubt restriction on entry is desirable
from the point of view of the existing physicians, but the public pressure needed to achieve the
restriction must come from deeper causes.
Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 941,
966 (1963). Writing before Medicare and Medicaid and at a time when the public was both less
insulated from and less concerned about the cost of health services, Arrow had no reason to be
concerned about the possibility of overregulation.
140. Even here, state governments, which are responsible for some of the most restrictive regulatory
controls, see none of the costs of Medicare and only a fraction of their own Medicaid costs, which are
paid in substantial measure with matching federal funds. See James F. Blumstein & Frank A. Sloan,
Health Care Reform Through Medicaid Managed Care: Tennessee (TennCare) as a Case Study and a
Paradigm, 53 VAND. L. REV. 125, 136–49 (2000).
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care.141 The most obvious beneficiary of the cost-hiding policy was the health
care industry itself, which wanted as little resistance as possible when indulging
its propensity for higher spending. In addition, however, high-income
consumers of health care have also benefited from policies and practices that
consumer-voters supported only because they did not appreciate the effects on
their own finances. The tax subsidy also gave union leaders an opportunity to
earn credit with the rank and file by negotiating expensive health benefits
seemingly provided at employers’ expense; more important to the powers that
be, it also reduced the labor movement’s interest in promoting national health
insurance, as trade unions had successfully done in other western countries.142
As the specific needs of the less well-off were neglected, the health care
industry and its affluent allies enjoyed many happy returns.
For a variety of reasons, therefore, the tax subsidy remained untouchable in
the political system for many years even though no one could defend it on its
policy merits. To be sure, one might argue (1) that the public really wanted (a)
as much health care as doctors advised patients to consume, and (b) not to
know how much they were paying for that care; and (2) that the nation
accordingly made a political choice to have the system that emerged.143 But
market and political choices made by a public that is kept in almost total
ignorance about costs can legitimize nothing, certainly not the systematic
exploitation of the majority by affluent minorities that we observe in U.S.
health care.
3. Will Shifting Overt Cost Burdens to Consumers Change Things?
Over time, and particularly recently, employers have increased the share of
health care costs that employees pay directly, making them more costconscious—and consequently, we presume, somewhat less dependably
supportive of public policies limiting their opportunities to economize on health
care. Consumers, however, still see only the tip of the iceberg of health care
costs. And they have no way of knowing the opportunity costs the system
forces them to bear by restricting their economizing options to a relatively

141. Although proposals to “cap” the tax exclusion have been offered from time to time, they have
always fallen on deaf political ears. See HAVIGHURST, HEALTH CARE CHOICES, supra note 24, at 103
(“[C]apping the tax subsidy is a notion that only a policy wonk could love, a meritorious policy idea
with no natural political constituency.”).
142. See generally MARIE GOTTSCHALK, THE SHADOW WELFARE STATE: LABOR, BUSINESS, AND
THE POLITICS OF HEALTH CARE IN THE UNITED STATES 42–44 (2000) (observing how, after World
War II and the introduction of the tax subsidy, the labor movement divided its efforts between
bargaining for health benefits and advocacy of national health insurance, but failing to highlight the tax
subsidy as a key explanation for the movement’s priorities).
143. For the view that “[c]onsumers have sought the kind of health insurance they have . . . precisely
because they don’t wish to be forced to make rational trade-offs when they are confronted with medical
care consumption decisions,” see Bruce C. Vladeck, The Market v. Regulation: The Case for Regulation,
59 MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q. 209, 211 (1981). Although it is true that people buy coverage to
avoid difficult choices, Vladeck’s statement begs the question whether people have in fact been offered
either market or political choices requiring them to face the high marginal cost of the extra levels of
protection he says they demand.
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narrow range. Thus, while the movement to make consumers more cost-aware
may be creating market and political demand for new cost-saving options, the
shell game by which the health care system hides its costs from those who pay
them still results in a market failure cum political failure especially
disadvantageous to less-than-affluent payers of health insurance premiums.144
One way in which employers have overtly shifted health care costs to their
employees is by increasing the share of the employer’s premium for health
coverage that employees pay via explicit deductions from their take-home
pay.145 Since 1978, it has been possible for an employer to arrange for its
employees’ share of the premium, as well as its own, to be paid with untaxed
dollars.146 This change made it possible for individuals whose employers would
not pay, or pay in full, for family coverage to obtain such coverage with pre-tax
dollars. Moreover, many employers now offer their workers a menu of
coverage options, requiring them to contribute, usually from pre-tax income,
some or all of the added cost of the more expensive packages. Surprisingly, a
number of employers that have increased their employees’ share of their
premium cost have done so without enabling them to pay that share with pretax dollars, thus making the employees’ contributions more costly, after taxes,
than they have to be. Analysts have found evidence that some employers
following this strategy have done so in order to induce employees, who for
some reason do not value coverage very highly, to forgo it altogether, thus
saving money for the employer.147 In any event, as consumers become
increasingly responsible for paying for their own health coverage, demand for
health insurance may become more price-elastic, inspiring more cost-reducing
innovation in both insurance and health care itself and perhaps even voter
interest in deregulatory moves facilitating more such innovation.
The recent CDHC reforms are also notable in this context because they are
expressly intended to make consumers pay more of the cost of their own health

144. For recent survey data demonstrating the increasing salience of costs in consumer attitudes
toward health care, see EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INSTITUTE, 2006 HEALTH CONFIDENCE
SURVEY: DISSATISFACTION WITH HEALTH CARE SYSTEM DOUBLES SINCE 1998 (2006), available at
http://www.ebri.org/publications/notes/index.cfm?fa=notesPrint&content_id=3758.
For
fuller
elaboration of the “shell game” metaphor, see Havighurst, How the Revolution Fell Short, supra note
24, at 78–80.
145. Jonathan Gruber & Robin McKnight, Why Did Employee Health Insurance Contributions
Rise?, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 1085, 1085 (2003) (observing that between 1982 and 1998 the percentage of
employees whose employers paid the full cost of their coverage fell from forty-four percent to twentyeight percent).
146. I.R.C. § 125 (LEXIS 2005) (providing for so-called cafeteria plans).
147. Helen Levy, Who Pays for Health Insurance? Employee Contributions to Health Insurance
Premiums 9–10 (Princeton Univ. Indus. Relations Section, Working Paper No. 398, 1998); see also
Gruber & McKnight, supra note 145, at 1088–89. Although the latter source suggests that this strategy
may cause employees simply to seek coverage available under a spouse’s plan or to rely on Medicaid to
provide for their dependents, the decline in the rate of employee “take-up” of employer-offered
coverage has also contributed to the growth of the uninsured population. See MICHAEL A. MORRISEY,
PRICE SENSITIVITY IN HEALTH CARE: IMPLICATIONS FOR HEALTH CARE POLICY 36–37 (2d ed. 2005)
(summarizing evidence that decline in take-up rates, rather than in the number of employers offering
coverage, is principally responsible for the increased number of uninsured).
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care—in this case, at the point of service rather than in purchasing health
coverage. To be sure, the CDHC reforms were not adopted in the interest of
consumers of moderate means,148 and they may, at least in the short run,
exacerbate some of the regressive tendencies noted in earlier discussion.149 On
the other hand, as high-deductible coverage and increased cost sharing of other
kinds cause consumers to be more aware of health care costs, there may be
more market pressure on health plans to discover new (or rediscover old) ways
of counteracting moral hazard and less public support for cost-increasing
regulation.150
C. Distributive Consequences of Substantive Health Care Law and Regulation
There are numerous identifiable ways in which political and legal systems in
the United States directly or indirectly foreclose opportunities for lower- and
middle-income consumers to enhance their own, as well as aggregate, welfare
by purchasing low-cost, arguably lower-quality health care and health coverage.
It is no coincidence that the various laws and policies criticized here all tend to
restrict consumers’ freedom of contract for the benefit of influential minorities,
principally industry stakeholders and high-income users of health services. The
overregulation summarized below is objectionable in large part because, in
markets for both health services and health coverage, it impedes what has been
called disruptive innovation—that is, offering new products that, while they
might be less good, or in some other way out of keeping with conventional
standards, put competition on a different, perhaps more affordable plane,
thereby serving many consumers better.151

148. See supra notes 96 & 108 on distributional implications of the CDHC reforms.
149. Some purport to fear that high-deductible coverage will cause healthier, often wealthier
employees to contribute less than they currently do to the support of coworkers with more or chronic
health problems. See generally BETH FUCHS & JULIA A. JAMES, NAT’L HEALTH POL’Y FORUM,
HEALTH SAVINGS ACCOUNTS: THE FUNDAMENTALS (2005), available at http://www.nhpf.org/
pdfs_bp/BP_HSAs_04-11-05.pdf (reviewing arguments for and against HSAs). Yet, as noted previously
in Part III, our conjecture is that, when people with disparate risks and preferences are arbitrarily
pooled in the same health plan, subsidies may actually run the other way, with higher-income insureds,
as a class, getting more out of the plan than their lower-income coworkers. See supra note 107 and
accompanying text.
150. See Hall & Havighurst, supra note 97 (arguing that HSAs and other innovations could make
the public more comfortable with health plans’ predetermination of benefits and other methods of
rationing coverage).
151. For an overview of disruptive innovation and the view that competition to create radically
different, often lower-cost, alternative products has been crucial in destabilizing and ultimately
improving the performance of many industries, see CLAYTON CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR’S
DILEMMA (1997). In our view, many potential innovations stymied by overregulation in the health
care sector would be helpfully destructive of conventional paradigms and beneficial from the
standpoint of efficiency and consumer welfare. For an application of disruptive innovation theorizing
to the health care sector and to the thesis of this article, see Lesley H. Curtis & Kevin A. Schulman,
Overregulation of Health Care: Mustings on Disruptive Innovation Theory, 69 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 195, 197–206 (Autumn 2006).
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1. Overregulating Providers
The most pervasive kind of regulation of the health care sector is entry
control through occupational licensure.152 In theory at least, exclusionary
licensure, barring from the market individuals who do not meet minimum
standards of competence in the regulated field of endeavor, can enhance
consumers’ welfare by minimizing both their exposure to risks of bad service
and their uncertainty in purchasing complex services, thus reducing what
economists call their “search costs.”153 Entry controls also raise costs, however,
by excluding providers who might serve some clients adequately and cheaply,
thus forcing those clients (mostly lower-income individuals) to pay higher prices
for arguably more reliable services. Nevertheless, despite these costs, entry
regulation could be calibrated in such a way that, according to one theory at
least,154 overall welfare is improved. Indeed, regulation may arguably be
efficient even if the resulting higher prices cause some consumers to forgo
needed services, with adverse health consequences.155 But, whatever economic
theory may say, it is relevant for present purposes that the lower-income
segment of the population, even if protected against costly mistakes, bears
many more of the costs of exclusionary licensure than more affluent interests.
Even though exclusionary licensure may in theory sometimes be
economically efficient, the nature of majoritarian politics makes it predictable
that in any field in which government regulates entry, entry standards will be
inefficiently high, causing more hardship than is even arguably optimal. Indeed,
if consumers feel at significant risk in purchasing some good or service on their
own, then the political majority they constitute can be expected to demand
more “consumer protection” and more peace of mind than is consistent with

152. See generally FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 25, ch.2, at 25–28;
Morris M. Kleiner, Occupational Licensing, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 189 (2000) (overview of economic
literature on licensure, with emphasis on the need for empirical studies of cost and other impacts);
Morris M. Kleiner & Robert T. Kudrle, Does Regulation Affect Economic Outcomes?: The Case of
Dentistry, 43 J.L. & ECON. 547 (2000) (estimating that state licensure causes thirty percent increase in
dentists’ fees).
153. See supra note 139. An alternative to exclusionary licensure is public certification, sometimes
called title licensure. This intermediate form of regulation, which addresses the information problem
by limiting not who may practice in a field but who may use certain titles, was famously advocated by
economist Milton Friedman. MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 144–49 (2d ed. 1982).
154. In economic theory, regulation is not deemed inefficient as long as the gains to the winners
exceed the losses to the losers, whether or not the losers are compensated in some way. See RICHARD
A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 13–15 (5th ed. 1998) (discussing this so-called KaldorHicks definition of efficiency). Even if regulation passes this test, however, social justice is obviously
implicated if lower-income persons are regularly on the losing end. See Uwe E. Reinhardt, Can
Efficiency Be Left to the Market?, 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 967, 984 (2001) (admonishing that
“Kaldor’s expedient normative dictum is never an excuse for setting aside moral thought”). Moreover,
even in the event that lower-income wage earners are not net losers once all social programs (which
serve mostly the poor) are taken into account, there is no good reason why the health care system
should be organized and regulated to their disadvantage.
155. See, e.g., Sidney L. Carroll & Robert J. Gaston, Occupational Restrictions and the Quality of
Service Received, 47 SO. ECON. J. 959 (1981) (stressing that social costs of regulation, which must be
compared to benefits, include harms resulting from consumers’ forgoing of valuable services because of
regulation-induced higher prices).
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aggregate welfare, let alone the welfare of those with less than median income.
Public choice theory, of course, anticipates that members of a regulated
industry will organize themselves and lobby effectively for high standards that
limit supply and increase both the duration and market value of their
incumbency. But majority rule is alone sufficient to explain the unfair burdens
imposed on those below the middle of the income spectrum.156 In the health
care sector, moreover, as we have previously observed, the welfare of the
sub-affluent is in special jeopardy because the middle-class majority tend not to
appreciate the economic costs of regulation even to themselves and therefore
regularly lean against their own self-interest.157 Indeed, occupational licensure is
a paradigm case illustrating how policies effectively obscuring the incidence of
health care costs from consumer-voters, when combined with tendencies
captured by public choice theory, consistently and systematically produce
distributive injustice.
Occupational regulation has other costs besides those flowing from stateimposed restrictions on entry. State legislatures typically also delegate
responsibility for regulating practice of a licensed occupation to its licensing
board, which is usually staffed by members of the licensed occupation itself. In
the nature of things, such boards discharge these responsibilities very much as
state-chartered cartels, making rules not only curtailing the supply of
competitors but also suppressing advertising, corporate or commercial practice,
and other practices that might intensify competition and foster consumer
choice.158 Moreover, at the same time that they largely control the regulatory
apparatus, the licensees in each field generally organize themselves privately
not only to advance their political objectives, but also to set private standards
for professional practice, educational programs, and institutional providers of
services. Although such private entities may not directly enforce the standards
they set, these standards and their accompanying certifications of compliance
usually carry decisive weight in the marketplace and with state regulators.159
With the public generally unaware of the cost and competitive implications of
such publicly sanctioned self-regulatory regimes, the interests of the regulated
are commonly advanced at consumers’ expense, with cost increases a natural
result. Because the actions taken are always rationalized by reference to quality
concerns, elite observers tend to be generally supportive and, in any event, less

156. For further discussion and a graphic bell curve illustrating how majority rule is likely to yield
overregulation, see Havighurst, How the Revolution Fell Short, supra note 24, at 82–86.
157. See id. (illustrating how majority rule under conditions of systematic consumer-voter ignorance
about the incidence of health care costs might produce “hyper-regulation”).
158. See Clark C. Havighurst, Contesting Anticompetitive Actions Taken in the Name of the State:
State Action Immunity and Health Care Markets, 31 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & LAW 585 (2006)
(discussing the limited extent to which federal antitrust law limits state authority to immunize
anticompetitive actions by state licensing and regulatory boards).
159. See generally Symposium, Private Accreditation in the Regulatory State, 57 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. (Autumn 1994).
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concerned about higher costs than lower- and middle-income consumers should
be.
Institutions in the health care field, particularly hospitals, also frequently
enjoy substantial benefits from the regulatory regimes to which they are subject
and from the activities of private standard-setting and accrediting organizations.
Once again, although quality-enhancing standards limit opportunities for costreducing innovations, they are rarely controversial politically, both because the
rank-and-file electorate fails to see any connection to their own pocketbooks
and because elite consumer-voters tend to value disproportionately the added
security they supply. In addition, institutional providers may enjoy the
protection of certificate-of-need regulation, which operates to curb new market
entry threatening to their market power. Though repealed in some states after
Congress repealed, in 1986, the federal law that compelled states to enact them,
certificate-of-need requirements still operate in many places.160 Originally put in
place under the rationale that competition could never work in medical care,161
these laws remain on the books today largely to prevent competition (with, say,
freestanding ambulatory surgery centers or specialty hospitals) from
undermining the ability of hospital monopolies to cross-subsidize unspecified
good works that hospitals presumably do.162 As noted earlier, to rely on
monopolist providers to carry out public responsibilities is to impose the
equivalent of a regressive head tax on premium payers.
2. Overregulating Health Plans
Financial oversight of insurance companies is essential to obviate, or at least
to deal with, the problem of insolvency, and consumers certainly need
substantial tort as well as contract remedies to deter insurers from stonewalling
valid claims in the hope that the claimant will go away. Also, the complexity of
insurance contracts is such that consumer welfare can be enhanced by having at
least individual policies vetted by insurance regulators. Some features of
current insurance regulation and insurance law, however, are less clearly
advantageous for all premium payers as a class. Fortunately, state regulation,
which can clearly provide helpful protection for individual insurance
purchasers, is far less intrusive in the case of group health insurance, where
employers act as agents for their employees and can be assumed to have (or be
able to hire) the requisite sophistication. In addition, some HMOs, and all
health plans in which the employer itself bears the insurance risk, are

160. See generally CLARK C. HAVIGHURST ET AL., HEALTH CARE LAW AND POLICY 709–52 (2d
ed. 1998).
161. See CLARK C. HAVIGHURST, DEREGULATING THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY: PLANNING
FOR COMPETITION (1982); see also supra note 136.
162. See, e.g., Sujit Choudhry et al., Specialty versus Community Hospitals: What Role for the Law?,
2005 HEALTH AFF. (WEB EXCLUSIVES) W5-361 (proposing certificate-of-need regulation to protect
community hospitals against opportunistic competition from specialized providers); Clark C.
Havighurst, Monopoly Is Not the Answer, 2005 HEALTH AFF. (WEB EXCLUSIVES) W5-373 (criticizing
Choudhry et al. proposal).
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significantly protected by federal law against burdensome state regulation and
state-created liabilities.163 But many aspects of the legal environment prevent
modern health plans from selling low-cost coverage that many consumers would
find well suited for their situations.
A common feature of insurance regulation is mandated coverage for certain
services, including mental health care, substance-abuse treatment, home health
care, certain organ transplants, treatment of jaw disorders, infertility treatment,
minimum hospital stays following normal births, and post-mastectomy breast
reconstruction.164 State laws also frequently require that health plans permit
certain covered services to be provided by non-physician providers to the extent
of their authorized scopes of practice. Each such mandate is a different story, of
course, and there may be an arguable rationale for some of them based on the
possibility that minority needs or preferences will be neglected in designing
health coverage for heterogeneous employment groups. But the usual story is
one of special-interest lobbying—often a combined effort of provider and
patient-advocacy groups—in an atmosphere of general consumer-voter
disinterest.165 In any event, the overall tendency of mandated benefits is to raise
costs unnecessarily.
The backlash against managed health care in the 1990s resulted in
significant cutbacks in health plans’ use of administrative methods—previously
employed with mixed results—to contain the effects of moral hazard.166 Not
only did employers, responding to new employee fears and complaints, rapidly
retract their early support for HMOs employing limited provider networks or
aggressively rationing financing for marginally beneficial services, but
consumers themselves supported legislative efforts to rein in health plans’
economizing efforts. These legislative measures included new coverage (for
example, length-of-stay) mandates, “any-willing-provider” laws limiting health

163. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–03 (LEXIS 2005)
(preempting state laws relating to employee health benefits); Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200
(2004) (finding certain health plans immunized by ERISA from state-imposed liability for wrongful
denials of health benefits).
164. See generally Gail A. Jensen, Regulating the Content of Health Plans, in AMERICAN HEALTH
POLICY: CRITICAL ISSUES FOR REFORM 167 (Robert B. Helms ed., 1993).
165. Ironically, only small employers and their workers are affected by such cost-increasing benefit
mandates because employers large enough to self-insure their employees’ health benefits are exempted
from such state requirements by federal legislation. See supra note 163 and accompanying text. A
recent federal legislative proposal to exempt health plans offered to pools of small businesses from
various state coverage mandates, S. 1955, 109th Cong. (2006), was opposed by a broad-based coalition
of health care providers, patient-advocacy groups, insurance regulators, and state attorneys general.
See From the CQ Newsroom: Industry Group Backs Health Association Bill as States Push for Their
Rights, http://www.cmwf.org/healthpolicyweek/healthpolicyweek_show.htm?doc_id=370240#doc370242
(last visited Nov. 10, 2006).
166. See generally Mark A. Hall, The Death of Managed Care: A Regulatory Autopsy, 30 J. HEALTH
POL. POL’Y & L. 427 (2005) (concluding that health plans scaled back earlier efforts to manage health
care costs less because of new regulation than for other reasons); Havighurst, How the Revolution Fell
Short, supra note 24 (extensive account of reasons, both legal and non-legal, for the failure of the
1970s–1990s movement to empower consumers to make health care choices through competing healthplan agents).
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plans’ ability to reward with increased volume providers who would reduce
their fees, and new “external review” procedures for challenging health plans’
denials of coverage.167 This outpouring of “patient-protection” legislation led
many to conclude that the majority of voters, as well as physician interests,
rejected an active role for health plans in deciding how health care dollars
should be spent. But the backlash provides a near-perfect illustration of how
consumer-voters’ unawareness of their own stake in cost-saving measures can
yield market and political outcomes contrary to their interests.168 Ever since the
virtual demise of managed care, health care costs have risen at staggering
rates,169 causing many employers to require their employees to shoulder a bigger
share of the premium and other costs.
A major obstacle to meaningful economizing by consumers in the purchase
of health coverage has been the near-universal acceptance by the health care
industry and other elite interests of the medical profession’s preferred paradigm
of medical care. This perspective treats health care as a non-economic good
and questions the wisdom of giving patients opportunities to make
consequential choices with costs or prices in view. To be sure, the professional
paradigm is not exactly incorporated in law. But its influence remains pervasive
in part because the tax subsidy has for so long minimized the chances that
consumers would come to defy the dominant paradigm or that health plans
would strive to customize coverage to fit, not the paradigm, but the
pocketbooks of the consumers they seek to serve.
Thus, instead of
differentiating their products in meaningful ways, health plans universally
undertook, as the paradigm dictated, to pay for any service that was both
medically necessary under professional standards and of sufficiently proven
effectiveness to be accepted by the medical profession. De facto, therefore, if
not de jure, health care is delivered and paid for under standards set by
professional interests, not in contracts with consumers. Notably, some external
review statutes have flirted with finally enshrining the professional standard in
substantive law by having coverage denials reviewed by medical experts
applying their own professional knowledge to the case without reference to the
language of the insurance contract.170

167. See Frank A. Sloan & Mark A. Hall, Market Failures and the Evolution of State Regulation of
Managed Care, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 169 (Fall 2002) (reviewing so-called patient-protection
legislation).
168. See Havighurst, How the Revolution Fell Short, supra note 24, at 86 (extending bell-curve
illustration, see supra notes 156–57, to the account for the “hyper-regulation” of managed care).
169. Cynthia Smith et al., National Health Spending in 2004: Recent Slowdown Led by Prescription
Drug Spending, 25 HEALTH AFF. 186, 187 exh. 1 (2006) (showing health care expenditures as stable
around 13.8% of GDP from 1993–2000, when managed care was dominant, but rising to 16% of GDP
in 2004).
170. Cf. Bipartisan Patient Protection Act, S. 1052, H.R. 2563, § 104, 107th Cong. (2001) (proposal
to mandate external professional review of any coverage decision based on “medical necessity or
appropriateness” would have freed external reviewers from honoring contractual limits unless the
applicable exclusion is categorically or numerically “exact”); see also supra note 110.
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Freedom of contract has also languished in health care because of the
immense difficulty of writing unambiguous contracts specifying patients’
entitlements in the myriad situations that can arise. But it is possible to imagine
economizing contracts with coverage criteria other than “medical necessity”—
perhaps incorporating by reference, for example, specific clinical guidelines
developed by reputable medical experts with economizing as a principal
objective.171 Although there is no solid legal obstacle to courts’ enforcing
economizing contracts with primary regard to the intentions of the parties
rather than to professional standards, one cannot count on courts to cooperate
with such a project. Instead, under the interpretive principle of contra
proferentem, a court might feel constrained to interpret any contractual
ambiguity against the party that drafted the contract, regardless of whether a
significantly less ambiguous contract could have been written. Although it is
certainly not too late to resurrect freedom of contract in the health care field,
the regulatory and legal environment has long limited, both de jure and de
facto, the options available to consumers, forcing them to pay for the Cadillac
coverage designed by professional interests and preferred by the industry’s elite
customers as well as some academic critics.172 It remains to be seen whether the
CDHC movement, by making consumers pay for much of the coverage they
enjoy and for many of the services they consume, will change perceptions
enough to widen the range of economizing options available to consumers.173
3. How the Malpractice Liability System Overburdens Consumers
Typical trial-lawyer rhetoric paints America’s tort system as a venue in
which the ordinary citizen can obtain justice against the wealthy and powerful.
But, in reality, the nation’s system for redressing injuries resulting from medical
malpractice is another cornerstone of an overall health policy that
disproportionately benefits elite classes at the expense of middle- and lowerincome consumers of health services. It is, of course, not obvious how a system
that permits injured patients to recover large amounts of money from
professionals and elite institutions might ultimately serve the interests of the
latter groups. But the rules defining medical malpractice are in the last analysis
made by the health care industry itself and consequently embody the medical
171. See HAVIGHURST, HEALTH CARE CHOICES, supra note 24, at 222–64.
172. See generally id. Economists and other policy analysts rarely recognize the unavailability in the
market of economizing choices and the legal risks that inhibit the offering of such choices as the serious
policy problems they are. See supra note 65. But see Pauly, supra note 24, at 1528 (recognizing that, for
legal and other reasons, “[p]eople cannot generally choose knowledgeably among a variety of plans
characterized by explicitly different policies toward new technology.”). Although Pauly’s discussion
focuses principally on encouraging private rationing of “new” technology, it concludes, wisely, that
“some type of legal safe harbor has to be created for insurers that implement well-designed plans for
limiting technology [in general], and [that] the ‘community or standard practice’ and ‘medical necessity’
concepts need to be jettisoned.” Id. at 1534.
173. See MICHAEL F. CANNON & MICHAEL D. TANNER, HEALTHY COMPETITION: WHAT’S
HOLDING BACK HEALTH CARE AND HOW TO FREE IT 69, 116 (2005) (advocating still greater tax
incentives for HSAs and suggesting that federal law widen consumer choice by enabling consumers to
purchase health coverage from insurers regulated by states other than their own).
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profession’s norm that undervalues cost as a factor in clinical decisionmaking, nflttn28.2g
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explicitly evaluated to determine their soundness as public policy. Yet, to the
extent such standards require more than just the exercise of appropriate care
and skill and presume to dictate what specific services providers must not omit
to prescribe, they are suspect from an efficiency standpoint, having developed
and evolved in a market fraught with moral hazard. In addition to not being
vetted in the democratic policymaking process nor validated in a smoothly
functioning marketplace, the standards constituting the legal standard of care
are nowhere published to inform practitioners authoritatively of their specific
obligations—contrary to an elementary due-process requirement of government
regulation.175 Moreover, because its standards must be discovered case-by-case
through the adversarial efforts of well-compensated private lawyers and
medical experts, the malpractice system is also far more costly to administer
than a regulatory program presumably would be. Finally, tort rules are
enforced more haphazardly than regulatory requirements since they can be
invoked against a practitioner only after an injury has occurred, not whenever
negligent behavior is detected.176 Despite these many problems, our principal
objection to the malpractice system as a regulatory program is the same as our
objection to other forms of health-sector regulation: By motivating providers to
prescribe services with only minimal regard to cost, it forces consumers either to
175. Indeed, the standard of care applied in any given lawsuit is rarely apparent even after the case
is decided, but is instead merely implicit in a general jury verdict based on conflicting expert testimony
about what the standard should be. Although a movement to create so-called clinical practice
guidelines began in the 1980s and has evolved into widespread insistence that physicians practice socalled evidence-based medicine, practice guidelines, however well grounded they may be in evidence of
efficacy and appropriateness (cost is still largely left out of the calculus), do not generally have official
status but are only evidence of prevailing practice standards that juries may consider without being
bound by them. See generally Troyen A. Brennan, Practice Guidelines and Malpractice Litigation:
Collision or Cohesion?, 16 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 67 (1991); Mark Hall, The Defensive Effect of
Medical Practice Policies in Malpractice Litigation, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 119 (Spring 1991);
Clark C. Havighurst, Practice Guidelines as Legal Standards Governing Physician Liability, 54 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 87 (Spring 1991); Andrew L. Hyams et al., Practice Guidelines and Malpractice
Litigation: A Two-Way Street, 122 ANNALS OF INT. MED. 450 (1995) (reporting survey of guideline use
in actual cases); Michelle M. Mello, Of Swords and Shields: The Role of Clinical Practice Guidelines in
Medical Malpractice Litigation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 645 (2001); Arnold J. Rosoff, Evidence-based
Medicine and the Law: The Courts Confront Clinical Practice Guidelines, 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y &
L. 327 (2001).
176. Although the licensure system might seem to provide protection for consumers against
negligent physicians, discipline is only rarely administered because of simple incompetence. Gary L.
Gaumer, Regulating Health Professionals: A Review of the Empirical Literature, 62 MILBANK
MEMORIAL FUND Q. 380, 407 (1984) (“[R]esearch on credentialing shows that contemporary
credentialing procedures may not be reliably screening actual practice competence.”). On the other
hand, private credentialing and other measures in well-run hospitals provide some assurance of quality.
Significantly, however, neither these efforts nor the tort system itself—the high cost of which seems
justifiable only if it effectively deters numerous patient injuries—has worked well enough in preventing
or deterring patient injuries to preclude some strong, authoritative adverse criticism of the overall
quality of U.S. health care. E.g., INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM: A NEW
HEALTH CARE SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (2001); INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, TO ERR IS
HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM (1999). Recent industry efforts to respond to this
embarrassing criticism have yet, it appears, to yield substantial improvements. See Lucian L. Leape &
Donald M. Berwick, Five Years After TO ERR IS HUMAN: What Have We Learned?, 293 J.A.M.A. 2384,
2384 (2005) (“[L]ittle evidence exists from any source that systematic improvements in safety are
widely available.”).
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pay for costlier care than many of them would otherwise choose or to go
without health coverage, and possibly health care, altogether.
Most of the foregoing shortcomings of malpractice law as a system for
regulating medical practice would largely disappear, of course, if consumers and
providers were free to negotiate, particularly through health-plan
intermediaries, for a less costly set of patient rights and provider obligations
than the law prescribes. For example, to obtain reduced health insurance
premiums, consumers might agree to a less demanding rule governing the
prescription of services of only marginal value177 or a less extensive set of
remedies if malpractice should occur.178 But freedom of contract is not the rule
in health care. Indeed, the regulatory character of the malpractice regime is
founded on the legal system’s monopoly over the definition and administration
of patients’ rights, a monopoly that persists in large part because common-law
courts are hostile to claims by malpractice defendants that the injured plaintiff
waived, by contract, some right that the law confers.179 Being concerned
primarily with the rights of injured plaintiffs ex post, judges rarely acknowledge
that some consumers, in order to save money, might rationally elect ex ante a
less demanding standard of care or less lucrative remedies for injuries they
suffer. Despite the many objections that can be raised to the legal system’s
insistence on its own rules, there is little chance that the courts can be

177. See HAVIGHURST, HEALTH CARE CHOICES, supra note 24, at 284–302 (suggesting various
strategies for modifying overly demanding standards of care, including dispensing altogether with fault
as the basis for liability). For the suggestion that selected clinical practice guidelines could be
incorporated in health care contracts to establish the standard of care, see supra text accompanying
notes 171–72; Havighurst, supra note 175.
178. See HAVIGHURST, HEALTH CARE CHOICES, supra note 24, at 271–84 (suggesting various
modifications of remedies for negligence and malpractice).
179. Virtually the only contractual modifications of traditional tort rights that courts have shown
much willingness to enforce are arbitration clauses. E.g., Buraczynski v. Eyring, 919 S.W.2d 314 (Tenn.
1996) (enforcing agreements with two different patients undergoing knee reconstructions and finding
that although the agreements were contracts of adhesion because presented by the physician on a takeit-or-leave-it basis, they were not unconscionable or oppressive); Hawkins v. Superior Court, 152 Cal.
Rptr. 491 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) (holding arbitration agreement signed by husband as part of
comprehensive contract with Kaiser plan was binding on his enrolled spouse). But see Obstetrics &
Gynecologists v. Pepper, 693 P.2d 1259 (Nev. 1985) (holding arbitration agreement offered by a clinic
on take-it-or-leave-it basis was an adhesion contract, unenforceable in absence of evidence of plaintiff’s
knowing assent). This exception to the usual hostility to contractual reforms helps to prove the general
rule, however, since an arbitration clause changes no more than the forum in which a claim is heard, not
the substance of the claim nor the remedy available. See, e.g., Madden v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals,
552 P.2d 1178, 1186 (Cal. 1976) (enforcing arbitration clause in HMO contract because it “does not
detract from Kaiser’s duty to use reasonable care in treating patients, nor limit its liability for breach of
this duty, but merely substitutes one forum for another”). Interestingly, arbitration clauses have been
uncommon in health-plan contracts because, by lowering the cost of suing, they tend to increase the
number of suits—hardly a result a health plan would desire. Cf. Engalla v. Permanente Med. Group,
Inc., 938 P.2d 903 (Cal. 1997) (finding Kaiser arbitration system cumbersome and costly, contrary to
how it was represented to consumers, suggesting that Kaiser did not want arbitration to make its
doctors any easier to sue than in the civil courts). On the other hand, HMOs might offer arbitration
clauses more widely—for the mutual benefit of both the plan and its subscribers—if such clauses could
be accompanied by other contract terms limiting substantive rights and obligations.
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persuaded to treat malpractice law as a set of default rules—that is, as the point
of departure for negotiating different arrangements if the parties so desire.180
Why courts so effectively deny consumers freedom of contract in this field is
unclear.181 Explanations no doubt vary with individual judges, but probably
include ignorance of, or unconcern for, the cost and other welfare consequences
of judicial actions for ordinary people; attachment to things as they have always
been; moral discontent with any but a nominally egalitarian health care system
in which all citizens enjoy on paper the same rights as judges would want for
themselves; acceptance of the medical profession’s own paradigmatic view that
health care is too important to be left to consumer choice; a belief that the legal
system of which he or she is a part knows best what is good for people;182 or
simply an unacknowledged interest in maintaining the legal system’s lawyerenriching, judge-empowering monopoly.183 In addition to having an elitist
flavor, all of the foregoing possible explanations for courts’ treatment of
malpractice rights and obligations as matters of positive law rather than implied
contract, variable by explicit agreement, betray an element of moral hazard, as
180. For scholarly discussions of the merits of letting consumers, with basic protections against fraud
and overreaching, choose alternative liability regimes, see Symposium, Medical Malpractice: Can the
Private Sector Find Relief?, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 143–320 (Spring 1986); see also Richard A.
Epstein, Medical Malpractice: The Case for Contract, 1976 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 87 (1976).
181. Of course, the ostensible justification for the legal system’s skeptical attitude toward contracts
limiting consumers’ rights is the well-documented inability of consumers to make well-informed,
rational choices. See supra note 134. It has never been clear, however, why consumers’ difficulty in
wisely choosing for themselves entitles privileged elites, with values, preferences, and economic
interests of their own, to choose for them, thus forcing them to accept a legal regime in which they have
virtually no voice at all. In our view, the often-impressive findings of psychology and behavioral
economics should not be used only to discredit law-and-economics theorizing but should instead be
seen as enriching it. See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Cass Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach
to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998) (providing an overview of ways experimental
psychology can inform thinking about legal rules). For example, findings about the limitations of
consumers as decisionmakers can be seen to strengthen the case for letting consumers select and rely
upon more disinterested agents and for reforming legal procedures to assist consumers in making
consequential choices by simplifying and clarifying options, “framing” issues, responsibly shaping
perceptions, forcing reconsiderations, and otherwise. See generally Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein,
Debiasing through Law, 35 J. LEG. STUD. 199 (2006). On the phenomenon and pervasiveness of the
framing effect, see Norbert Schwarz, Self-Reports: How the Questions Shape the Answers, 54 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 93 (1999).
182. Note the strong similarity between such a belief on the part of the legal profession in its own
benignity and the medical paradigm under which physicians deem themselves to be, as ethical
professionals, superior makers of spending decisions.
183. Many state courts have been so protective of their authority over the tort system that, using
various somewhat strained constructions of the judiciary’s powers under their state constitution, they
have invalidated numerous efforts by state legislatures to reform malpractice law. E.g., Ferdon v.
Wisconsin Patients Compensation Fund, 701 N.W.2d 440 (Wis. 2005) (finding a cap on non-economic
damages unconstitutional and reviewing cases from other jurisdictions); see also HAVIGHURST ET AL.,
supra note 160, at 941–89 (2d ed. 1998) (reviewing case law on state malpractice reforms); Carly N.
Kelly & Michelle M. Mello, Are Medical Malpractice Damages Caps Constitutional? An Overview of
State Litigation, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 515 (2005). One might expect contractual reforms, being
consensual, to fare better than legislative prescriptions, but they have not. A possible justification for
maintaining the inalienability of tort rights is to preserve the integrity of the tort system as a public
good, a vital deterrent to future malpractice. But, whereas one might be concerned that those opting
out of the tort system are free-riding on its continuing beneficial effects on the quality of care, the
evidence that the system serves that useful purpose is not strong. See supra note 176.
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legal decisionmakers indulge their own elite preferences or advance their own
interests with other people’s money. In any event, as currently administered,
the legal system provides powerful support for the health care industry’s undue
claims on consumers’ limited resources.
Unfairness is also detectable in the way the medical malpractice system
spreads financial risk, collecting wealth on the one hand and redistributing it on
the other in the form of administrative expenses and damages. On the
collection side (who pays?), the malpractice regime’s revenue is generated
ultimately, as noted above, in roughly equal amounts from individuals who,
directly or indirectly, pay health insurance premiums. As in our earlier
exploration of possible disparities in health insurance, we are interested here in
whether equal contributions, regardless of income, give rise to equal
entitlements, not just on paper but in fact. Once again, significant unfairness to
those lower on the income scale seems clear.
On the distribution side (who benefits?), the beneficiaries of the malpractice
system include the lawyers and expert witnesses needed to ascertain fault in
each case under vague legal standards. Most prominent in this elite class of
beneficiaries are plaintiffs’ attorneys, whose take is generally a substantial
percentage of each settlement or award and whose political ability to defend
their traditional domain is legendary. The rewards to all these stakeholders are
substantial. Indeed, something less than half of liability insurance premiums
collected remain available to compensate injured individuals after the system’s
heavy administrative costs are paid.184 It would be hard to imagine a less
efficient mechanism for compensating injured persons.
Moreover, in
accordance with previous discussion, we would reject the usual claim by
plaintiffs’ lawyers that, whatever it costs, the malpractice system deserves to be
maintained in its present regulatory form because it deters negligence and
ensures care of appropriate quality.185

184. PAUL C. WEILER ET AL., A MEASURE OF MALPRACTICE: MEDICAL INJURY, MALPRACTICE
LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION 17 (1993) (“[E]ven when one leaves aside the cost of
securing and investing insurance funds and focuses simply on the process of claims administration and
distribution, only about 40 percent of the total amount expended in the claims process actually reaches
injured patients as compensation for their injuries.”).
185. But see Mello & Brennan, supra note 174 (mildly defending current system while suggesting
modest reforms). For suggested ways of making the tort system pull more helpfully in the direction of
quality assurance, see Jennifer Arlen & W. Bentley MacLeod, Malpractice Liability for Physicians and
Managed Care Organizations, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1929, 1996–98 (2003) (arguing that “entity-level
liability” for physician torts, rather than traditional liability rules, would come closer to creating
optimal incentives for quality); Clark C. Havighurst, Vicarious Liability: Relocating Responsibility for
the Quality of Care, 26 AM. J.L. & MED. 7 (2000) (arguing that making organized health plans
vicariously liable for the torts of their participating providers would both inspire integrated efforts to
improve quality and restore needed legitimacy to managed health care by making plans responsible for
the quality, as well as the cost, of care); Randall Bovbjerg & Lawrence R. Tancredi, Liability Reform
Should Make Patients Safer: “Avoidable Classes of Events” Are a Key Improvement, 33 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 478 (2005) (expanding earlier proposals to impose automatic, i.e., strict, liability for certain,
normally preventable adverse outcomes as a way both to ensure fair compensation at low
administrative cost and to strengthen incentives to avoid such compensable events); Clark C.
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To the extent the money that malpractice victims finally receive as damages
is intended to compensate them for lost employment income, higher-income
victims stand to receive larger awards than victims whose income loss is less.186
In addition, because the willingness of a plaintiff’s lawyer to accept a case
depends heavily on the size of the potential award, some lower-income victims
of malpractice will find it harder to get lawyers to prosecute their claims. On
the other hand, the largest tort awards, while relatively few compared to the
incidence of malpractice injuries, are intended to cover the future medical
expenses of severely disabled individuals, who may be disproportionately
poorer rather than richer because the care they receive may be
disproportionately poorer as well. Nevertheless, we still hypothesize that
lower-income premium payers stand, on average, a poorer chance of benefiting
from the insurance funds collected partly at their expense to compensate for
patient injuries. It seems evident, for example, that, whereas a few lowerincome patients may receive substantial recoveries under the tort system,
working-class individuals are less likely to pursue claims aggressively because
of, say, their lesser ability to discover that a bad medical outcome resulted from
negligence, a lesser willingness to sue powerful authority figures or institutions,
a greater willingness to accept a low settlement offer, or greater difficulty in
getting a competent lawyer to take their case.
Although empirical evidence on which income classes benefit most from the
tort system is thin, we suspect that lower- and middle-income consumers, whose
health insurance premiums include roughly equal contributions to support the
malpractice insurance system, do not enjoy equivalent, or equally valued,
protection against losses they might incur from a negligence-caused injury.187 To
the extent that this is true (or perceived by providers to be true), providers
might provide better and more costly care for higher-income patients because
they perceive them to be generally in a better position to bring a legal action in
Havighurst & Lawrence R. Tancredi, “Medical Adversity Insurance”—A No-Fault Approach to Medical
Malpractice and Quality Assurance, 51 MILBANK Q. 125 (1974) (earlier proposal to the same effect).
186. To be sure, reforms in roughly half the states now allow juries to reduce damages for income
losses to the extent that the plaintiff has been compensated for such losses already by various so-called
“collateral sources” (public or private income-replacement programs, for example). See generally
NAT’L ASS’N OF MUTUAL INS. COMPANIES, COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE REFORM,
http://www.namic.org/reports/tortReform/CollateralSourceRule.asp (last visited Feb. 19, 2006)
(summarizing collateral-source reforms by state). But, whereas some such reforms appear to diminish
regressivity, many reforms focus only on denying double recovery for medical expenses, thereby
increasing the relative significance of lost income as an element of tort damages. Under some new
rules for calculating damages, therefore, higher-income persons stand to profit even more from the
malpractice system than lower-income premium payers.
187. There is unfortunately only limited empirical evidence supporting our perception here.
Nevertheless, some research finds disparities in malpractice awards correlated with race, gender, and
age, factors that may also correlate with income. See Martha Chamallas, Questioning the Use of RaceSpecific and Gender-Specific Economic Data in Tort Litigation: A Constitutional Argument, 63
FORDHAM L. REV. 73 (1994) (finding evidence that the tort system’s emphasis on economic over noneconomic damages enables white men to recover more in tort awards than women and minorities);
Lucinda M. Finley, The Hidden Victims of Tort Reform: Women, Children, and the Elderly, 53 EMORY
L.J. 1263 (2004) (concluding that elderly plaintiffs and young children rely disproportionately on noneconomic damages and would be adversely affected by certain tort reforms).
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the event of injury.188 Disparities of this kind, if they exist, would add physical
injury to financial insult, providing yet another basis for questioning the welfare
effects of the tort system on those lower on the income scale.
Finally, past and present moves to cap the amount of non-economic
damages that an individual plaintiff may recover seem likely—indeed, seem
intended—to further reduce the prospects that injured patients with relatively
less lost income will find lawyers willing to take their cases. Indeed, it would
seem fairer to lower-income premium payers for a legislature to cap economic
damages, expecting those at risk for greater income losses to protect themselves
by purchasing life and disability insurance. In addition to causing compensation
funds to be distributed more fairly, such a cap would help to equalize providers’
incentive to exercise care in treating all patients rather than encouraging
treatment disparities based on an income-correlated disparity in access to the
tort system.189 In any event, capping non-economic damages seems likely to
make the malpractice system even more regressive than it already is. By the
same token, addressing the medical malpractice system’s regressive features
would reduce both monetary and non-monetary injustices, bringing more
fairness both to the distribution of compensation and the distribution of medical
mistakes. At the very least, this discussion has identified another series of
important questions in need of more examination and research.
V
CONCLUSIONS, WITH POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Some readers may think that, in purporting to discern unfairness in the form
of “distributive injustice” in American health care, we have entered the domain
of philosophy and must prove, rather than simply assume, that one particular
distribution of wealth is definitively less just than another.190 But there should
be little disagreement, philosophical or otherwise, with the two main premises
of this article: (1) that the burden of paying for public goods such as health care
for the uninsured, medical education, and pharmaceutical research should not
fall disproportionately on those with less ability to pay and (2) that persons with
lower incomes should not be compelled to pay, as part of the price of having

188. See text accompanying supra notes 109–11.
189. No court, it appears, has ever been asked to consider whether a statutory cap on non-economic
damages denies equal protection—or its equivalent under a state constitution—to lower-income
citizens. See Kelly & Mello, supra note 183, at 521–23 (outlining arguments accepted and rejected in
state litigation). The usual equal-protection objection to damage caps—that they particularly
disadvantage the most seriously injured victims—is hardly credible, one would think, when, ex ante, all
consumer-patients are similarly situated. On similarly close analysis, however, there would seem to be
merit in the argument that caps disproportionately affect lower-income persons and are particularly
unfair to those who, having purchased standard health coverage, have reason to expect that a
legislature will not deny them equal value for their money.
190. But see JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) (purporting to prove logically, by
reasoning behind a “veil of ignorance,” that economic inequality can be justified only as a necessary
side effect of an incentive system beneficial to the least advantaged). As noted supra note 18,
economists’ work on distributional effects is generally descriptive rather than judgmental.
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any health insurance at all, either for coverage designed by and for elite
interests or for health care that is consumed disproportionately by the well-todo. This article has observed many ways in which, under these premises, the
U.S. health care system unfairly exploits ordinary payers of health insurance
premiums.
To be sure, the health care system’s unfairness also extends to those whom
the high cost of health coverage has priced out of the insurance market
altogether. Our analysis suggests, however, that lower-income premium payers
deserve equivalent sympathy. The uninsured, after all, are generally not the
poorest of the poor, and many of them are, in varying degrees, uninsured by
choice;191 moreover, by virtue of not paying thousands of dollars in health
insurance premiums, the uninsured have more money in their pockets to spend
on health care and other things, while also being eligible for charitable care or
personal bankruptcy in many worst-case scenarios. The overriding fact,
however, is that the lower-income insured and the uninsured are both victims of
a system that denies them reasonable choices. And, with premiums continuing
to rise faster than incomes, many of today’s insured will be among the
uninsured
tomorrow.
Unfortunately,
current
sympathies
focus
disproportionately on the uninsured and clamor only for expansions in coverage
when concern should also extend to premium payers and the causes of excessive
costs that victimize both groups. Although in the last analysis the plight of the
uninsured and the plight of the lower- and middle-income insured are two sides
of the same coin, this article has emphasized the cumulatively large and
seriously unfair financial burdens the U.S. health system imposes on working
people having private coverage, arguing that these burdens merit far more
attention than they have been given by researchers and policymakers alike.
A. Impositions on Working Families
In essence, the U.S. health care system causes payers of health insurance
premiums to bear two kinds of excessive costs without their knowledge or
consent—except insofar as the decision to insure at all can be deemed
voluntary. First, they pay excessive prices for many goods and services, mostly
because U.S.-style health insurance makes it relatively easy for sellers of
insured services or products to exploit dominant market positions. Indeed,
health-sector monopolists are able to charge prices much higher than an
equivalent monopolist could charge in the absence of such insurance and thus
to capture substantially more of (and possibly even more than) the surplus that
consumers would enjoy in purchasing at the competitive price. As earlier
discussion showed, the enhanced redistributive effects of monopoly in the
health sector would be objectionable even if hospitals and other providers spent
all their monopoly profits in socially worthwhile ways and even if the prospect
191. See Barak D. Richman, Behavioral Economics and Health Policy: Understanding Medicaid’s
Failure, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 705, 715 (2005) (concluding that “for [certain] individuals, insurance
status is a choice variable much more than an unavoidable consequence of poverty”).
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of monopoly returns stimulated only socially worthwhile innovative activity;
that wasteful spending is also induced only adds additional insult to the injury.
In our view, the high costs of meeting the health care system’s alleged needs
should not fall like a (regressive) head tax on the subset of the working
population that bears the costs of private health insurance.
Although it is difficult to quantify the total burden that falls on U.S.
premium payers because their health insurers facilitate the exercise of
providers’ and suppliers’ market power, Gerard Anderson, Uwe Reinhardt, and
coauthors have suggested that the very large excess of per-capita health care
spending in the United States over similar spending in other countries (totaling
more than a half trillion dollars per year192) “is mostly attributable to higher
prices of goods and services.”193 A more direct estimate of the “tax” burden that
consumers must bear for the privilege of being insured would begin by
identifying hospitals’ “community service” costs, a large part of which they
cover from surpluses earned at the expense of private insurers. These costs
have been roughly estimated to be “as much as $80–95 billion a year (in 2003),
or a little more than 15 percent of the total economic activity of this $500 billion
industry”;194 even after taking account of state and federal subventions to cover
such costs, the burden on premium payers remains substantial.195 Another,
more problematic, factor in the total “tax” on premium payers is the inflated
prices paid by U.S. health insurers for some prescription drugs and medical
devices.196 Although monopoly profits yielded by such prices serve to motivate
and finance future innovation, the burden on premium payers may substantially
exceed any resulting benefits they can expect to enjoy.
The second way in which lower- and middle-income premium payers
overpay for health care in the United States is by being forced to buy more of it,
or better quality, than they can reasonably afford. A variety of regulatory and
legal requirements incorporating high minimum standards developed and
favored by industry interests—and supported without question by elite policy
advocates and higher-income consumer-voters—foreclose many low-cost
options. In addition, the almost universal convention of covering any medical
service that qualifies as “medically necessary”—a professional standard that

192. See supra note 8.
193. Anderson et al., supra note 13, at 90. To be sure, these authors compare U.S. prices only with
prices that are depressed in some measure by government-sponsored monopsony power, not with
competitive prices equal to marginal cost. Moreover, some of the higher charges in the U.S. may be
borne—not altogether fairly, see supra note 1—by taxpayers rather than by premium payers as such.
Nevertheless, these authors’ observation of substantially higher prices in the U.S. system strongly
supports our concern about the redistributive effects of U.S.-style health insurance.
194. Vladeck, supra note 36, at 41.
195. See supra notes 36–38 & 47–48 and accompanying text.
196. For data on the significant extent to which U.S. prices for brand-name pharmaceuticals exceed
prices in other OECD nations (except Japan), see Patricia M. Danzon & Michael F. Furukawa, Prices
and Availability of Pharmaceuticals: Evidence from Nine Countries, 2003 HEALTH AFF. (WEB
EXCLUSIVES) W3-521 (also noting that generic drug competition, when patents do not preclude it, is
generally stronger in the U.S. than in other countries). See also supra note 27.
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takes virtually no account of benefit-cost ratios—prevents consumers wanting
health insurance from buying low-cost versions of it. Finally, the legal system’s
propensity to appraise health insurance contracts and their consequences ex
post rather than ex ante effectively precludes consumers from minimizing the
consequences of moral hazard by agreeing in advance to unconventional
restrictions on their freedom to dip into common premium pools. Although
there is no sure basis for estimating the actual gap between the cost and quality
of health care that today’s consumers enjoy and the choices they would make if
a full menu of choices were available,197 the unfairness of limiting their choices
should be apparent from the high proportion of their family incomes that most
consumers must spend if they are to have any health coverage at all.198
Essentially, the median family faces a Hobson’s choice: either to pay a
significant fraction of its total income for standard health coverage199 or take its
chances with the safety net.
Consumption patterns also suggest regressivity in the U.S. system because
lower-income premium payers appear to get less out of their health plans than
do higher-income persons paying the same premiums. Part III presented our
hypothesis that lower-income insureds are systematically subsidizing the health
care of their higher-income coworkers because the latter are in a better position
to meet cost-sharing requirements and otherwise take maximum advantage of
the available coverage. Although our reasons for suspecting that equal nominal
benefits do not equate to equal value for equal outlays are quite plausible,
evidence to establish this particular unfairness remains to be collected.
Confirmation of our suspicions on this point is not necessary, however, to
establish our broad claim that U.S.-style private health insurance has seriously
regressive effects on premium payers below the high end of the income
spectrum.
Most of the defects in U.S. health insurance that produce the consumer
burdens noted here flow both directly and indirectly from the way the nation
subsidizes the purchase of health coverage through the tax system. Unlike most

197. Anderson et al., supra note 13, provide evidence that, even as the United States spends far
more than other nations on health care, the rates at which Americans consume many important health
services are generally no higher than in several other countries. Although these authors suggest that
their data shows that overutilization is not a serious problem in the United States, evidence on national
averages is not helpful in answering the question whether some Americans whose private insurance
enables them to consume more and better than average health care are in fact buying more of it than is
good for them in welfare terms. See supra text accompanying notes 79 & 80.
198. Antitrust law treats so-called tying arrangements as unlawful when used by a seller of a unique
and valuable product to force consumers desiring it to purchase an additional, perhaps unwanted good.
See, e.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2. v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 12 (1984) (deeming a hospital’s
maternity and anesthesia services to be separate products that, if bundled, might be subject to antitrust
law’s prohibition on tying and stating that “the essential characteristic of an invalid tying arrangement
lies in the seller’s exploitation of its control over the tying product to force the buyer into the purchase
of a tied product that the buyer either did not want at all, or might have preferred to purchase
elsewhere on different terms”). Antitrust doctrine thus supports our view that consumers wanting basic
health coverage should not also have to pay for unnecessary bells and costly whistles.
199. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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other commentators on the tax subsidy, we have emphasized how, by fostering
employer purchasing, the subsidy systematically hides the true cost of health
coverage from those who ultimately pay it, thus not only distorting market
choices—there is implausibly little discernible demand for radically low-cost
health coverage200—but also enabling the political system to make regulatory
and other policy with virtually no regard for the costs imposed on consumervoters. The net result is a U.S. marketplace in which consumers are effectively
denied important opportunities to economize in purchasing health care. On the
other hand, if public policy encouraged (and allowed) middle- and lowerincome premium payers to economize in reasonable ways, the great majority of
them would be able to substantially improve their welfare, both by reducing
their support of the larger health care enterprise (through involuntary indirect
payments to providers possessing market power) and by agreeing to reasonable
limits on their own access to costly, marginally valuable care. Not only would
freedom to economize enable ordinary insured consumers to make their
incomes, increasingly lagging behind the affluent classes, go further, but it
would also put the cost of health insurance back within reach of many of the
uninsured. It would also reduce the cost to government of reducing the ranks of
the uninsured still further with new public subsidies.201
B. The Indifference of Elite Interests
We anticipate great difficulty in persuading stakeholders in the American
health care industry to share our concern that the health system is imposing a
huge, unjustified cost burden on ordinary premium payers and payroll-tax
payers.202 Although provider interests regularly profess distress over the plight
of the uninsured, we suspect that many of them are troubled at least as much by
the failure of uninsured Americans to contribute their share of the health care
system’s finances as by their reduced access to care. As to the burden on those
who do pay premiums, the health care industry and its allies usually
acknowledge only that the industry has a duty to act responsibly in incurring

200. Occasional experiments with “barebones” coverage have found few takers for it. See MARK A.
HALL, REFORMING PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE 57 (1994); FAMILIES USA, NO SALE: THE
FAILURE OF BAREBONES INSURANCE (1993). The apparent explanations are several. One of these is
the difficulty that employers would face in offering potentially controversial coverage to workers who
do not see the trade-off with their take-home pay. Second, low-cost options must compete with the
safety net, which, though deficient in many respects, carries no up-front price tag at all. Third,
“barebones” offerings, such as they were, were designed with most of the usual legal and conventional
constraints intact. Thus, even when a state waived some mandates with respect to benefits, the effect
was only to allow some additional categorical exclusions; “medical necessity” continued to govern basic
coverage, and providers, partly because of legal compulsions, continued to practice in their usual costly
ways. See Havighurst, How the Revolution Fell Short, supra note 24, at 71 (“Unless and until a critical
mass of employers offer benefits in forms that invite real economizing at the core of clinical practice,
consumers whose welfare would be enhanced by purchasing revolutionary low-cost coverage will find
no health plans offering it.”).
201. See supra note 75.
202. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
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costs—by practicing only “evidence-based” medicine, for example.203
Otherwise, industry leaders appear to take comfort in the belief that insured
Americans have access to the world’s best health care and to focus their
attention on improving quality204 and reducing racial and class disparities in the
way care is delivered.205 Although such efforts to justify the public’s trust may
be praiseworthy, noblesse oblige is not the answer to the large and regressive
redistribution of wealth wrought by today’s health system.206
Whereas industry stakeholders’ disinterest in distributional concerns is
understandable, it is harder to explain why so few of the industry’s progressive
critics have ever questioned the large amounts of money taken
disproportionately from ordinary working people to support the health care
system.207 To be sure, the high cost of health care in the United States is a
matter of frequent comment and concern, and for-profit enterprises regularly
draw populist fire. But the unfair degree to which high health care costs are
paid unknowingly by lower- and middle-income premium payers is almost
never observed as the specific injustice it is. Instead, progressive complaints
about unfairness in U.S. health care focus almost exclusively on government’s
refusal to spend more on the poor and the uninsured and on socioeconomic
inequalities in health status and treatment patterns. But those who urge
coverage of the uninsured ought to appreciate that many who lack health
coverage are uninsured more or less by choice and that their decisions to go
bare are a direct reflection of the unfair cost burdens against which this article
protests. Similarly, those who support legal and regulatory moves to equalize
entitlements and to narrow treatment disparities should be careful that they,
too, are not simply advancing the health care industry’s interest in spending
ever more money at the expense of working people.
Both industry stakeholders and progressive critics may discount consumers’
cost burdens because they assume that all consumers attach the same high value
to the right to spend freely on costly health care as the elite classes themselves.
But the truest tests of preferences generally come in markets in which people

203. See, e.g., David M. Eddy, Evidence-Based Medicine: A Unified Approach, 24 HEALTH AFF. 9
(2005) (summarizing industry reactions over time to revelations of widespread, unexplained variations
in medical practice and of shortcomings in the way clinical policies are developed and implemented).
The cited article appears in a symposium showing the field’s current efforts and mixed success in
improving medical decisionmaking. Symposium, Putting Evidence into Practice, 24 HEALTH AFF. 7
(2005).
204. See Symposium, The Quality Conundrum, HEALTH AFF., July–Aug. 2002, at 12.
205. See Symposium, supra note 111.
206. Although the various activities reviewed in the cited symposia, supra notes 203–205, illustrate
how the medical profession and health care industry as a whole regularly respond to revelations of
inadequate performance, such efforts to do better, however sincere they may be, are also well
calculated to maintain the profession’s and the industry’s elite status and to head off radical, exogenous
reforms that would introduce real accountability to either government or consumers in the
marketplace.
207. For a recent example of how even thoughtful commentators focus single-mindedly on how
fairly health services are distributed while neglecting to consider where the cost burden falls, see
POWERS & FADEN, supra note 86.
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with limited resources must choose among many desirable things, each with its
own price tag.208 In health care markets today, the sobering reality is that more
and more consumers are revealing a preference far different from the one
imputed to them by elite interests—by dropping health coverage altogether.
Indeed, the force of our observation that U.S. health policy is unfairly designed
and operated by and for elite interests, though powerful in itself, is significantly
amplified by the income-elasticity of consumer demand for health care.209
Precisely because ordinary consumers necessarily attach relatively less value to
the added services and better quality they may enjoy by virtue of good,
egalitarian intentions expressed in legal mandates and industry standards of
practice, a health care system tailored to the values, preferences, and resources
of higher-income consumers does a special disservice to those who would prefer
to spend less. This observation multiplies the significance of everything we
have said in this article about how the divergence of the interests of lowerincome and high-income consumers results in unfairness to the former in both
the marketplace and the political process.
In our view, the cumulative inequity that results from the many discrete
unfairnesses we have observed in this article should be the dominant concern of
health policymakers today, to be addressed either before or in conjunction with
the problems of the uninsured and disadvantaged. Those who dispute this
priority need to say exactly why. We doubt that maintaining egalitarian
appearances alone, however morally satisfying to some, can excuse the
injustices we see.
C. Implications for the Policy Debate
The ability of the U.S. health care system to finance itself by loading everhigher costs on unsuspecting premium payers may finally be reaching its highwater mark. Most of the resistance to paying higher costs will probably not
come, however, from insurers finally acting as consumers’ cost-conscious agents
and refusing to pay health-sector monopolists’ extraordinarily high prices or to
cover every health service that medical experts will not declare medically
unnecessary. Nor will consumers spending their own money with the backing of
health savings accounts be a major force in curbing rising costs. Instead, the
nation may be nearing a point at which continuing to raise health insurance
premiums faster than consumers’ incomes grow will actually generate less, not
more, revenue for the industry because of the rate at which employers or
consumers drop health coverage altogether.210 If this point is finally reached, the
208. To be sure, consumers are generally ill-informed and cognitively challenged, and their
preferences, as expressed in either market or political choices, are often incoherent. See supra note
181. But these circumstances do not automatically qualify elites, with interests of their own as well as
different values, to make choices on their behalf.
209. See supra note 101.
210. See Todd Gilmer & Richard Kronick, It’s the Premiums, Stupid: Projections of the Uninsured
through 2013, 2005 HEALTH AFF. (WEB EXCLUSIVES) W5-143 (predicting very substantial increases in
number of uninsured as cost increases continue to outpace increases in personal income). Once they
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nation would confront a far greater health care “crisis” than any previously
declared, because burgeoning health care budgets could no longer be balanced
on the backs of the working population.211
The day of reckoning in U.S. health policy could be hastened if populist
politicians (liberal or conservative, as the case may be) would tell consumervoters the truth about the extortion-like protection scheme being practiced on
them by the health care system—which essentially forces them to choose
between paying what the system demands and putting their families’ health in
danger. This unpleasant truth has heretofore been kept from consumer-voters
for complex reasons. Certainly, politicians have reason to fear that voters
would react badly if asked to think of health care as an economic good which
they, rather than someone else, must pay for and make choices about.
Nevertheless, once the health care industry and the political system no longer
have the luxury of seeing rising costs passed on to unresisting premium payers,
some members of the political class might begin to see a partisan advantage in
appealing to the large subset of consumer-voters that the system has exploited
so successfully for so long. Indeed, this article’s greatest contribution to the
health policy debate may be to translate arcane, seemingly technical concerns
about moral hazard and the misallocation of resources into more human terms
that stand some chance of arousing the body politic. Allocative inefficiency
naturally provides a poor rallying cry for health reform, to such an extent that
even health economists rarely express concern about it in health policy
discussions;212 instead, one finds mostly articles discussing whether rising costs

become uninsured, of course, patients are much less likely to pay providers’ bills, as the increasing
number of bankruptcies caused by health-care-related liabilities reveals. See supra note 51.
211. See Altman et al., supra note 34 (predicting economic instability for hospitals as demands for
uncompensated care grow and revenue sources dry up). Other articles in the same symposium make
similar predictions. E.g., Dobson et al., supra note 40, at 30 (“This secular trend in combination with
technology-driven health care cost increases has the potential to destabilize the U.S. health care
financing system to the extent that low-wage (if not median-wage) workers will no longer be able to
afford health care coverage.”); Vladeck, supra note 36 (noting potential for a “death spiral”).
212. There are other reasons, to be sure, why economists are slow to assert that resources are being
under- or over-allocated to a particular sector of the economy. For one thing, demand curves, while
useful in theory, are a poor indicator of social welfare in markets for merit goods—which, by definition,
should not be distributed solely on the basis of ability and willingness to pay. See Reinhardt, supra note
154, at 978–90 (noting the questionable social implications of relying exclusively on willingness-to-pay
criteria, which demand curves incorporate, and of employing so-called Kaldor-Hicks cost-benefit
criteria to evaluate welfare effects in health care markets). Another reason why allocative efficiency is
problematic for economists is the so-called “problem of second best.” See generally F.M. SCHERER &
DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 38 (3d ed. 1990)
(“[O]ne might conclude that the whole question of allocative efficiency is so confused and uncertain,
once second-best considerations are introduced, that policy-makers would be well advised to give up
trying to achieve the best possible allocation of resources.”); Havighurst, How the Revolution Fell
Short, supra note 24, at 80–81 (suggesting that, despite its force in weakening confidence that
competition is always allocatively efficient, “second-best theorizing” should magnify, not diminish,
concern that the nation is allocating excessive resources to underpriced health care). Despite the
reasonableness of economists’ hesitancy about relying on economic theory, however, this Article has
shown that health insurance, especially as we know it in the United States, creates a situation with
serious misallocative tendencies. But see supra note 68 (“Whatever its magnitude, inefficiency that is
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are affordable by society, are worth worrying about, or require government
intervention.213 In our view, however, a responsible reform movement might
gain political traction if middle-class consumers were given some sense of how
much they are paying to support a health care industry essentially
unaccountable for its cost-increasing actions.214
Although this article has made our general policy preferences reasonably
clear, it takes no firm position on the particular health policy that should
replace the one we criticize for giving ordinary premium payers a horrendously
bad deal while also serving inadequately those without any insurance
protection. Indeed, we would not object if our observation of the major
burdens imposed on consumers by private health insurance were cited as a
reason to adopt a monolithic national health program, scrapping private health
insurance altogether (except insofar as it might supplement the national
system’s coverage). We hope, however, that populists and progressives
invoking our concerns in such a cause will not simply claim that that marketoriented policies have proved unworkable and that big government is therefore
needed to do the job. We have, after all, stressed that it is not private insurance
as such but “U.S.-style” health insurance and government policy itself that
generate the problems that concern us. Moreover, we have some confidence
that, with altered subsidies and incentives for consumers, some deregulation of
insurers and providers, substantial redesign of insurance products, and some
tweaking at a few other points, the market would soon evolve so as generally to
give consumers, in actuarial terms, both no more and no less than they choose,
with limited public subsidies, to pay for. All we ask here, however, is a fair
hearing for proposals to let consumers, with as much financial and other help as
public institutions and private agents can give them, choose more or less freely
the style of health care they want to purchase for their families.
Of course, no public policy (and no market) can be perfect, and much might
be said against as well as in favor of our preferred strategy.215 We are not overly
already embedded in the economy is simply never going to be viewed as a problem by the political
class.”).
213. E.g., Michael E. Chernew, Increased Spending on Health Care: How Much Can the United
States Afford?, HEALTH AFF., July–Aug. 2003, at 15; Henry J. Aaron, Should Public Policy Seek to
Control the Growth of Health Care Spending?, 2003 HEALTH AFF. (WEB EXCLUSIVES) W3-28; Mark
V. Pauly, Should We Be Worried About High Real Medical Spending Growth in the United States?, 2003
HEALTH AFF. (WEB EXCLUSIVES) W3-15. The Pauly article, however, does address concerns similar
to ours. See also Pauly, supra note 24. On the importance of focusing on marginal, rather than the
more politically potent aggregate, benefits of health care spending in appraising allocative efficiency,
see supra note 68.
214. For reasons why any such hope may be unrealistic, see David A. Hyman, Getting the Haves to
Come out Behind: Fixing the Distributive Injustices of American Health Care, 69 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 265, 273–82 (Autumn 2006).
215. Some health economists, for example, like to emphasize the limitations of both economic
theory and markets in general and to criticize advocates of market-oriented policies for having
simplistic, theory-driven views. E.g., THOMAS RICE, THE ECONOMICS OF HEALTH RECONSIDERED
(2d ed. 2003); Reinhardt, supra note 154. Yet to argue, as so many non-economists also do, that
markets should not be trusted simply because they do not satisfy the rigorous conditions necessary to
achieve Pareto optimality is also to use the unrealistic textbook model as the benchmark for a policy
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concerned, however, as so many purport to be, that consumers might have to
make market choices in some ignorance, both of their future health needs and
of health plans’ or providers’ characteristics. It would be seriously destructive
of insurance markets, after all, if consumers knew too well what their future
health needs would be; indeed, the risk of adverse selection makes it actually
preferable that they purchase behind a veil of ignorance about such matters and
not be free to upgrade their coverage when a serious need arises. As for other
informational difficulties that consumers face, we anticipate that they could be
significantly ameliorated by limited regulation defining new contract terms, by
comparative information available from private and public sources, and by
consumers’ continued reliance on purchasing agents (including employers in
purchasing health plans and health plans in purchasing services). The potential
benefits of a policy based on the principles of managed competition216 seem to us
to be great and uncontroversial enough that responsible policymakers of
different ideological persuasions should be able to find common ground on
which to build bipartisan reform.217 Although highly threatening to special
interests, such a policy would not be radical in itself but would instead, we
think, be entirely in keeping with American values.
It is highly possible, of course, that influential members of the body politic
will never be permanently comfortable in the presence of explicit, incomecorrelated disparities in insured individuals’ legal entitlements to medical
care—even if those inequalities result from reasonable choices by consumers,
spending not just their own limited resources but also whatever earmarked
subsidies democratic legislatures choose to provide. For some observers
(apparently), the symbolic significance of any such disparities will always trump
efficiency and welfare concerns, overriding respect not only for private choices

prescription. In fact, real-world markets do many things quite well despite their limitations, particularly
in comparison with real-world government. Moreover, government can improve the market’s
performance by such measures as providing information, strictly policing fraud, and enforcing private
contracts and the antitrust laws. Ideally, health policy debates should focus on such practical, rather
than ideological, considerations. See supra note 181.
216. This model, which features menus of health-plan options maintained and explained to
consumers by employers or other “sponsors,” has been described most helpfully by its principal
architect, Alain Enthoven. See generally ALAIN C. ENTHOVEN, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
MANAGED COMPETITION IN HEALTH CARE FINANCE (1988) (outlining the structure of a system of
managed competition based on the principle that “cost-conscious consumer choice is necessary to
create incentives for people to develop and demonstrate less costly alternative ways of organizing
medical care of acceptable quality”); Alain C. Enthoven & Richard Kronick, A Consumer-Choice
Health Plan for the 1990s: Universal Health Insurance in a System Designed to Promote Quality and
Economy, 320 NEW ENG. J. MED. pt. 1, at 29 & pt. 2, at 94 (1989).
217. See supra note 131, recalling the Clinton administration’s proposed Health Security Act, which
was based, ostensibly at least, on the managed-competition model and might have had a better chance
of enactment had it been truer to that model. An easy way to ensure near-universal participation might
be to offer a substantial, refundable tax credit to those who could demonstrate that they (or their
employer) had spent at least that much on acceptable health coverage; then, anyone going uninsured
would, by forgoing the tax credit, be effectively financing his share of the safety net (perhaps a residual
public financing program) rather than free-riding on the health system’s charitable impulses and
capacity.

02__HAVIGHURST_RICHMAN.DOC

Autumn 2006]

3/7/2007 3:53 PM

DISTRIBUTIVE INJUSTICE(S) IN AMERICAN HEALTH CARE

81

but also for government’s legitimately established budgetary priorities.218 Faced
with such inequalities, legislators wanting popular credit for good intentions
may continue to enact quality- and access-enhancing measures for which
consumers, mostly, must pay, and the legal system may too often be tempted to
discover and vindicate individual rights without concern for costs or due
recognition of the legitimacy of other decisionmaking mechanisms, private or
public. If such cost-increasing, destabilizing forces seem too likely to frustrate a
sound market-based reform strategy, it may be necessary to embrace a secondbest alternative,219 perhaps a government-defined, government-financed basic
entitlement with consumers able to supplement that coverage as they see fit. In
any event, we hope that our observation of the serious unfairness of the
burdens that the current system imposes on the majority of consumer-voters
will help both to inflame and to enlighten a political debate leading to a more
responsible national health policy—whatever that policy may turn out to be.
The crucial thing is to find a fairer way to distribute the costs of health care.220
Other nations, it seems, have more or less arranged their health care systems so
that those who want more or better care than is deemed suitable for the median
citizen must pay more for it. The United States, on the other hand, has
structured things so that lower- and middle-income premium payers bear heavy
burdens so that elite interests can continue to provide or enjoy, as the case may
be, the style of health care that best satisfies their needs. This is the situation
that needs to be corrected.
218. Perhaps what we have witnessed in the last thirty years, and what is in store for the indefinite
future, is a continuous playing out of the cycle that Guido Calabresi and Philip Bobbitt observed some
years ago in public policies affecting so-called “tragic choices.” See GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP
BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES (1978). Their insight was that there are some situations (tragic choices) in
which, even though economic efficiency may clearly dictate that unlucky individuals should bear some
serious hardships rather than having them prevented or alleviated by public action, our political and
legal institutions cannot, and will not, indefinitely accept such apparently avoidable tragedies. Instead,
they predicted, public policy in such cases is destined to evolve endlessly in cycles, emphasizing at each
stage some value—efficiency, compassion, fairness, or openness, for example—that previous policy had
neglected. Under the Calabresi–Bobbitt hypothesis, it may be that seriously consequential choices
about health care can never be permanently removed from the public agenda and placed finally (even
with public subsidies) in private hands. On the other hand, there are other factors, including the tax
subsidy, special-interest politics, and the peculiar division of policymaking responsibilities among
federal and state legislatures and courts, that may account for the nation’s failure, over many years, to
put a coherent health policy permanently in place. Our hope is that this long-standing gridlock can be
broken by publicizing the serious unfairnesses of the present system.
219. For the observation that a system based on private financing may not justify its high
administrative and other costs unless it enables consumers to make consequential, welfare-enhancing
choices, see Havighurst, supra note 12. Because the costs of a private system include those associated
with legal and political uncertainties, it may be simply impossible for the American polity to adopt
successfully and for all time the policy that strikes us not only as the ideal one but also as the one best
suited for the diverse American people.
220. Given our emphasis on distributional issues, it is relevant to ask how a new public financing
program, whatever its form, would be financed. The options include increasing progressive rates under
the income tax, a flat tax on payrolls or total income, and a consumption tax. Although any of these
would be fairer than the methods by which the health care industry currently finances the production of
many public goods, a recent proposal by Victor Fuchs and Ezekial Emanuel sounds especially fair to us.
Ezekial J. Emanuel & Victor R. Fuchs, Health Care Vouchers—A Proposal for Universal Coverage, 352
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1255 (2005) (suggesting value-added tax as revenue source).
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Finally, we acknowledge that some of our observations of unfairness in U.S.
health care, although seemingly well grounded in theory and observation, lack
as much empirical confirmation as responsible observers might like to see.
Although we doubt that further research could significantly weaken the case we
have made against the current system’s unjust impositions on premium-paying
American workers, we conclude by inviting health services researchers to
pursue the extensive agenda for new investigations that this article provides.

